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Introduction1 
 
What does it mean to do “justice” in times of transition? Justice for what, justice for 
whom, and to what ends?2 Attempts to answer these and other related questions have 
often aroused debate, from antiquity,3 to the so-called “third wave” of democratic 
transitions in the 1980s and 90s, up through the present day.4 They are profoundly 
political, ideological, ethical, philosophical, religious, and, yes, legal questions. Over the 
last thirty years, these questions have become increasingly associated with the field of 
transitional justice, an area of policy, practice, and study that has become the “globally 
dominant lens”5 through which we grapple with legacies of violence and mass atrocity. 
Since the initial explosion of transitional justice practice in the 1980s, the programs and 
institutions associated with it have in some respects moved from the exception to the 
norm,6 embraced by the United Nations (UN) and major international donors alike. Yet 
the fundamental questions of justice evoked above have not always become easier with 
the passage of time. If these controversies persist, it is at least in part because “justice” 
remains an elusive and essentially contested concept often deeply rooted in context-
specific history and culture.7  
Transitional justice is often defined in part by reference to a set of practices—
including prosecutions, truth-seeking, vetting and dismissals, reparations, and 
institutional reform—now associated with responses to widespread human rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Unlike the other chapters in this articles-based dissertation, this introductory chapter is 
unpublished. As a summary and synthetic chapter, it borrows heavily from concepts and 
language from other chapters throughout this dissertation, together with two other works I have 
published that are not formally included in this dissertation project: Dustin Sharp, “From 
Foreground to Periphery: Where Does Policy Go from Here?,” in Justice and Economic Violence 
in Transition, ed. Dustin Sharp (New York: Springer, 2014). (2014); Dustin Sharp, “Interrogating 
the Peripheries; The Preoccupations of Fourth Generation Transitional Justice,” Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 26 (2013): 149-78. 
2 See Rosemary Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical Reflections,” Third World 
Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2008): 276. 
3 See generally Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) (reviewing historic practices now associated with 
the modern field of transitional justice). 
4 The “third wave” refers to a period of global democratization beginning in the mid-1970s that 
touched more than sixty countries in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. See generally 
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
5 Paul Gready and Simon Robins, “From Transition to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for 
Practice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice (2014) (Advance Access). 
6 One can now point to over 40 truth commissions around the world (and many times more 
human rights prosecutions) carried out both nationally and internationally, as evidence of a global 
“justice cascade.” See Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions 
Are Changing World Politics (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2011) 
7 Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2009): 27. 
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violations.8 However, viewing transitional justice as an apolitical “toolbox,” or simple set 
of “best practices,” a notion implicit in UN and other definitions, would be a mistake as it 
fails to account for the important historical, cultural, and ideological underpinnings of the 
field.9  
When it first took the global stage in the 1980s and 1990s, transitional justice 
was largely thought of as a vehicle for helping to deliver important liberal goods in post-
conflict and post-authoritarian societies, including political/procedural democracy, 
constitutionalism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. If it was hoped that 
transitional justice could help to strengthen transitions to Western liberal democracy, its 
practices were also seen by some as bound up with a legal imperative to provide an 
effective remedy for a somewhat narrow (if not egregious) band of international human 
rights and international humanitarian law violations.10 The conceptualization of the field 
as an expression of these twin normative aims and its subsequent global dissemination 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 According to a famous UN definition, “[transitional justice comprises] the full range of processes 
and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-
scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. 
These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international 
involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional 
reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.” See United Nations Secretary General, 
“The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Post-conflict Societies,” UN Doc. S/2004/616 
(August 23, 2004), ¶ 8. 
9 See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Editorial Note: From the Neocolonial “Transition” to 
Indigenous Formations of Justice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 7, no. 2 (2013): 
197. 
10 All violations of international human rights law entail legal consequences, including the right to 
redress and compensation—a fact that has without doubt given impetus to the field of transitional 
justice. Theo van Boven has noted that the “United Nations Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy” were developed in the shadow of expanding transitional justice practice. See 
Theo van Boven, “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law,” Introductory Note, December 16, 2005, http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_60-
147/ga_60-147.html. Today, the “normative framework supporting transitional justice [includes] 
the right to justice, truth and guarantees of non-recurrence.” See United Nations Secretary 
General, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies,” UN Doc. 
S/2011/634 (October 12, 2011), ¶ 8. Yet it is also true that the bulk of international institutional 
capital has been invested in examining and articulating remedies for “gross” violations, a category 
heavily associated with genocide, torture, crimes against humanity, disappearances and other 
extremely serious violations of physical integrity, and civil and political rights more generally. See 
van Boven, Introductory Note, 2-3. Many early transitional justice scholars had these sorts of 
violations in mind when they analyzed the intersection between international legal duties and 
transitional justice policy, particularly as regards to duty to prosecute. See generally Diane 
Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 
Regime,” Yale Law Journal 100, no. 8 (1991): 2537. As I discuss in Part II of this dissertation, the 
narrow legalism and focus of transitional justice on physical integrity and civil and political rights 
violations is increasingly questioned, and the conceptualization of rights violations as either 
“gross” or “simple,” must itself be interrogated as a potential political and ideological construct.   
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can thus be linked to the broader globalization of international human rights and Western 
governance ideals, especially those civil and political rights norms strongly associated 
with liberalism and neoliberalism.11  
Some three decades after the Latin American and Eastern European democratic 
transitions associated with the field’s naissance, the idea of transitional justice as 
handmaiden to liberal political transitions—the “paradigmatic transition” of transitional 
justice—remains a deeply embedded narrative that has helped to shape dominant 
practices and conceptual boundaries up through the present day.12 Together with post-
conflict peacebuilding, transitional justice has, since the end of the Cold War, been an 
important feature of liberal post-conflict governance, a means by which Western liberal 
values are pushed from core to periphery.13  
Examined closely, therefore, the core narratives of the field contain something of 
a contradiction. Transitional justice is at times imagined as a post-political and post-
ideological enterprise, part of “the end of history,”14 and yet is also heavily associated 
with liberal democratic political transitions and has been dominated by largely Western 
conceptions and modalities of justice. Thus, even a brief tour d’horizon of the history of 
the field reveals that transitional justice theory and practice have typically failed to reflect 
the complex depth and pluralism of the many varied notions of justice across the globe.15 
 
A. This Dissertation Project and the Trajectory of the Field 
 
As transitional justice has become institutionalized and mainstreamed,16 there has been 
an increasing willingness to interrogate some of the boundaries, blindspots, frictions, and 
contradictions of the field.17 Even as the field has been pushed to the nerve centers of 
international policymaking, other voices push outward, questioning dominant liberal 
scripts, templates, and toolboxes. This dissertation project, therefore, comes at a time 
normative ferment within the field, a time when foundational paradigms and assumptions 
are increasingly questioned: Should we continue to think of transitional justice along 
narrowly liberal lines, tasked with facilitating transitions to liberal (market) democracy? 
Should transitional justice apply to situations involving non-liberal transitions or to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Gready and Robins, “From Transition to Transformative Justice,” 3.  
12 See generally Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History 
of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009). 
13 Philip Cunliffe, “Still the Spectre at the Feast: Comparisons between Peacekeeping and 
Imperialism in Peacekeeping Studies Today,” International Peacekeeping 19, no. 4 (2012): 428.  
14 See generally Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon 
Books, 1992). 
15 Gready and Robins, “From Transition to Transformative Justice,” 3. 
16 See Kieran McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional 
Justice,” Journal of Law and Society 34, no. 4 (2007): 412 (observing that “[t]ransitional justice 
has emerged from its historically exceptionalist origins to become something which is normal, 
institutionalized and mainstreamed”). This is perhaps best exemplified in high-level reports by the 
UN Secretary General. See, e.g., United Nations Secretary General, “The Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies.”  
17 Dustin Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries.”  
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already consolidated liberal democracies for that matter? Would a transition to “peace” 
look different than a transition to “democracy”? What is the utility of using the “transitions” 
lens altogether?  
This dissertation project does not claim to provide any simple answers to such 
immense questions, but can be situated as part of the ongoing process of contestation 
surrounding them. As elaborated in greater detail below, it seeks more specifically to 
contribute to the literature in its interrogation of some of the field’s historic blindspots and 
peripheries as a prelude grappling with its central research question: might a 
(re)conceptualization of the field of transitional justice around frames of peace and 
peacebuilding help to address longstanding critiques and limitations of the field and, at 
the same time, serve as useful tool for re-orienting theory and practice in ways more 
reflective of a genuinely pluralistic and global project? Whatever the answer to this 
question, one can hope that the centripetal and centrifugal forces currently influencing 
the field will be a source of creative energy and tension in the years to come, moving 
transitional justice practice and policy into new and at times uncharted waters in an 




B. Research Gap and Methodology  
 
Though efforts are increasing to close the gaps, transitional justice as a field has 
been both under-empiricized and under-theorized.19 The great bulk of transitional justice 
literature is normative, tending to describe, critique, or compare individual country 
experiences or transitional justice mechanisms across several countries. Transitional 
justice policies are often critiqued or asserted because of what is considered to be 
normatively good or unacceptable, yet the articulation of more robust theoretical 
constructs and paradigms that might help to provide deeper context and substance to 
these specific critiques has been largely lacking.20 Thus, for example, it is often taken for 
granted that transitional justice practice somehow helps to build democracy, increases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid.  
19 For an example of efforts on the theoretical front, see, e.g., Susanne Buckley-Zistel et al, eds., 
Transitional Justice Theories (New York: Routledge, 2014). For efforts on the empirical front, see, 
e.g., Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne, Andrew Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing 
Processes, Weighing Efficiency (Washington: USIP, 2010); Oskar Thoms et al., “State-Level 
Effects of Transitional Justice: What Do We Know?,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 
4, no. 3 (2010): 332; Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, and Audrey Chapman, eds., 
Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice (Washington:  USIP, 2009); Phuong Pham and 
Patrick Vinck, “Empirical Research and the Development and Assessment of Transitional Justice 
Mechanisms,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 1, no. 2 (2007): 231. 
20 Perhaps it is not so surprising then that Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s 2003 assertion the 
so-called dilemmas of transitional justice are no different—theoretically or empirically—from the 
dilemmas of domestic (non-transitional) justice has gone largely unanswered. See generally 
“Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice,” Harvard Law Review 117, no. 3 (2003): 761. 
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accountability, and contributes to the rule of law.21 Yet these often appear to reflect more 
sloganeering than depth or rigor. What, for example, is the theory by which transitional 
justice produces reconciliation, accountability, etc? What empirical evidence is there 
than any of these magic-making claims are justified? 
In general, a critical theory of transitional justice has also been largely lacking 
and transitional justice has mostly been assumed to be a non-ideological “good” for post-
conflict societies.22 This is not to say that there have not been many specific critiques of 
transitional justice mechanisms and experiences. Indeed, the literature is replete with 
arguments that transitional justice is “top-down,” that it has failed to be inclusive or 
participatory, that a particular transitional justice initiative was a failure due to poor 
implementation, etc. However, efforts to link these specific critiques of transitional justice 
practice with the deeper undercurrents of transitional justice ideology and assumptions—
exploring the ways in which transitional justice practice might even legitimate or 
obfuscate forms of injustice while legitimating other political and ideological purposes—
have not been as numerous. If transitional justice is often “good,” might it also 
occasionally be “part of the problem”?23 The latter question has not received as much 
attention in the literature as it deserves. 
This dissertation project has no ambition to contribute to the empirical gap in the 
transitional justice literature. Rather, it seeks to make a particular contribution to the 
critical theory gap in the literature by examining the birth and trajectory of transitional 
justice through a lens largely resonant with the “critical legal studies” movement of the 
late twentieth century; 24 I apply that same lens in examining the intersection of 
transitional justice and peacebuilding. My approach also has parallels with the so-called 
“Third World Approaches to International Law” (TWAIL) scholarship.25 Taken together, 
this critical theory methodology attempts to do for transitional justice what scholars such 
as Duncan Kennedy and others once did for domestic private law:  to bring to the 
surface the politics and ideological assumptions of regimes and practices that are often 
presented as technocratic, apolitical, and non-ideological, and to examine the implicit 
tradeoffs and distributional consequences that often go undiscussed.26 In this sense, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For a critique of similarly simplistic assumptions in the context of truth commissions, see 
generally David Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb 
the Enthusiasm?,” International Studies Review 6, no. 3 (2004): 356. 
22 Thomas Obel Hansen, “Transitional Justice: Toward a Differentiated Theory,” Oregon Review 
of International Law 13 (2011): 17; see also Siphiwe Ignatius Dube, “Transitional Justice Beyond 
the Normative: Towards a Literary Theory of Political Transitions,” International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 5, no. 2 (2011): 181.  
23 See, e.g., David Kennedy, “The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?,” 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 (2002): 101. 
24 In this regard, I find myself indebted to the work of Duncan Kennedy, David Kennedy, Martii 
Koskenniemi, Morton Horwitz, Roberto Unger, and many others.  
25 In this regard, I find myself indebted to the work of Upendra Baxi, Anthony Anghie, 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Makau Wa Mutua, Obiora Vhinedu Okafor, Vasuki Nesiah, and many 
others.  
26 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,” Harvard Law 
Review 89 (1976): 1685.  
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falls in the tradition of scholars of public international law such as David Kennedy, 
Makau Mutua, and others.27 
Another major gap in the transitional justice literature is an examination and 
critique of the relationship between transitional justice and liberal peacebuilding more 
generally. For the most part, transitional justice has been dominated by lawyers engaged 
more in constructs of accountability and the rule of law than peace or peacebuilding. To 
the extent that it is engaged with at all, peace has often been treated rather simplistically, 
an uncontested and non-ideological construct. Yet even outside of the legal literature, 
there has been relatively little formal connection between transitional justice initiatives 
and the staples of post-conflict peacebuilding programming, either in theory or practice.28 
This is a bit surprising given the shared temporal origins and ideological assumptions of 
both transitional justice and liberal peacebuilding. In recent years, a small but growing 
literature looking at potential linkages between peacebuilding and transitional justice 
generally,29 and in particular with respect to specific initiatives like Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), has started 
to emerge.30 However, much of this literature adopts more of a “problem-solving” or 
policy-based lens than a critical-theory lens.  
Thus, this dissertation project adds value to this small but emerging literature by 
bringing a critical theory approach to questions, both practical and conceptual, regarding 
the emerging nexus between transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding. The 
over-arching goal of this methodology is to question the assumptions undergirding 
transitional justice and liberal peacebuilding that liberal democracy and capitalism—as 
they have been narrowly and simplistically understood—are somehow a unique pathway 
to grappling with legacies of violent conflict. In doing so, it builds on the work of scholars 
working within the critical studies vein of peacebuilding scholarship, including Timothy 
Donais, Roger Mac Ginty, Edward Newman, Roland Paris, Oliver Richmond, and 
others.31 This is one of the first works to bring these two related threads (transitional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See, e.g., David Kennedy, “The ‘Rule of Law,’ Political Choices and Development of Common 
Sense,” in The New Law and Economic Development, eds. David M. Trubek, and Alvaro Santos 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Makau Wa Mutua, “The Ideology of Human 
Rights,” Virginia Journal of International Law 36 (1996): 589.  
28 See Paul van Zyl, “Promoting Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies,” in Security 
Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, eds., Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggis, (Geneva: 
DCAF, 2005). 
29 See, e.g., Chandra Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega, Johanna Herman, “Evaluating and Comparing 
Strategies of Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice,” JAD-PbP Working Paper Series No 1. (May 
2009), 13 (discussing increasing linkages between transitional justice and a broader set of 
peacebuilding activities). 
30 See, e.g., Alan Bryden, Timothy, and Heiner Hänggi, Shaping a Security-Governance Agenda 
in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (Geneva: DCAF, 2005). 
31 See, e.g., Timothy Donais, “Haiti and the Dilemmas of Local Ownership,” International Journal 
64 (2008-2009): 759; Roger Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local 
Resistance. Rethinking Peace and Conflict (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011); Oliver 
Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005); Edward 
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justice and peacebuilding) of critical theory together, though the work of Chandra Lekha 
Sriram is an important exception to which I am indebted.32  
As with most pieces of critical theory and perhaps critical legal studies in particular, 
this dissertation project does not seek to provide any kind of definitive answer to the 
many conundrums that are posed, though I do offer several pragmatic policy proposals 
throughout the various chapters. The chief hope, rather, is to stimulate new thinking by 
attempting to deconstruct aspects of the transitional justice and peacebuilding 
enterprises, and thereby strip them of their sense of naturalness and inevitably—to 
reassert what to some may be obvious and others less so:  that like everything else they 
inhabit the domain of politics and ideology. To remain honest, and hopefully more 
productive, future debates need to move forward with a cognizance of that fact in mind.  
 
 
C. Chapter Overviews and Central Arguments 
 
This articles-based dissertation project consists of five recently published journal 
articles and book chapters that explore the increasingly contested nature of the 
dominant narratives and assumptions at the heart of the transitional justice and the 
frictions and contradictions generated by transitional justice as a form of liberal post-
conflict governance. A central argument uniting these chapters—a “red thread” if you 
will—is that while the liberal ideological narratives undergirding and shaping the field 
have had many positive dimensions, they have also served to limit and constrain the 
transitional justice enterprise, by (a) heavily shaping the modalities of transitional justice 
(approaches that are generally state-centered, top-down, privileging the global over the 
local) and (b) serving to limit our sense of what the “justice” of transitional justice should 
reasonably include (generally addressing civil and political rights rather than economic 
and social rights, physical violence rather than questions of economic or structural 
violence). As an ideological enterprise with a deeply liberal and Western cultural 
fingerprint, I argue that this may ultimately hinder the emergence of a more pluralistic 
global project reflective of the diversity of humanity and its many peace and justice 
traditions.  
 
i. Parts I and II 
 
Parts I and II (which include Chapters I-III) of the dissertation are therefore 
dedicated to an exploration of the ways in which the dominant liberal lens of transitional 
justice has shaped our sense of what it means to do justice in times of transition. In Part 
I, I explore the frictions and contractions generated by the interface point between a 
largely liberal internationalist transitional justice enterprise and dimensions of “the local” 
(local ownership, local values, local practices, etc). I argue that the dominance of law, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond, eds., New Perspectives on Liberal 
Peacebuilding (New York: United Nations University, 2009). 
32 See, e.g., Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of 
Transitional Justice,” Global Society 21, no. 4 (2007): 580. 
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legalism, liberalism and western conceptions of justice associated with the field has 
resulted in rather clumsy and at times tense engagement with questions of non-
conventional (i.e., non-Western) justice. In the contemporary academic and policy 
literature, the importance of giving primacy to the local is repeatedly asserted as a sort of 
mantra.33 Yet ultimately most transitional justice interventions and debates reflect a 
profound ambivalence and distrust of the local reflecting a clash of normative 
commitments: between liberal internationalism and international human rights on the one 
hand, and principles of local sovereignty and autonomy on the other. Rather than simply 
assert that giving greater weight to the local in questions of post-conflict justice is both 
important and hard (a persistent trope in most of the policy literature),34 this Part seeks 
to analyze and deconstruct the concept of the local in the transitional justice context, 
exploring its promises and pitfalls. In particular, I argue that understanding global-local 
dilemmas requires one to unpack the concept of local ownership, distinguishing 
concerns about actual control (agency, decision making, funding), process (bottom-up, 
participatory, homegrown), and substance (values, practices, priorities), even if those 
concerns are in practice highly related. Deconstruction of the concept of the local, in turn, 
tends to destabilize, breaking down simple binary notions of global and local. Going 
forward, I argue, achieving a better global-local balance along the multiple dimensions of 
local ownership may help to generate new and innovative approaches that take us 
beyond the transitional justice “toolbox.” Ultimately, I suggest that while the local is as 
problematic as it is promising, making transitional justice more of a true global project 
will likely require an unconformable degree of legal pluralism for many Western human 
rights lawyers and a large margin of appreciation, even if that pluralism is still probably 
best managed within the values of a loosely liberal system.  
In Part II (which includes Chapters II and III), I turn to explore the ways in which 
the liberal frames at the heart of the field of transitional justice have served to limit our 
sense of what the “justice” of transitional justice should cover. I argue that while there is 
increasing momentum behind the notion that the tools of transitional justice should be 
marshaled in response to large-scale human rights atrocities and physical violence—
including murder, rape, torture, disappearances, and other crimes against humanity—the 
proper role of transitional justice with respect to economic violence—including violations 
of economic and social rights, corruption, and plunder of natural resources—is far less 
certain. Historically, if mass atrocities and physical violence have been placed in the 
transitional justice spotlight, issues of equally devastating economic and social justice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General on Peacebuilding in the 
Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, UN Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304 (June 11, 2009), ¶ 7 (Observing 
that “[t]he imperative of national ownership is a central theme of the present report.”); U.N. 
Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies, ¶¶ 16-17 (arguing that the UN must “learn better how to respect and support local 
ownership, local leadership and a local constituency for reform.”); Simon Chesterman, “Walking 
Softly in Afghanistan: The Future of UN Statebuilding,” Survival 44 (2002): 41 (noting that “[e]very 
UN mission and development program now stresses the importance of local ‘ownership.’”).  
34 Benjamin de Carvalho and Niels Nagelhus Schia, Local and National Ownership in Post-
Conflict Liberia: Foreign and Domestic Inside Out?, NUPI Working paper 787 (Oslo: NUPI, 2011). 
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have received little attention.35 The marginalization of the economic within the 
transitional justice agenda serves to distort our understanding of conflict, and the policies 
thought to be necessary in the wake of conflict.  
In Chapter II I argue that a more nuanced, contextualized, and balanced 
approach to a wider range of justice issues faced by societies in transition is necessary.  
To this end, I proposes that one way to achieve a more balanced approach would be to 
re-conceptualize and reorient the “transition” of transitional justice not simply as a 
transition to democracy and the “rule of law,” the paradigm under which the field 
originated, but as part of a broader transition to “positive peace” in which justice for both 
physical violence and economic violence receive equal pride of place.36 The utility of 
frames of peace and peacebuilding in reshaping transitional justice narratives is a theme 
I return to in greater depth in Part III.  
A paradigm shift in the direction of positive peace would not dictate a particular 
approach to economic violence in transition, or even ensure that economic violence 
would be addressed at all. As with all transitional justice mechanisms and modalities, the 
needs and limits of the context would have to be considered. Depending on the context, 
addressing economic violence might not always be necessary, or even desirable. In 
other contexts, addressing legacies of economic violence may appear to key 
constituencies as having more relevance than other more traditional transitional justice 
concerns.37 The key point, however, is that whatever is to be the dividing line between 
what is included or not included within transitional justice mandates, it should not be 
drawn upon lines of civil and political and economic and social rights. Besides being 
simplistic and unnecessary, to do so where economic violence has been intimately 
associated with the logic of a conflict or the abuses suffered would be to stymie the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 This is of course beginning to change, and in recent years there has been increased attention 
in the academic and policy literature to questions of economic justice in transition. See, e.g., 
Louise Arbour, “Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition,” New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 40, no. 1 (2007): 1; The entire volume of International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (2008); Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie, eds., Transitional 
Justice and Development: Making Connections (New York:  ICTJ, 2009); Dustin Sharp, ed. 
Justice and Economic Violence in Transition (New York: Springer, 2014). For a thoughtful but 
skeptical take on calls to broaden the mandates of transitional justice institutions, see Lars 
Waldorf, “Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs,” Social and 
Legal Studies 21 (2012): 171-86. 
36 The term “negative peace” refers to the absence of direct violence. It stands in contrast with the 
broader concept of “positive peace,” which includes the absence of both direct and indirect 
violence, including various forms of “structural violence” such as poverty, hunger, and other forms 
of social injustice. See generally Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Peace 
Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167. 
37 Consider in this regard the example of Kenya where it has been argued that economic issues 
actually have a longer pedigree and are more central to most victimization accounts than civil and 
political rights, which “were late entrants to the Kenyan debate.” Godfrey Musila, “Options for 
Transitional Justice in Kenya: Autonomy and the Challenge of External Prescriptions,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 3 (2009): 460. 
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ability of transitional justice institutions to lay at least some of the groundwork for long-
term positive peace.  
In Chapters II and III, I also explore the possibilities and practicalities of 
integrating questions of economic violence into transitional justice practice. Chapter III 
looks specifically at those few truth commissions that have addressed questions of 
economic violence and attempts to draw lessons for future work, one of the only 
academic articles to have done so. In particular, I argue that one way of opening the field 
to questions of economic violence while at the same time addressing the very real 
possibility for overbreadth and dilution of efforts would be to focus on an “economic 
violence-human rights nexus,” which would involve looking primarily at those aspects of 
economic violence that most directly and egregiously impact economic and social rights 
recognized under national and international law. In this, I am very much attempting to 
strike a middle ground between those who would push transitional justice in the direction 
of almost boundless “transformative” approach, and those who advocate that transitional 
justice continue to hew to its narrower roots.  
In sum, the liberal ideological impulses undergirding mainstream transitional 
justice practice have over time tended push certain questions and themes into the 
spotlight, while marginalizing and largely rendering other matters invisible: 
 
Set in the Foreground Set in the Background38 
the global, the Western 
the modern, the secular 
the legal 
civil and political rights  
physical violence 
the state, the individual 
formal, institutional, “top-down” change 
the local, the non-Western “other” 
the religious, the traditional 
the political 
economic and social rights 
economic and structural violence 
the community, the group 
informal, cultural, social, “bottom-up” change 
 
The intent animating Parts I and II of this dissertation project is to bring some of the 
ideological assumptions and blindspots of the field to the surface—to bring some of the 
historic periphery into the foreground—so that they can be better engaged as part of a 
process for remaking the field going forward.  
To be clear, the central “problem” being analyzed is not that human rights, the 
rule of law, good governance, democracy or other key liberal goods are themselves 
undesirable or unworthy goals of the transitional justice enterprise. To contest some of 
the liberal ideological assumptions of transitional justice is not therefore to jettison 
liberalism itself. Many aspects of the ideology are invaluable and, indeed, many of the 
critiques found throughout this dissertation project are based on decidedly liberal 
principles.39 Thus, there are certainly readings of the liberal tradition that would give 
greater weight to local autonomy, participation, and decision making and which would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Chart adapted from, Dustin Sharp, “Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition,” 15. 
39 See Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies 2 (2010): 
354.  
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reflect greater contextual openness and adaptability (themes I take up in Part I). And 
there are also strands of the liberal tradition that would pay greater attention to everyday 
needs, economic and social rights, and questions of distributive justice (themes I explore 
in Part II). Much of the critique leveled here therefore stems from the reductionism, 
chauvinism, and arrogance of a particularly narrow liberal form of transitional justice (and 
liberal peacebuilding for that matter, which I address below) that tends to privilege 
certain forms of expertise and knowledge, promotes reductionist “justice” over broader 
forms of justice irrespective of context, has too often been associated with exogenous 
imposition, and which tends not to question its own assumptions and checkered history.  
 
ii. Part III 
 
In view of some of the aforementioned blindspots and limitations that have 
characterized the field, and at a time when some have begun to ask the question “does 
transitional justice have a future,” 40 now is the time, I argue, to consider alternative 
narratives and paradigms. Thus, having probed some of the central blindspots of 
transitional justice as a form of liberal post-conflict governance associated with the 
globalization of human rights and market democracy in Parts I and II, I then turn in Part 
III to greater focus on the question of possible alternative paradigms or groundings for 
the field, and specifically to the interface between transitional justice and post-conflict 
peacebuilding.  
The departure point for this inquiry is an observation that the central narrative of 
transitional justice is beginning to change. While the idea of transitional justice as 
handmaiden to liberal political transitions remains a deeply embedded narrative, in 
recent years, it has become increasingly intertwined with a view of transitional justice as 
a component of post-conflict peacebuilding more generally, including in societies not 
undergoing a paradigmatic liberal transition.41 In some respects, this is a striking 
development insofar as, historically, transitional justice has at times been seen as being 
in competition with the demands of peace, and not as a potentially important component 
of peacebuilding itself. We can then ask whether “transitional justice as peacebuilding” 
as an alternative frame to “transitional justice as liberal democracy building” might 
provide a fruitful alternative to explore at the level of policy, practice, and study. How 
could or would it differ from what came before? Might it serve to strike a better balance 
between this historic foreground and background of the field, as highlighted in the chart 
above?  
To the extent that “peace” invokes more holistic sets of objectives than the 
narrower goals associated with facilitating liberal political transitions, the turn to 
peacebuilding might be seen to represent a broadening and a loosening of earlier 
paradigms and moorings, making this a significant moment in the normative evolution of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Consider, for example, the 2013 call to papers for a special issue of the International Journal of 
Transitional Justice with the theme “Transitional Justice: Does It have a Future?,” 
http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/ijtj/call_for_papers_2015.html. 
41 Examples of transitional justice outside of paradigmatic liberal transitions include Rwanda, 
Kenya, Uganda, Chad, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere.  
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the field. Yet with few exceptions, there has thus far been little scrutiny as to what 
“transitional justice as peacebuilding” might actually mean, how it might be different than 
“transitional justice as liberal democracy building,”42 or how transitional justice can and 
should relate to existing components of the post-conflict peacebuilding recipe-book 
(including efforts to disarm previously warring parties, re-integrate former soldiers into 
society, demine and destroy weapons, reform the formal “security sector,” repatriate or 
resettle refugees, and various forms of democracy, governance, and rule of law 
assistance, including monitoring elections).43 In many instances, analysis of the linkages 
between transitional justice and peacebuilding goes little further than the loose 
sloganeering of “no peace without justice” or simplistic assertions that peace and justice 
go hand in hand.44  
I argue that (re)conceptualizing transitional justice as a form of peacebuilding has 
the potential to reinvigorate the field, challenge longstanding blindspots and assumptions, 
and open the doors to more creative thinking, policies, and practices that take us beyond 
the confines of the increasingly rote transitional justice “toolbox,” but this cannot be 
taken for granted. It is worth recalling that concepts of both peace and justice have 
emancipatory dimensions, yet both have also been associated with colonial logics and 
dominant ideologies and power structures throughout history. While both concepts are 
often presented as neutral and apolitical, devoid of inherent ideological content, they 
have at times been used to legitimate a world order characterized by structural and 
economic violence enforced by military interventionism. In this light, one must note that, 
historically, the “peace” associated with international post-conflict peacebuilding efforts 
spearheaded by the United Nations and major international donors has typically been 
conceived of as a narrow liberal peace predicated on free markets and Western-style 
democracy.45 Thus, insofar as the goals of liberal international peacebuilding and the 
historic goals of transitional justice are essentially one and the same, without more, 
“transitional justice as peacebuilding” may be little more than a dressed up tautology.  
I set the stage for my inquiry in Chapter IV with an analysis of the parallels between 
transitional justice and liberal international peacebuilding. I observe that the growing 
sense of shared space between transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding 
initiatives has sparked new interest in sounding out potential connections between both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 For the most part, transitional justice scholars have not framed their work in terms of peace or 
peacebuilding. Kora Andrieu, “Civilizing Peacebuilding: Transitional Justice, Civil Society and the 
Liberal Paradigm,” Security Dialogue 41, no. 5 (2010): 439. 
There are, of course, notable exceptions to this trend, including Chandra Lekha Sriram and Rama 
Mani. See, e.g., Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Justice as Peace?”; Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution: 
Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2002). 
43 See United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines 
(United Nations, 2008), 26.  
44 See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
conflict Societies, ¶ 8 (arguing that “[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive 
objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives”). 
45 See generally Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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fields. If transitional justice has its own “toolbox,” one might then ask whether it cannot 
simply be subsumed into the larger post-conflict peacebuilding template. However, while 
the pursuit of synergies is a worthwhile goal, I argue that in developing these 
connections we must also be attentive to mutual shortcomings. Transitional justice and 
post-conflict peacebuilding have historically proceeded on separate tracks, yet there has 
been a remarkable similarity in the critiques and concerns that have been leveled 
against both fields: that they are too often externally driven, being planned and 
implemented in a top-down and state-centric manner that gives insufficient voice and 
agency to those most affected by the conflict;46 that they are biased toward Western 
approaches, giving too little attention to local or indigenous peace and justice 
traditions;47 that they are presented as technocratic, neutral, and apolitical solutions to 
highly contested or contestable political issues and choices;48 and that they ultimately 
reflect not local needs and realities, but a dominant “liberal international peacebuilding” 
paradigm that seeks to foster Western, market-oriented democracies in the wake of 
conflict without considering the tensions this may unleash in the immediate aftermath of 
conflict.49  
Considered together, there is reason to worry that better integration and coordination 
between peacebuilding and transitional justice might exacerbate some of the tendencies 
that have given rise to these parallel critiques rather than alleviate them. There is also a 
danger that as transitional justice is mainstreamed into emerging best practices for post-
conflict reconstruction, it will increasingly come to be seen as yet one more box to tick on 
the “post-conflict checklist,” a routine part of the template deployed in the context of 
post-conflict peace operations.50 I therefore argue that to the extent that we seek to 
promote coordination or even synthesis, we should seek synergies with thorough 
cognizance of the historic concerns and critiques leveled against both fields, and this 
may in turn serve as one technique of resistance to the tendencies that gave rise to the 
critiques in the first place. As an example, I suggest how transitional justice initiatives 
and Demobilization Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programs might be better 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See, e.g., Kora Andrieu, “Civilizing Peacebuilding,” 541 (noting that “transitional justice seems 
to be strongly under the influence of [a] top-down state-building approach.”) 
47 See, e.g., Wendy Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass Violence,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2009): 28 (calling for a revalorization of local 
and cultural approaches to justice and reconciliation). 
48 See, e.g., Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, “Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice 
from the Bottom Up,” Journal of Law and Society 35, no. 2 (2008): 276-77 (arguing that “wider 
geo-political and economic interests too often shape what tend to be represented as politically 
and economically neutral post-conflict and transitional justice initiatives”).  
49 See generally Roland Paris, At War’s End; Chandra Sriram, “Justice as Peace?”  
50 The problem of template-based or one-size-fits-all peacebuilding initiatives is a frequent trope 
in both academic and policy literature. See, e.g., Roger Mac Ginty, “Indigenous Peace-Making 
Versus the Liberal Peace,” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic Studies Association 
43, no. 2 (2008): 144 (observing the existence of “set templates” and a “formulaic path” in 
internationally sponsored peacebuilding).  
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coordinated in ways which run counter to the historical liberal ideological bias of both 
transitional justice and liberal peacebuilding.51  
Chapter V helps to conclude this dissertation project, bringing together a number of 
strands developed in the preceding chapters with an attempt to deconstruct the 
emerging transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding narrative in the hopes that what emerges 
might prove more emancipatory, freed from the bonds of the paradigmatic transition and, 
one hopes, from some of the tendencies that gave rise to the trenchant critiques 
discussed in Chapter IV. I begin with the observation that, bearing in mind Robert 
Cover’s observation that institutions and prescriptions do not exist apart from the 
narratives that locate and give them meaning,52 the particular “peace” and the particular 
“justice” that serve to undergird any emerging transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding 
narrative matter a great deal. Thus, whether “transitional justice as peacebuilding” takes 
on a more emancipatory or reductive dimension depends in large measure on what we 
mean by “transition,” “justice” and “peace.” Therefore, the emergence of the “transitional 
justice as peacebuilding” narrative calls upon us to deconstruct several key assumptions 
that might implicitly undergird it, including: (1) the idea of “transition” as necessarily 
suggestive of a narrow liberal teleology; (2) ideas of “justice” as synonymous with human 
rights and atrocity justice; and (3) the idea of “peacebuilding” as synonymous with what 
has come to be known as “liberal international peacebuilding.” I offer several concepts 
from critical peacebuilding theory—including “the everyday,” “popular peace,” and 
“hybridity”—that might serve as useful correctives to these narrow assumptions.53 Taken 
together, I argue, critical reflection along these lines can help to lay the groundwork for a 
transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding paradigm that reflects a commitment to human 
rights ideals and the consolidation of a more open-textured, contextually relevant, and 
genuine positive peace. It may also lead to approaches to transitional justice that better 
balance the historic foreground and periphery of the field.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 This is a possibility I discuss at much greater length in a book chapter not included as part of 
this dissertation project. See Dustin Sharp, “Bridging the Gap: the United Nations Peacebuilding 
Commission and the Challenges of Integrating DDR and Transitional Justice,” in Transitional 
Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants, eds. Chandra Lekha 
Sriram, et al (London: Routledge, 2012), 23.  
52 Robert Cover, “Nomos and Narrative,” Harvard Law Review 97 (1983): 4.  
53 On “popular peace” and “the everyday,” see David Roberts, “Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 
Liberal Irrelevance and the Locus of Legitimacy,” International Peacekeeping 18 (2011): 411; on 
hybridity, see Roger Mac Ginty and Gurchathen Sanghera, “Hybridity in Peacebuilding and 
Development: an Introduction,” Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 7, no. 2 (2012): 3-8. 
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Part I:   Transitional Justice and its Engagement 
with “the Local”
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Chapter I:   Addressing Dilemmas of the Global and the Local in 
Transitional Justice1 
 
The importance of “the local” (local ownership, local values, local practices, etc.) 
is an increasingly common trope in post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional justice 
discourse.2 While transitional justice solutions have at times been imposed from the 
outside, it is now acknowledged that the United Nations (UN) must better support “local 
ownership” in matters of post-conflict justice and that “due regard” must be given to local 
justice and reconciliation traditions.3 Paeans to the value of the local in policy circles are 
paralleled by a growing body of scholarship on the topic that has sought to explore the 
complexities of bringing dimensions of the local from the periphery to the foreground of 
transitional justice work.4 Put succinctly, the current moment in transitional justice is 
marked by a veritable “fascination with locality.”5 
While the reasons for this growing attention are complex, it could be said to 
reflect the commonsense understanding that peace processes and justice mechanisms 
not embraced by those who have to live with them are unlikely to be successful in the 
long term.6 Interventions perceived as being imposed “from the outside” may spark 
backlash and resentment that undermines both legitimacy and effectiveness.7 In that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This dissertation chapter was originally published in the Emory International Law Review 29 
(2014): 71-117.  
2 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General on Peacebuilding in the 
Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, UN Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304 (June 11, 2009), ¶ 7 (Observing 
that “[t]he imperative of national ownership is a central theme of the present report.”); U.N. 
Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004), ¶¶ 16-17, 36 (arguing that the UN must “learn 
better how to respect and support local ownership, local leadership and a local constituency for 
reform.”); Simon Chesterman, “Walking Softly in Afghanistan: The Future of UN Statebuilding,” 
Survival 44 (2002): 41 (noting that “[e]very UN mission and development program now stresses 
the importance of local ‘ownership.’”). 
3 U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies (2004), ¶¶ 16-17, 36; Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding 
and Strategies of Transitional Justice,” Global Society 21, no. 4 (2007): 591. 
4 See, e.g., Deborah Isser, ed., Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies 
(Washington: USIP. 2011); Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf, eds., Localizing Transitional 
Justice: Interventions and Priorities After Mass Violence (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 
2010); Alexander Hinton, ed., Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after 
Genocide and Mass Violence (Newark: Rutgers University Press, 2010); Erin Baines, “Spirits and 
Social Reconstruction After Mass Violence: Rethinking Transitional Justice,” African Affairs 109, 
no. 436 (2010): 409; Elizabeth Stanley, “Transitional Justice: From the Local to the International,” 
in The Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and International Relations, ed. Patrick Hayden 
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009). 
5 Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf, “Introduction,” in Localizing Transitional Justice.  
6 See Timothy Donais, “Haiti and the Dilemmas of Local Ownership,” International Journal 64 
(2008-2009): 759. 
7 See Andrea Talentino, “Perceptions of Peacebuilding: The Dynamic of Imposer and Imposed 
Upon,” International Studies Review 8, no. 2 (2007): 153. 
	   22	  
sense, grappling with the dilemmas of the global and the local is not an option, but a 
profoundly pragmatic imperative.8 Yet despite the acknowledged centrality of the local, 
concepts like local ownership remain vague and poorly understood, being marshaled in 
different ways by different actors for different ends,9 often being associated more with 
aspirational rhetoric than concrete policy reality.10 Moreover, in the transitional justice 
context—a context permeated with international normative frameworks, institutions, 
donors, and technocratic expertise—the odds are often stacked against giving primacy 
to the local in a meaningful sense.11 It is perhaps, therefore, unsurprising that transitional 
justice interventions have been and continue to be a frequent locus of tensions between 
the global and the local.12  
Examined more deeply, the seeming consensus about the importance of the 
local masks a profound ambivalence.13 Building upon local ownership, priorities, 
practices, and values is often recognized as among the keys to the success in 
transitional justice interventions,14 and yet local practices and solutions can also lead to 
stark clashes with international human rights standards.15 The appeal to the local can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General on Peacebuilding in the 
Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, ¶ 7 (Observing that “[t]he imperative of national ownership is a 
central theme of the present report.”) 
9 See Daniel Bendix and Ruth Stanley, “Deconstructing Local Ownership of Security Sector 
Reform: A Review of the Literature,” African Security Review 17, no. 2 (2010): 101.  
10 Timothy Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding Processes,” Peace and Change 34, no. 1 (2009): 5 (observing that in the broader 
field of peacebuilding, “local ownership has rarely moved beyond the level of rhetoric.”); Simon 
Chesterman, “Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding 
Operations,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1, no. 1 (2007): 9 (noting that in the fields 
of post-conflict reconstruction and development, ownership “has frequently been of more 
rhetorical significance than anything else.”) 
11 See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, “Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist Process 
Approach,” Michigan Journal of International Law 21 (2010-2011): 21 (noting that “[i]n transitional 
justice mechanisms to date, the international justice proponents’ concerns have generally been 
paramount, perhaps because they often provide much of the funding and technical support for 
transitional justice mechanisms in the developing world.”) 
12 See Alexander Hinton, “Introduction,” in Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local 
Realities, 9 (observing that “transitional justice mechanisms almost always have unexpected 
outcomes that emerge out of ‘frictions’ between . . . global mechanisms and local realities.”) 
13 See Oliver Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace (Milton Park: Routledge, 2011), 153. 
14 In an oft-cited comment on the topic, Kofi Annan noted that “no rule of law reform, justice 
reconstruction, or transitional justice initiative imposed from the outside can hope to be successful 
or sustainable.” U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice, ¶ 17. Leopold 
von Carlowitz has observed that while policy-makers, academics and practitioners generally 
agree with this principle, local ownership has nevertheless proven difficult to operationalize in 
practice. Local Ownership in Practice: Justice System Reform in Kosovo and Liberia, Occasional 
Paper No. 23 (Geneva: DCAF, 2011), 1. 
15 See Peter Uvin, “Difficult Choices in the New Post-Conflict Agenda: the International 
Community in Rwanda After the Genocide,” Third World Quarterly 22, no. 2 (2001): 185-86 
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also be used by local elites to reinforce oppressive power structures, some of which may 
have led to the conflict in the first place.16 For these and others reasons, there is a deep 
distrust of local agency in the post-conflict context.17 Ultimately, the dilemmas of the 
local therefore reflect a clash of normative commitments: between liberal 
internationalism and international human rights on the one hand, and principles of local 
sovereignty and autonomy on the other.18 The result of this ambivalence, as played out 
through global-local power disparities, has typically been accommodation of the local to 
the extent of conformity with the global, co-option and not co-existence.19 
Conflicting commitments call for a complicated balancing act. In some contexts, 
too much local may be as problematic as too much global.20 While it may be an all-but-
impossible needle to thread,21 finding the right balance between global and local agency, 
priorities, practices, and values stands out as one of the key policy challenges of 21st 
century transitional justice.22 To this end, this article seeks to analyze and deconstruct 
the concept of the local in the transitional justice context, exploring its promises and 
pitfalls. In doing so, I attempt to make three key points.  
First, a better understanding of the role of the local in transitional justice 
discourse and practice requires that we think carefully about why transitional justice 
should have so often become the locus for such vivid global-local tensions in the first 
place. While cautioning against unduly rigid notions path dependency, I offer the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(noting that “when internal or local solutions emerge, they often take forms that do not conform to 
Western ethnical ideals of international legal principles.”)  
16 See Patricia Lundy, “Paradoxes and Challenges of Transitional Justice at the ‘Local’ Level: 
Historical Enquiries in Northern Ireland,” Contemporary Social Science 6, no. 1 (2011): 93 
(reviewing arguments in the literature that “transitional justice can be used by elites for a variety 
of purposes and to serve or conceal other very different political agendas.”) 
17 Florian Kuhn, “The Peace Prefix: Ambiguities of the Word ‘Peace’,” International Peacekeeping 
19, no. 4 (2012): 402. 
18 See Donais, “Haiti and the Dilemmas of Local Ownership,” 755-56. Global frictions arise in part 
due to a clash between universalism and particularism—a dynamic at the heart of the cultural 
relativism debate in human rights. Yet it is important to note here that values like participation, 
inclusion, and local agency are themselves often held out as universal values intended to trump 
others, and at times are even as a shield against local or traditional practices that might 
discriminate or otherwise fail to be fully inclusive. Thus, the clash of normative commitments I 
speak of here is much more complex than frictions between a cosmopolitan liberalism and 
vigorous localism, and could also be thought of a tension between different (purportedly 
universal) liberal commitments. 
19 See Stephanie Vielle, “Transitional Justice: A Colonizing Field?,” Amsterdam Law Forum 4, no. 
3 (2012): 66.  
20 See Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition?,” 21.  
21 See Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk, Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of 
Postwar Statebuilding (International Peace Academy/Research Partnership on Postwar 
Statebuilding, 2007), 5 (suggesting that insofar as the dilemmas of postwar statebuilding stem 
from “compelling but mutually conflicting imperatives,” they may prove unresolvable). 
22 I have elsewhere outlined this and other key dilemmas that characterize what I call “fourth 
generation transitional justice.” Dustin Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries; The Preoccupations 
of Fourth Generation Transitional Justice,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 26 (2013): 149. 
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historical and ideological origins of transitional justice in Western liberalism and legalism 
as one partial explanation for the global-local “frictions” experienced today.23 I also 
sketch the contours of several decades of transitional justice practice to highlight the 
continued relevance of those origins.  
Second, because concepts like local ownership present a loose and often 
confusing theme in academic and policy discourse that subsumes a wide range of 
critiques and concerns, understanding global-local dilemmas requires one to unpack the 
concept, distinguishing concerns about actual control (agency, decision making, funding), 
process (bottom-up, participatory, homegrown), and substance (values, practices, 
priorities), even if those concerns are in practice highly related. Given the rise of 
transitional justice interventions in recent decades, tensions and conflict between global 
and local will inevitably continue for the foreseeable future. At the same time, 
approaches to post-conflict justice that take into account the need for a better global-
local balance along the multiple axes of local ownership (control, process, and 
substance) may help to generate new and innovative approaches to trying to achieve 
peace with justice in the wake of mass atrocity that take us beyond the increasingly rote 
transitional justice “toolbox.”24 
Finally, I observe that breaking down concepts like local ownership tends to 
tends to destabilize, deconstructing simple binary notions of global and local. In reality, 
transitional justice processes typically involve complicated interplay between multiple 
varied levels, resulting in a dialectic process where global and local are transformed by 
their encounter with each other.25 This has led some scholars to question the value of 
the concept of the local, arguing instead for more complicated notions of “glocality,” 
“translocality,” and “local and larger local.”26 Yet as an ideal, the concept of the local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 As Miller at al. have noted, the “frictions” concept helps to stress the unexpected, unintended, 
and extremely complex nature of what happens when global meets local. See Gearoid Millar, Jair 
Van Der Lijn, and Willemijn Verkoren, “Peacebuilding Plans and Local Reconfigurations: Frictions 
between Imported Processes and Indigenous Practices,” International Peacekeeping 20, no. 2 
(2013): 139.  
24 The phrase “transitional justice toolbox” refers to the mechanisms and interventions most 
associated with the field: prosecutions, truth telling, reparations, vetting and dismissals, 
institutional reform, etc. The toolbox metaphor is increasingly critiqued as suggesting a set, one-
size-fits-all template ignorant of context, and because the tool idea implies that transitional justice 
interventions are somehow neutral, acultural, and apolitical.  
25 See Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism and Transnational Culture: The Ka Ho’okolokolonui 
Kanaka Maoli Tribunal, Hawai’i, 1993,” in Human Rights, Culture and Contest; Anthropological 
Perspectives, ed. Richard Wilson (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 30 (arguing that “human rights is 
an open text, capable of appropriation and redefinition.”); Sally Engle Merry, “Global Human 
Rights and Local Social Movements in a Legally Plural World,” Canadian Journal of Law and 
Society 12 (1997): 249 (noting that “global rights discourses are appropriated in local 
communities [and] are themselves constructed out of local struggles.”) 
26 See Lundy, “Paradoxes and Challenges,” 93 (reviewing perspectives that seek to move beyond 
the “stark and mutually exclusive binary oppositions of ‘local’ and ‘global’ that tend to dominate 
transitional justice literature.”); Bruce Mazlish, “The Global and the Local,” Current Sociology 53, 
no. 1 (2005): 99 (discussing the idea of “local and larger local”). 
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continues to provide an important counterweight to the centralizing and universalizing 
tendencies of transitional justice and liberal international peacebuilding more generally. 
Concepts of local and global therefore retain utility for purposes of both analysis and 
policymaking, even if they do not accurately describe the full complexity of transitional 
justice processes.  
This article consists of six sections. In Section II, I examine the ideological and 
historical origins of the field of transitional justice, with a view to how these origins have 
shaped some of the boundaries, tensions, and dilemmas of field. In Section III, I discuss 
some of the frequent critiques of mainstream transitional justice practice, particularly the 
idea that it is largely a top-down and state-centric enterprise that pays insufficient 
attention to questions of local ownership, agency, priorities, practices, and values. In 
Section IV, I examine some of the promises and pitfalls of greater engagement with the 
local in matters of transitional justice. In Section V, I argue for the need to break down 
concepts of local ownership as a means of striking a better global-local balance.  
Section VI concludes the article.  
 
 
A. The Historical and Ideological Origins of Transitional Justice 
 
Transitional justice can be conceived of as a set of moral, legal, and political 
dilemmas involving how best to respond to mass atrocities and other forms of profound 
injustice in the wake of conflict or in times of political transition.27 It is often defined in 
part by reference to a set of practices—including prosecutions, truth-seeking, vetting and 
dismissals, reparations, and institutional reform—now associated with responses to 
widespread human rights violations. 28 In the last three decades, these practices have 
become increasingly widespread. Priscilla Hayner, for example, has documented the 
existence of some 40 modern-day truth commissions.29 Kathryn Sikkink has 
demonstrated an increasing crescendo of human rights prosecutions taking place at 
national and international levels leading, she argues, to the emergence of a new global 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Sriram, “Justice as Peace?,” 582-83. For a review of how definitions of transitional justice have 
evolved over time, see Rosemary Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical 
Reflections,” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2008): 277-78; see also Paige Arthur, “How 
‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice,” Human 
Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 329-32 (tracing the history of the use of the term “transitional 
justice”). 
28 According to a famous UN definition, “[transitional justice comprises] the full range of processes 
and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-
scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. 
These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international 
involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional 
reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.” U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice (2004), ¶ 8. 
29 Prisilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 256-62.  
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norm of accountability, at least for certain harms.30 In a relatively brief span of history, 
therefore, transitional justice has in a sense gone mainstream, with the question no 
longer being whether there will be some kind of transitional justice, but what particular 
interventions will be deployed, and what their scope and sequencing might look like.31 
Though it continues to be shaped by the broader field of international human rights, 
transitional justice has emerged as its own field of theory, policy, and practice, with 
dedicated NGOs, job descriptions, academic journals, and itinerant expert consultants.32  
Practices now associated with what we call transitional justice can be traced back 
millennia,33 yet the origins of the modern field have firm roots in the 1980s and 90s and 
the attempts of nascent democracies during the so-called “third-wave” of democratic 
transitions34 to grapple with historical legacies of repression and widespread human 
rights abuses.35 Born out of the euphoria of the immediate post Cold-War era, an era 
pregnant with the rhetoric of Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history,”36 transitional justice 
was shaped not just by a preoccupation with accountability for past human rights 
violations, but by the notion that grappling with the legacies of the past would also help 
to facilitate a democratic political transition.37 Implicit in these twin impulses and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing 
World Politics (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2011), 21.  
31 See Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project,” 276; see also Kieran McEvoy, “Beyond 
Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice,” Journal of Law and Society 
34 (2007): 412. 
32 See Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-
Field,’” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2009): 7 (arguing that transitional 
justice emerged as a distinct field sometime after 2000); Laura Arriaza and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, 
“Social Reconstruction as Local Process,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 2 
(2008): 152 (noting that “[a] whole agenda—and a whole set of institutions and professionals—
has emerged to implement ‘transitional justice’ interventions.”) 
33 See generally Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) (reviewing historic practices now associated with 
the modern field of transitional justice). 
34 The “third wave” is a term used by political scientist Samuel Huntington to describe a period of 
global democratization beginning in the mid-1970s that touched more than sixty countries in 
Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. See generally Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK; University of Oklahoma Press, 
1991). 
35 See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 325-26. The definitive source that 
captures the thinking and spirit of the period is Neil Kritz’s seminal three-volume work. See 
generally Neil Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former 
Regimes (Washington: USIP, 1995).  
36 See generally Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon 
Books, 1992). 
37 Influential scholars from the period attempted to predict to what extent the scope of transitional 
justice would be determined by a set of bargains between the various elite groups facilitating the 
democratic transition, with more or less justice possible depending on the extent to which 
previous elites retained a grip on the levers of power. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,” in Kritz, Transitional Justice, 54-81; Guillermo 
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ideology of the era was a sort of teleological or “stage-theory” view of history.38 As part 
of this narrative, transitional justice mechanisms become a sort of secular right of 
passage symbolizing evolution39 as countries progress from barbarism, communism, 
and authoritarianism to Western liberal democracy. Thus, viewing transitional justice as 
an apolitical “toolbox,” a notion implicit in UN and other definitions, fails to account for 
the important historical and ideological underpinnings of the field.40 While transitional 
justice is a dynamic and evolving field, these origins remain key to understanding some 
of its modern conceptual boundaries, assumptions, and blindspots, shaped as they have 
been by a particular faith in the ability of key liberal goods, including the rule of law, 
democracy, legalism, and human rights, to create peace.41  
Origins also help to explain in part the dominance of certain disciplines, approaches, 
and professional sensibilities in the field today. In the abstract, the question of how best 
to respond to mass atrocities is one well-suited to a range of disciplines, including 
philosophy, history, religion, anthropology, and psychology, yet in practice the field has 
for the most part been dominated by lawyers and political scientists.42 Given the 
dominance of lawyers in particular, it is perhaps not surprising that mass atrocities have 
been largely analogized as a form of mass crime,43 and that the tools that have been 
marshaled in response have had a heavily legal character, often focusing more on 
retributive justice via formal courts and tribunals rather than other forms of justice.44 This 
“prosecution preference,” under which anything short of Western-style courtroom justice 
is often seen as comprised justice, is seemingly hardwired into the DNA of mainstream 
transitional justice.45 It has been and continues to be persistent source of debate and 
global-local frictions.46 Though truth commissions as a form of restorative justice are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
About Uncertain Democracies,” in Kritz, Transitional Justice, 57-64. 
38 See Hinton, “Introduction,” in Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms, 6-7. 
39 See Michael Rothberg, “Progress, Progression, Procession: William Kentridge and the 
Narratology of Transitional Justice,” Narrative 20, no. 1 (2012): 5. 
40 To An-Na’im, these historical and ideological underpinnings include an implicit neocolonial logic 
that places dominant conceptions of “transitional justice” within “the grand “modernizing’ mission 
of North Atlantic societies.” See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, “Editorial Note: From the Neocolonial 
“Transition” to Indigenous Formations of Justice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 7, 
no. 2 (2013): 197. 
41 Sririam, “Justice as Peace?,” 579. On the dominance of law and legalism in transitional justice, 
see generally McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism.”  
42 See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 333. 
43 Miriam Aukerman, “Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crimes: A Framework for Understanding 
Transitional Justice,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 (2002): 94-97. 
44 Rama Mani stands as an early exception to this trend, arguing for a more balanced approach to 
post-conflict reconstruction that would include three dimensions of justice: retributive, rectificatory, 
and distributive. See Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War 
(Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2002); 
45 Aukerman, “Extraordinary Evil,” 39-44 (describing the “prosecution preference”).  
46 The prosecution preference can be seen in debates that raged in the late 1990s concerning 
whether a truth commission alone could constitute an adequate form of justice. See, e.g, Reed 
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arguably an exception to the historic emphasis on retributive responses to mass 
atrocities, it has been argued that they are still fundamentally rooted in Western modes 
of truth telling and traditions of public confession and may not be appropriate in cultures 
with a different historical grounding.47 Other items routinely considered as among the 
standard tools of transitional justice such as reparations, which could be considered a 
limited form of distributive justice, have in practice been given comparatively little 
emphasis and funding in many transitional processes.48 
As a thought experiment, Arthur observes, one might consider the possible 
orientation of theory and praxis if the intellectual origins of transitional justice had been 
rooted in paradigmatic transitions to socialism and the dominant disciplines had been 
history and developmental economics.49 While it is impossible to say for sure, it seems 
likely that the perceived dilemmas and preoccupations, together with the tools 
marshaled to address them would look considerably different. As an example, one could 
note the historic preoccupation of transitional justice with civil and political rights rather 
than economic and social rights, with acts of egregious physical violence such as murder, 
torture, and rape, rather than equally devastating acts and policies of economic and 
structural violence.50 Greater attention to questions of distributive justice in transition—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Brody, “Justice: The First Casualty of Truth?,” The Nation, April 30, 2001, 25 (arguing that truth 
commissions can serve as “a soft option for avoiding justice.”) More recently, one can look to 
controversies sparked by ICC indictments of leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army rebel group in 
Uganda where some members of the Acholi community in Northern Uganda would prefer to forgo 
prosecutions in favor of Mato Oput, a local ritual that emphasizes reconciliation and reintegration 
rather than simple retribution. See generally Adam Branch, “Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics 
of ICC Intervention,” Ethics and International Affairs 21, no. 2 (2007): 179. 
47 See Rosalind Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions; Lessons from Sierra 
Leone, United States Institute for Peace Special Report 130 (Washington: USIP, 2005); see also 
Tim Kelsall, “Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in Sierra Leone,” Human Rights Quarterly 27 (2005): 361. 
48 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Reparations in the Aftermath of Repression and Mass Violence,” in 
My Neighbor, My Enemy, eds. Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 121 (noting that “[o]utside the context of the Second World War, 
examples of large-scale reparations programs become scarcer.”)  
49 See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 359. 
50 There is a growing literature examining the extent to which transitional justice can and should 
grapple with economic and social rights and questions of distributive justice more generally. See, 
e.g, Dustin Sharp, ed., Justice and Economic Violence in Transition (New York: Springer, 2014); 
Gaby Oré Aguila and Felipe Gómez Isa, eds., Rethinking Transitions: Equality and Social Justice 
in Societies Emerging from Conflict (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2011); Morten Bergsmo et al, 
eds, Distributive Justice in Transitions (Oslo: PRIO, 2010); Pablo de Grieff and Roger Duthie, 
eds., Transitional Justice and Development: Making Connections (New York: ICTJ, 2009); Louise 
Arbour, “Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition,” New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 40, no. 1 (2007): 1. The importance of greater engagement 
questions of economic justice has also been recognized by the UN. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-
General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, U.N. 
Doc. S/2011/634 (Oct. 12, 2011) ¶ 24 (observing “growing recognition that truth commissions 
should also address the economic, social and cultural rights dimensions of conflict to enhance 
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something that might have come more naturally if the field had different historical, 
ideological, and professional grounding—might well have entailed a focus on 
prosecutions for corruption and other economic crimes, together with a push for policies 
involving redistributive taxation or land-tenure reform in the wake of conflict. Yet as the 
field has evolved, these issues have been largely pushed to the margins.51 Thus, the 
Western liberal roots of transitional justice together with the professional orientations of 
those first drawn to the field helped to shape conceptions of both problems and solutions, 
circumscribing and stunting the nature of what counts as an injustice, who counts as a 
victim, as well as the nature of and emphasis within the “toolbox” itself. 52  
While the historical and ideological origins of transitional justice may have 
predisposed the field to privilege certain forms of harm and certain ways of responding 
to those harms, it can be argued that the field’s roots in Western liberalism do not 
necessarily dictate internationally imposed solutions, “top-down” responses, or the more 
general marginalization of the local that has featured in many transitional justice 
interventions over time.53 At the same time, the historic association between transitional 
justice and largely Western and legalistic responses to mass atrocity, when coupled with 
the field’s grounding in international law and international human rights more generally, 
has served to privilege international institutions, norms, practices, knowledge, and 
expertise.54 The early dominance of lawyers and legalism may also help to explain a 
tendency to view social change as a function of elite bargaining and top-down legal-
institutional reforms.55 The result is an emphasis on a constrained yet institutionally 
demanding understanding of transitional justice that some have argued is not consistent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
long-term peace and security”); United Nations, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United 
Nations Approach to Transitional Justice (March 2010), 7 (noting that “Successful strategic 
approaches to transitional justice necessitate taking account of the root causes of conflict or 
repressive rule, and must seek to address the related violations of all rights, including economic, 
social, and cultural rights.”) 
51 See generally Zinaida Miller, “Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional 
Justice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 266. 
52 For example, under the South African TRC Act, a “victim” was limited to individuals who had 
suffered “gross violations of human rights, including killing, abduction, torture, or ill-treatment.” 
The poverty, racism, and structural violence of the Apartheid system itself where thereby 
excluded. Pablo De Greiff and Roger Duthie, “Repairing the Past: Reparations for Victims of 
Human Rights Violations,” in The Handbook on Reparations, ed. Pablo de Greiff (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 8. 
53 Roland Paris has made this point with respect to similar critiques that have been leveled 
against the broader field of post-conflict peacebuilding. See Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal 
Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies 36, no. 2 (2010): 363. I outline these critiques in 
more detail below.  
54 See generally Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries.”  
55 See Sandra Rubli, Transitional Justice: Justice by Bureaucratic Means? (Geneva: Swiss Peace 
Working Paper 4 – 2012), 11. 
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with the quality and capacity of state institutions in many post-conflict countries, to say 
nothing of cultural congruence.56  
Against this backdrop, the felt need for prosecutions and truth commissions “in 
conformity with . . . international standards”57 often leads to the involvement of 
international donors, NGOs, and experts, placing a further thumb on the scales favoring 
the primacy of the global rather than the local. Indigenous or homespun solutions come 
to appear rough around the edges, second-best approaches to questions of how to do 
justice in times of transition.58 Mirroring the savages-victims-saviors paradigm at the 
heart of some human rights advocacy, these dynamics produce a situation where the 
locals (savages) need to be assisted by international experts and institutions (saviors) 
not just from the abuses they have committed against victims during the conflict, but 
from the “mistakes” locals would make in attempting to devise their own post-conflict 
solutions as well.59 Internationally constructed categories of “perpetrator” and “victim” are 
essential to justifying such interventions. (Who after all will defend the rights of “victims” 
if not members of the “international community”?)60 The international assistance offered 
in such a context is projected as apolitical and technocratic, yet it carries with it heavy 
implications for the distribution of power (political, legal, social, etc.) in the post-conflict 
context.61  
Of course, origins are not destiny, and the biases and blindspots of the early years of 
transitional justice need not necessarily be those of today. Thus, in seeking to 
understand contemporary challenges, unduly rigid notions of path dependency must be 
avoided. There are signs of limited but increasing openness to more diverse and 
culturally-grounded approaches to justice and a growing reconsideration of the need to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See Lydiah Bosire, “Overpromised, Underdelivered: Transitional Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 
Sur International Journal on Human Rights 5, no. 5 (2006): 72. 
57 U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice (2004), ¶ 36. 
58 See An-Na’im, “Editorial Note,” 197 (observing that “preference is given to a standard of justice 
that is mandated by the international community over indigenous or ‘traditional’ practices.”)  
59 See generally Makau Mutua, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights,” 
Harvard International Law Journal 42 (2001): 201.  
60 For a useful deconstruction of the problematic term “international community,” see generally 
Berit Bliesemann de Guevara and Florian Kuhn, “‘The International Community Needs to Act’: 
Loose Use and Empty Signaling of a Hackneyed Concept,” International Peacekeeping 18, no. 2 
(2011): 135.  
61 See Lundy and McGovern, “Whose Justice?,” 276-77 (noting that “wider geo-political and 
economic interests too often shape what tend to be represented as politically and economically 
neutral post-conflict and transitional justice initiatives”); Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, “The 
Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2008): 98-106 
(arguing that a superficial consensus as to the goals of transitional justice can serve to mask a 
deeper level of politicization and debate, and that assessment of the tensions, trade-offs, and 
dilemmas associated with transitional justice has become difficult to the extent that they have 
been conceptualized in apolitical terms); Sririam, “Justice as Peace?,” 587-88 (discussing the 
ways in which post-conflict institutional reform strategies relating to the judiciary, constitution, and 
security forces may be seen by key protagonists as permanently cementing new power 
arrangements and therefore not as neutral or apolitical processes). 
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address questions of economic justice.62 The field is also increasingly being shaped by 
perspectives from disciplines other than law and political science. Yet it is also true that 
once sets of practices and assumptions come to dominate a field, more than superficial 
change can prove difficult and slow going. As James Cavallaro and Sebastián Albuja 
have argued, the early years of transitional justice helped to establish a “dominant script” 
that has gone on to be replicated irrespective of how suited it has been to some new 
contexts.63 
Over time, the democratic transitions paradigm in which the field was originally 
grounded has become less explicit, and transitional justice is increasingly associated 
with the much broader field of post-conflict peacebuilding.64 One could ask whether this 
newfound association will help to break through the conceptual boundaries and 
dominant scripts that have developed over time.65 However, as many have noted, the 
field of international post-conflict peacebuilding is itself largely rooted in the belief that 
free markets and Western liberal democracies are the surest path to peace.66 As I have 
argued elsewhere, the critiques of what has become known as “liberal international 
peacebuilding” share much in common with critiques of transitional justice, including that 
they both frequently involve top-down and state-centric interventions that serve to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See generally Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries.” 
63 James Cavallaro and Sebastián Albuja, “The Lost Agenda: Economic Crimes and Truth 
Commissions in Latin America and Beyond,” in Transitional Justice from Below, Grassroots 
Activism and the Struggle for Change, ed. Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2008), 125. The problem of set templates and formulaic paths 
is of course not unique to transitional justice, but has dogged the broader work of post-conflict 
peacebuilding as well. See Ole Sending, Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and be 
Sensitive to Context, Security in Practice, NUPI Working Paper 755 (2009), 7. It is important to 
note, however, that even established and dominant scripts can and do change (as evident in the 
growing work of certain African truth commissions on questions of economic justice), even if it 
typically involves a very slow and uneven process. See generally, Dustin Sharp, “Economic 
Violence in the Practice of African Truth Commissions and Beyond,” in Justice and Economic 
Violence in Transition, 79. 
64 Thus, for example, transitional justice practices are now associated with countries and regime 
changes such as Rwanda that can hardly be considered democratic. See generally Phil Clark and 
Zachary Kaufman, eds, After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and 
Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 
65 Many have questioned the utility of the transitions paradigm altogether. See, e.g, Moses 
Chrispus Okello, “Afterword: Elevating Transitional Local Justice or Crystallizing Global 
Governance?,” in Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities After Mass Violence, 
278-79 (questioning the “unintended consequences of assuming that we are all progressing 
towards the same destination”); Harvey M. Weinstein et al., “Stay the Hand of Justice: Whose 
Priorities Take Priority?,” in Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities After Mass 
Violence, 36 (stating that “[i]t is time to reconsider whether the term transitional justice accurately 
captures the dynamic processes unfolding on the ground”). 
66 See generally Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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marginalize local ownership, agency, priorities, practices, and values.67 There is reason 
to worry that the concerns that have given rise to these parallel critiques will be 
exacerbated by greater association between transitional justice and post-conflict 
peacebuilding, not made better.68 Thus, one should not expect global-local frictions in 
transitional justice to disappear as the historical and ideological origins of the field slip 
further below the surface. On the contrary, the lingering perception that transitional 
justice and post-conflict peacebuilding more generally share a common project to 
remake illiberal and imperfectly liberal states in the image of Western liberal 
democracies69 helps to contribute to the tendency of post-conflict interventions with a 
strong international component to produce some of the global-local frictions discussed in 
the following Section.70  
 
 
B. Critiques of Transitional Justice Practice Vis-à-Vis the Local 
 
While the ideological and professional origins of transitional justice theory and 
practice helped to shape the conceptual boundaries of the field and to set in motion 
some of the global-local frictions experienced today, it would be too simple to attribute 
everything to those origins. We must also look to several decades of transitional justice 
practice to better understand the dilemmas of the local. Transitional justice practice is, of 
course, not a monolith, and where trenchant critiques have been raised, there are 
always notable exceptions to the more general trend.71 And to be clear, much of the 
work of transitional justice—be it national-level human rights prosecutions or locally 
initiated and driven restorative justice practices—is carried out without significant tension 
with the global.72 Yet a persistent critique of many transitional justice initiatives is that 
they pay insufficient attention to questions of locality and have been distant from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See generally, Dustin Sharp, “Beyond the Post-Conflict Checklist; Linking Peacebuilding and 
Transitional Justice Through the Lens of Critique,” Chicago Journal of International Law 14, no. 1 
(2013): 165. 
68 Ibid.  
69 See Lundy and McGovern, “Whose Justice?,” 276-77.  
70 As with development and transitional justice, there is a burgeoning peacebuilding literature 
analyzing the dilemmas of the local. See, e.g, Oliver Richmond, “The Romanticisation of the 
Local: Welfare, Culture, and Peacebuilding,” International Spectator: Italian Journal of 
International Affairs 44, no. 1 (2009); 161-63; Roger Mac Ginty, “Indigenous Peace-Making 
Versus the Liberal Peace,” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic Studies Association 
43, no. 2 (2008): 139; Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition?,” 3.    
71 See Jenny Peterson, “A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity: Accounting for Notions of Power, 
Politics and Progress in Analyses of Aid-Drive Interfaces,” Journal of Peacebuilding and 
Development 7, no. 2 (2012): 12 (noting the tendency of assessments of liberal interventions to 
homogenize). 
72 At the same time, as I note in the following Section, great caution with categories of global and 
local is warranted. What may look like a purely “local” effort or initiative may turn out to have been 
in part initiated by internationals, and receive international funding, framing, and technical 
assistance. Thus, in practice, there is often a blurring of categories.  
	   33	  
victims and larger communities they were at some level intended to serve. Examples 
here will be largely drawn from transitional justice initiatives with a significant 
international component or where global-local frictions have otherwise risen to the 
surface most palpably. International prosecutions, in particular, have tended to set 
global-local frictions in sharpest relief, and will be examined in some detail before turning 
more briefly to the work of truth commissions.73 
In many ways, the paradigm for modern-day international tribunals can be found in 
the Nuremburg International Military Tribunal (IMT) established by the victorious allied 
powers shortly after the Second World War in order to try senior Nazi leaders for 
aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.74 From the outset, the tribunal 
was dogged with criticism that it exemplified a form of victor’s justice and made little 
attempt to secure what we might today call local ownership, drawing both judges and 
prosecutors from the ranks of the victors.75 Indeed, quite apart from a preoccupation with 
such niceties, one of the chief policy debates in the lead up to the creation of the tribunal 
was whether to summarily execute senior Nazi leaders, with options ranging from 50 to 
50,000 executions.76 The trial option prevailed, however, and unlike some modern 
international tribunals the IMT was located in country, and in Nuremburg no less, the 
ceremonial birthplace of the National Socialist (Nazi) party and site of annual 
propaganda rallies. The choice of a trial (rather than executions) and a symbolic location 
in Germany were intended to help to generate a sense of defeat amongst the 
vanquished (i.e., the locals), but also to serve an educational function for ordinary 
Germans in conveying some sense of the scope of the atrocities committed by the Nazis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 By “international prosecutions” I include purely international tribunals such as the international 
criminal tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and the so-called “hybrid” tribunals, such as the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL). Though one could argue for a distinction between “international criminal justice,” 
limited primarily to international and hybrid criminal tribunals, and the broader work of “transitional 
justice,” the fact remains that since Nuremburg international tribunals have often been associated 
with transitional and post-conflict contexts, and tend to generate similar legal, political and moral 
dilemmas. Because it has the potential to hear cases from a great variety of countries, the 
International Criminal Court is not of course limited to addressing crimes in post-conflict or 
transitional contexts, yet its work in places like Uganda and Côte d’Ivoire has become central to 
post-conflict dynamics in both countries. Even when operating where there is no political 
transition to speak of, the ICC has demonstrated a capacity to generate very sharp global-local 
frictions. Thus, for purposes of analyzing global-local frictions at least, a sharp line between 
international criminal justice, on the one hand, and transitional justice on the other need not be 
drawn. 
74 For a fascinating account of the establishment of the Nuremburg tribunal and recap of the 
debates that it engendered, see Gary Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War 
Crimes Tribunals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 147-205.  
75 With respect to the victor’s justice charge, Chief Justice Stone of the United States Supreme 
Court famously called the trials a “high-grade lynching party” and a “sanctimonious fraud.” Louise 
Arbour, “The Rule of Law and the Reach of Accountability,” in The Rule of Law, eds. Cheryl 
Saunders and Katherine Le Roy (Annandale: Federation Press, 2003), 104. 
76 Gary Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, 158-95. 
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in their name.77 Ultimately, though better than the alternatives debated at the time, there 
can be little doubt that the Nuremburg (and lesser known Tokyo) tribunals were an 
imposed justice and that the ability of local constituencies to have meaningful input into 
the process was limited to nonexistent.78  
Despite some of the controversy generated by the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals, 
they helped to spark an interest in the creation of a permanent international criminal 
court.79 However, Cold War frictions soon made consensus on the parameters of such 
an institution impossible.80 Nevertheless, the Nuremberg model remains important 
because it was in some respects resurrected in the mid 1990s with the creation of the 
ad-hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). The first major 
post-Cold War experiments in international justice, both tribunals served as a lightning 
rod for critiques and concerns relating to their engagement with the local. Neither 
tribunal was fully supported by the national governments most concerned, and the 
tribunals themselves were set up far from the victim communities and publics on whose 
behalf, at least in part, they ostensibly worked.81 Focusing on this sense of almost 
imperial remoteness, one early critic argued that the tribunals “orbit in space, suspended 
from political reality and removed from both the individual and national psyches of the 
victims as well as the victors in those conflicts.”82  
Perhaps predictably, the distanced and isolated nature of the tribunals led to a lack 
of understanding of their work in both regions.83 Nationals of the affected states were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 See Ibid., 154 (noting President Roosevelt’s desire that “every person in Germany should 
realize that this time Germany is a defeated nation” and speculating that the aspect of the 
Nuremburg trials that may have most appealed to President Roosevelt was their educational 
value for the local population in terms of conveying some of the truth of what was done during the 
war). Beyond its symbolic value, Nuremburg was also chosen out of convenience since its Palace 
of Justice was large and relatively undamaged by the war.  
78 The majority of defense counsel were German lawyers. 
79 See John Dugard, “Obstacles in the Way of an International Criminal Court,” Cambridge Law 
Journal 56, no. 2 (1997): 329 (noting that "[t]he enthusiasm generated by Nuremberg and Tokyo 
for a permanent court”). 
80 See Ibid. Between 1949 and 1954, the International Law Commission prepared several draft 
statutes that would have led to the creation of a permanent international criminal court, but they 
were eventually shelved.  
81 The ICTY is located in The Hague, The Netherlands, far from the killing fields of Bosnia. The 
ICTR is located in Arusha, Tanzania. Unlike the ICTY, the Rwandan government actually asked 
the Security Council to create a tribunal, though it eventually cast the sole dissenting vote against 
the tribunal due to its location outside of Rwanda, its primacy over Rwandan courts, and its lack 
of ability to impose the death penalty. Its relations with the tribunal have ranged from coolness to 
hostility. See Alison Des Forges and Timothy Longman, “Legal Responses to Genocide in 
Rwanda,” in My Neighbor, My Enemy, 54.  
82 Makau Mutua, “Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals,” Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal 11 (1997): 168.  
83 See Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein, “A World Unto Itself? The Application of 
International Justice in the Former Yugoslavia,” in My Neighbor, My Enemy, 29; Timothy 
Longman et al., “Connecting Justice to Human Experience: Attitudes Toward Accountability and 
Reconciliation in Rwanda,” in My Neighbor, My Enemy, 206.  
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excluded from holding high-level positions on the tribunals, further eroding a sense of 
ownership, and leading to a situation where those doing the prosecuting and judging not 
only did not share the traditions of the alleged perpetrators, but in many cases were 
almost totally ignorant about local history and culture.84 Despite expectations that the 
tribunals would contribute to peace in the respective regions, it has been argued that, in 
the case of the ICTY, the tribunal’s architects “gave little thought to how it would relate to 
those most affected by the carnage ” ultimately threatening “the legitimacy of the court in 
the eyes of the society it was trying to help.”85 Given the misunderstandings and lack of 
local legitimacy, it is perhaps not surprising that some local constituencies have come to 
see the work of the ICTY as a form of victor’s justice.86 While the ICTR has provoked 
less overt hostility among ordinary Rwandans, many see it as largely useless, an affair 
conducted by the international community for the international community.87  
Mounting criticism of the ad-hoc tribunals eventually led to the creation of 
“community outreach” units, though turning around perceptions of the tribunals’ work has 
proved to be a tall order, and such outreach and other community-centered objectives 
have always been ancillary to the primary task of securing convictions.88 Writing in 2003, 
some five years after the creation of the ICTR’s outreach program, Uvin and Mironko 
note that “[t]he main sentiment in Rwanda regarding the ICTR may well be massive 
ignorance: ordinary people know or understand next to nothing about the tribunal’s work, 
proceedings, or results.”89 These are disappointing results, and it is hard to see how a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 See Fletcher and Weinstein, “A World Unto Itself?,”32; Des Forges and Longman, “Legal 
Responses to Genocide in Rwanda,” 53 (noting that in the early years of the ICTR, “[v]irtually 
none of the tribunals staff . . . knew anything about the history and culture of Rwanda.”)  
85 See Fletcher and Weinstein, “A World Unto Itself?,” 32-33. 
86 Ibid., 40. With regards to the ICTR, the tribunal’s failure to prosecute crimes committed by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front has been seen by some as a form of victor’s justice. International Crisis 
Group, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed, Africa Report No. 30 
(Brussels: ICG, 2001), iii. 
87 Ibid. See also Bert Ingelare, “The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda,” in Traditional Justice and 
Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, eds. Luc Huyse and 
Mark Salter (Stockholm: IDEA, 2008), 31-45 (arguing that “[o]n Rwandan soil, the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda is portrayed and perceived as an instance of the Western way of 
doing justice—highly inefficient, time-consuming, expensive and not adapted to Rwandan 
custom.”) 
88 See David Cohen, “‘Hybrid’ Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: “Lessons 
Learned” and Prospects for the Future,” Stanford Journal of International Law 43 (2007): 5-6; 
Varda Hussain, “Sustaining Judicial Rescues: The Role of Judicial Outreach and Capacity-
Building Efforts in War Crimes Tribunals,” Virginia Journal of International Law 45 (2005): 551; 
see also Victor Peskin, “Courting Rwanda: The Promises and Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach 
Programme,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 (2005): 950-61. 
89 Peter Uvin and Charles Mironko, “Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda,” 
Global Governance 9 (2003): 221. This ICTR is not alone in this regard. Though hailed as 
modestly innovative, it has been argued that the Outreach Section of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone “largely failed in its primary goal of educating Sierra Leoneans about the Special Court.” 
Stuart Ford, “How Special is the Special Court's Outreach Section?,” in The Sierra Leone Special 
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tribunal could contribute to broader efforts at reconciliation and post-conflict 
peacebuilding when so many are not familiar with its work in the first place.90 Lack of 
information likely also contributes to distortions promoted by those opposed to the work 
of the tribunals, including elites and former perpetrators attempting to sway public 
opinion against them.91  
Much has therefore been said about the potential for more and better outreach.92 
However, even a well staffed, well funded, and brilliantly executed outreach program can 
only do so much to bridge the substantial gap that can exist between local populations 
and international justice efforts. In and of itself, outreach does little to address the 
marginalization of local agency, priorities, values, and practice in the set up and 
operation of the tribunals, and carries with it a subtext of locals as passive recipients of 
international justice discourse and practice. Outreach does not, for example, change the 
fact that Rwandans are being judged outside of Rwanda by non-Rwandans using 
Western-style judicial practices not all Rwandans agree with or understand in an 
international tribunal that has primacy over national proceedings within Rwanda, the very 
creation of which was opposed by the Rwandan government in the first place.93 It also 
does not change the fact that defendants found guilty by the ICTR will serve their 
sentences outside of Rwanda in conditions far superior to that of anyone found guilty on 
similar charges by Rwanda’s national courts.94 Outreach does not change the fact that, 
at the end of the day, neither the Rwandan government nor the so-called international 
community solicited the views of the Rwandan people regarding how justice should best 
be achieved in post-genocide Rwanda.95 Thus, while being better informed about a 
distant process is better than being wholly ignorant, it is still very different than having a 
meaningful say about the setup and implementation of justice processes that might 
deeply affect a community.  
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 505. 
90 The preamble to the United Nations Security Council resolution establishing the ICTR provides 
that “the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law, would enable this aim [bringing effective justice] to be achieved and would contribute to the 
process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.” UNSCR 955, 
S/RES/955, November 8, 1994.  
91 See Fletcher and Weinstein, “A World Unto Itself?,” 32.  
92 See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales, “Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice,” 29-38; Etelle Higonnet, 
“Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform,” 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 23 (2005-06): 363-76, 387-88, 410-13, 425.  
93 The reasons for the Rwandan government’s opposition to the creation of the tribunal are 
discussed in footnote 81, infra.  
94 The disparate treatment of defendants and those convicted has been a source of some 
resentment in Rwanda as it gives the impression that the “big fish” who orchestrated the genocide 
are being given better treatment than “rank-and-file” offenders. See Jennie Burnet, “The Injustice 
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Prevention 3, no. 2 (2008): 175.  
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Of course, one could debate to what extent international tribunals should spend 
valuable time and resources trying to be more communicative, be more connected to 
local communities, and pursue wider social aims beyond delivering judgments.96 There 
may indeed be cause to be modest in our expectations for what a tribunal can 
meaningfully accomplish given historic resource limitations and established bureaucratic 
incentives and priorities.97 Yet one danger in not doing a better job engaging in 
questions of locality than the ICTY and ICTR is a potential loss of legitimacy and a sense 
that the tribunals are little more than a “theoretical exercise in developing international 
humanitarian law.”98 While scrupulously run proceedings and eventual convictions are 
unquestionably important, a process viewed by locals with indifference (at best) to 
hostility (at worst) would seem to represent a lost opportunity when it comes to deeper 
projects of accountability and the rule of law associated with long-term peacebuilding.  
Following the many challenges, success, and failures of the ad-hoc tribunals, a new 
international tribunal model emerged, that of the so-called “hybrid” or “mixed” tribunals of 
Sierra Leone (Special Court for Sierra Leone), Kosovo (“Regulation 64” Panels in the 
Courts of Kosovo), East Timor (the Serious Crimes Panels of the District Court of Dili), 
and Cambodia (the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia).99 Unlike the 
ICTY and ICTR, hybrid tribunals are generally located in the country most affected by 
the conflict, and are comprised of national and international judges and staff.100 This 
model was initially greeted with some enthusiasm, being thought to hold the promise of 
greater local legitimacy, greater norm penetration at the local level, and the ability to do 
more local capacity building, including strengthening domestic judicial systems.101 In the 
literature, they are often presented as a sort of evolution from and response to the 
failures and critiques of the ad-hoc tribunals,102 representing a sort of middle ground that 
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97 See Padraig McAuliffe, “Hybrid Tribunals at Ten: How International Criminal Justice’s Golden 
Child Became an Orphan,” Journal of International Law and International Relations 7 (2011): 64 
(arguing that without a significant re-orientation of the priorities of international criminal justice 
policymakers, expectations for tribunals should be dampened.) 
98 See Fletcher and Weinstein, “A World Unto Itself?,” 30.  
99 A great deal has been written about the establishment, functioning, and failures of hybrid 
tribunals. See, e.g., McAuliffe, “Hybrid Tribunals at Ten”; Cohen, “‘Hybrid’ Justice in East Timor”; 
Higonnet, “Restructuring Hybrid Courts.” 
100 There have been slight deviations from this norm. The trial of Charles Taylor before the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone was held in The Hague, due primarily to fears about security. See 
generally Giulia Bigi, “The Decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to Conduct the Charles 
Taylor Trial in The Hague,” The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 3 (2007): 
303. 
101 McAuliffe, “Hybrid Tribunals at Ten,” 10-22. 
102 See Cohen, “‘Hybrid’ Justice in East Timor,” 1; Olga Martin-Ortega and Johanna Herman, 
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Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism, eds. Oliver Richmond and 
Audra Mitchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 73. 
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harnesses the power and legitimacy of international law, remains connected to local 
expertise and populations, while avoiding the staggering costs of purely international 
prosecutions.103 Yet closer study of the creation of the various hybrid tribunals reveals a 
process of quick decisions and tough compromises more than a conscious process of 
experimentation as part of an effort to improve upon past failures.104 It should also be 
noted that the exceptional cost of the ad-hoc tribunals (which represented a full 15 
percent of the UN budget at the time of the creation of the hybrid tribunals) made the 
possibility of creating additional courts modeled on the ICTY and ICTR impossible as a 
practical matter.105 Thus, the narrative of progress and institutional learning regarding 
the best relationship between tribunals and the local may not be as straightforward as 
once imagined.  
Over a decade after the enthusiasm that greeted the first hybrid tribunals, 
evaluations of their success have become more circumspect. McAuliffe argues that 
some of the hybrid tribunals were often more hybrid in principle than in practice.106 That 
is, far from being paragons of shared or local ownership, in the case of a number of the 
tribunals, “domestic authorities were largely marginalized or disengaged” while 
internationals dominated the process.107 This may have resulted in part from ambiguity 
over allocation of responsibility and in part out of a seeming reluctance by some national 
governments to share blame and responsibility.108 Compounding matters, tribunals in 
Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodia have also been severely underfunded, 
particularly when it comes to activities such as outreach.109  
If the ad hoc tribunals orbited in space,110 the hybrid tribunals have been described 
as a “spaceship phenomenon,” with the tribunals’ physical headquarters a strange and 
alien hive of activity largely seen as an irrelevant curiosity by the local population.111 In 
practice, some critics argue, far from being the goldilocks solution some had hoped for 
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165 (2003): 136. 
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that brings together the best of the global and the local, hybrid tribunals may sometimes 
turn out to be the worst of both worlds, bringing together the remoteness of purely 
international tribunals like the ICTR and ICTY with the shoestring budgets and 
occasional lack of rigor that can at times stymie purely local efforts.112 Thus, while hybrid 
tribunals as a model continue to hold much promise,113 some have argued that without a 
radical shift in priorities and funding, we may need to be modest in our expectations as 
to what they can accomplish beyond the fairly straightforward work of trying defendants 
and rendering judgments.114  
Given that enthusiasm for hybrid tribunals has waned and additional ad hoc tribunals 
modeled on the ICTR and ICTY seem unlikely for the foreseeable future, the ability of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) to better engage with questions of locality and to 
avoid some of the failures of the past becomes especially important.115 Yet as a model, 
the institution created by the Rome Statute seems to harken back to Nuremburg and the 
ad hoc tribunals, suggesting, even in the absence of any practice, that the potential to 
generate significant global-local frictions would be high.116 Indeed, with a headquarters 
far removed both physically and culturally from the conflicts and perpetrators it has thus 
far addressed, the ICC’s first decade of practice has been regularly punctuated by what 
one could characterize as a clash between global and local.117 In Uganda, for example, 
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involving non states parties to the Court under Article 13(b). In addition, provisions in the Rome 
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where the court may sit represent a distinct improvement compared to the ad hoc tribunals, at 
least in principle. For review of the Court’s outreach work in practice, see Marlies Glasius, “What 
is Global Justice and Who Decides? Civil Society and Victim Responses to the International 
Criminal Court’s First Investigations,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 509-20.  
117 Thus far, all of the Court’s official investigations are in Africa: Central African Republic, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Sudan (Darfur), and Uganda. Though 
it has yet to take advantage of it, it should be noted that a degree of flexibility has been built into 
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of the International Criminal Court, Art. 3 (While “[t]he seat of the Court shall be established at 
The Hague in the Netherlands,” “[t]he Court may sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it 
desirable . . . .”). Judges at the ICC have recently suggested that it might be desirable to hold 
portions of a trial against Kenyan officials in either Kenya or neighboring Tanzania. BBC News, 
	   40	  
some members of Acholi constituencies in the North have expressed a strong 
preference for using local reconciliation and reintegration practices to address crimes 
committed by former members of the Lord’s Resistance Army rather than the ICC’s 
retributive justice.118 With respect to Kenya, a variety of African states and the African 
Union (AU) have attempted to pressure the Court to drop charges against Kenyan 
President Uhuru Kenyatta, with the AU chairman going so far as to accuse the ICC of 
being racist for only prosecuting cases in Africa.119 With respect to Sudan, members of 
the African Union voted to refuse cooperation with the indictment of Omar Al-Bachir.120 
Taken together, declining enthusiasm for the Court, particularly in Africa, constitutes a 
serious challenge to the future health and legitimacy of the fledgling institution, 
highlighting the importance of taking questions of locality seriously.121  
It would be easy to write off some criticism of the ICC as a sort of rearguard effort by 
autocratic leaders and regimes to preserve some of the privileges and impunity 
associated with power. Indeed, as demonstrated in Kenya, support for the work of the 
Court may at times be higher among ordinary citizens than in segments of a self-
interested political class, even if the views of the former are eventually susceptible to 
elite manipulation.122 At the same time, one should note that the possibility of having a 
former president or senior official tried for human rights abuses in a foreign country or 
before an international tribunal has almost always generated significant tensions and 
feelings of ambivalence, from Augusto Pinochet, to Charles Taylor, to Laurent Gbagbo 
today.123 Thus, one should expect that prosecutions of the type carried out by the ICC 
will generate controversy even in the best of circumstances.  
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However, though important, overemphasis of these factors would serve to ignore 
some of the deeper issues driving the global-local frictions that seem to plague the 
Court’s work, issues stemming from the way global and local responsibilities and powers 
are structured under the Rome Statute. Put simply, the very architecture the Rome 
Statute hinges on a delicate compromise between global and local sovereignty in 
matters of justice.124 Under the principle of complementarity, sometimes described as 
the “cornerstone” of the Rome Statute, member states exercise primary but only 
conditional sovereignty in matters of justice, with power effectively ceded to the ICC 
where a member is “unwilling or unable” to prosecute a case itself.125 The “unwilling or 
unable” standard echoes other emerging international norms and practices associated 
with the “responsibility to protect” and the US war on terror that are serving to 
reconfigure the relationship between global and local by replacing traditional notions of 
sovereignty with a sense of conditionality.126  
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While the principle of complementarity is in many ways a form of deference to the 
local, and stands in contrast to the primacy of jurisdiction exercised by the ad hoc 
tribunals, it also establishes a potential tension between the global and the local insofar 
as it invites the Court to stand as ultimate arbiter as to the adequacy of local effort and 
capacity.127 The principle of complementarity would also seem to preclude local 
approaches to atrocity that differ from a retributivist approach in some instances.128 
Consider in this regard the possible response of the ICC not just to a local pardon or 
grant of amnesty, but an effort to address offenses using restorative, “traditional,” or 
otherwise alternative local practices of justice and reconciliation.129 In instances without 
concurrent prosecutions, would such alternative approaches to justice be tantamount to 
“unwilling or unable” under the terms of the Rome Statute? While former Chief 
Prosecutor Louis Moreno-Ocampo has suggested that there should be great flexibility 
when it comes to lower-level offenders and the modalities of justice applied, the 
possibility for deviating from international retributivism when it comes to high-level 
offenders is less clear.130 
Building upon the principle of complementarity and the notion of the primary 
responsibility of national governments, the ICC has no enforcement mechanisms of its 
own, but is completely dependent on state cooperation to carry out investigations and 
enforce its judgments.131 Particularly in cases of self-referral under Article 14 of the 
Rome Statute, this can create special challenges to the Court’s legitimacy as ICC 
intervention is played through the prism of local politics.132 In Uganda, for example, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. Both R2P 
and the Obama administration’s terrorism policy might be considered to be an expression of a 
larger post Cold War trend where the “transformation of the adversary into a criminal [has] 
permitted, in the name of protecting humanity, intervention beyond state boundaries.”) Pierre 
Hazan, “Transitional Justice after September 11,” in Localizing Transitional Justice, 52. 
127 See William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 175 (observing that the relationship between international 
justice and national justice established under the principle of complementarity is “far from 
‘complementary,’” with the two systems functioning “in opposition and to some extent with hostility 
vis-à-vis each other.”) Aside from deference, it should be noted that the principle of 
complementarity also acknowledges the reality that the ICC is a court of limited jurisdiction 
without the resources to address the great bulk of the world’s human rights atrocities.  
128 See Alexander Greenawalt, “Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the 
International Criminal Court,” Virginia Journal of International Law (2009): 141-44.  
129 Some scholars take exception to the word “traditional” as a description of such practices 
because it can imply that local are static and because it can also have pejorative implications. As 
noted in Section C, infra., “traditional” practices used in the modern-day transitional justice 
context tend to be adaptations of much older forms of local justice and reconciliation practices. 
130 See Greenawalt, “Complementarity in Crisis,” 141-44. 
131 See Charles Jalloh, “What Makes a Crime Against Humanity a Crime Against Humanity,” 
American University Law Review (2013): 419. 
132 Under Article 14(1), a “State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or 
more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the 
Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more 
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2003 referral by the Ugandan government has resulted in the indictment of senior-level 
commanders in the Lord’s Resistance Army.133 This has proven divisive for several 
reasons. First, because it is arguably subverting local judicial and reconciliation practices 
in Northern Uganda where segments of the population would prefer the use of 
customary justice practices to the Western retributive justice of the ICC.134 Second, 
because it would seem to turn a blind eye to violations committed by the Ugandan army 
at the height of the civil war in Northern Uganda, potentially giving the impression that 
the ICC is taking sides in a conflict rather than meting out impartial justice.135 Similarly, in 
Côte d’Ivoire, former President Laurent Gbagbo stands indicted as an indirect co-
perpetrator of crimes against humanity while crimes committed by forces loyal to his 
erstwhile political opponent, current president Alassane Ouattara, are largely 
overlooked.136 In this and other cases, it may prove difficult for the ICC to serve as a 
credible check on state power while needing to tread lightly enough to ensure local 
cooperation.137  
Both the Ugandan and Ivorian cases illustrate one of the key challenges for the 
ICC and international tribunals more generally vis-à-vis the local. To stand wholly aloof 
and independent from the local invites mistrust and misunderstanding, ultimately 
undercutting the potential to do more than develop abstract international legal 
precedents. Yet the ICC is also dependent on the local for its day-to-day work, and this 
carries with it the possibility of playing into local political agendas that may further 
notions of victor’s justice, besmirch the impartiality and credibility of the ICC, and play 
into narratives that would see in the ICC a Western project that picks winners and plays 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
specific persons should be charged with the commission of such crimes.” Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Art. 14(1). 
133 See generally, Tim Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (London: Zed Books, 2006).  
134 See Adam Branch, “Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention,” Ethics and 
International Affairs 21, no. 2 (2007): 195. It should be noted, however, that the Acholi population 
is not a monolith, and there are also segments of the population that support ICC intervention. 
See Ibid., 192.  
135 See Ibid., 187-90 (2007). The suggestion of partiality was not helped when then Chief 
Prosecutor Louis Moreno-Ocampo appeared at a joint press conference in London with President 
Museveni in January 2004. See Michael Otim and Marieke Wierda, “Justice at Juba: International 
Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda,” in Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and 
the ICC in Africa, eds. Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark (London: The Royal African Society, 
2008), 22. There are also suggestions that it was actually Moreno-Ocampo who first persuaded 
Museveni to file the “self-referral” in the first place, further giving the impression of some kind of 
unseemly partnership. See Phil Clark, “Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case 
Selection in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda,” in Courting Conflict?, 43.  
136 See Human Rights Watch, Turning Rhetoric into Reality: Accountability for Serious 
International Crimes in Cote d’Ivoire (New York: HRW, 2013), 10; see also Pascal Airault, “Côte 
d’Ivoire – CPI: Gbagbo ou le Bénéfice du Doute,” Jeune Afrique, June 14, 2013.  
137 See Janine Clark, “Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court: Limitations and 
Possibilities,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 9 (2011): 527-29.  
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favorites.138 What seems clear is that an international tribunal that ignores the complexity 
of local context (history, politics, culture, etc.) does so at its own peril.139 Building the 
legitimacy of transitional and post-conflict justice interventions over time will likely require 
an exquisite sensitivity to context, and this may, as Greenawalt has argued, “call for as 
much, if not more, open-ended political assessment and balancing than for legal 
expertise.”140  
While the dilemmas of the global and the local are perhaps most acute in the 
realm of international and mixed tribunals, truth commissions often raise similar issues, 
though perhaps in more subtle ways. Over the last thirty years, the truth commission has 
become a truly global phenomenon, with some forty commissions having been created, 
and new ones emerging on a fairly regular basis.141 Though their mandates, composition, 
and powers vary greatly, most truth commissions attempt to accomplish three essential 
tasks: (1) diagnosing “what went wrong” in the lead up to the conflict or period of abuses; 
(2) documenting and analyzing the human rights abuses that were perpetrated; and (3) 
offering prescriptions for the future with a view to preventing recurrence of conflict.142  
These tasks would seem to require an approach that is much more open-ended, 
context sensitive, and participatory than most tribunals. And indeed, truth commissions 
tend to be located in the affected region, largely staffed by locals, and typically involve 
the direct participation of a greater number of members of the affected public than a 
tribunal.143 At the same time, as Rama Mani has noted, owing to restricted mandates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 See Glasius, “What is Global Justice,” 519 (arguing that “[o]n the basis of current indictments 
he [the ICC prosecutor] could even be accused of exercising victor’s justice . . He has helped 
governments, including some that are none too friendly to human rights, to constrain rebels and 
rogue states under the banner of international law.”) 
139 For this reason, it has been argued that a “stakeholder assessment” employing qualitative 
interviews, ethnographies, focus groups, or population-based surveys should be carried out prior 
to a transitional justice intervention in order to discern local preferences, values, and cultural 
knowledge. See Ramji-Nogales, “Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice,” 63-67. Nogales 
argues that under this model, the ICC prosecutor “would issue an indictment only if the population 
expresses a preference for international prosecutions in a distance location.” Ibid., 70. While 
efforts along these lines to gain a greater appreciation of context would be a welcome step 
forward in many instances, at the same time, in the case of a potential ICC intervention based on 
a self-referral by a national government, this would raise some serious questions about 
sovereignty in the context of international justice. Even where a government might not be fully 
representative or a population divided, one could ask whether it is appropriate for an international 
treaty-based institution to do an end run around s state party in this way. 
140 See Greenawalt, “Complementarity in Crisis,” 159. 
141 In her authoritative book on the topic, Priscilla Hayner documents the existence of forty 
modern-day truth commissions. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 256-62.  
Since that volume’s publication, new commissions have emerged in Côte d’Ivoire and Brazil.  
142 Sharp, “Economic Violence in the Practice of African Truth Commissions,” in Justice and 
Economic Violence in Transition.  
143 There has been at least one call for a permanent international truth commission. See generally, 
Michael Scharf, “The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission,” Duke Comparative 
and International Law Journal 7 (1997): 375. That said, as Hayner has noted, “[m]ost truth 
commissions are predominantly national, in both commission members and staff.” Hayner, 
	   45	  
and budgets, participation of the local population can still be quite limited, and the 
dissemination of reports can be erratic, incomplete, or even nonexistent.144 Nevertheless, 
truth commission have, by and large, been spared the trenchant critiques directed 
toward tribunals vis-à-vis their rather clumsy engagement with the local. Yet there is also 
a sense in which truth commissions have become part of a global project rather than a 
local initiative, a box to tick on post-conflict checklist funded by international donors and 
assisted by a shadow staff of international consultants, rather than the result of a home-
grown push for the particular type of truth and accountability that a truth commission can 
deliver.145 One might consider in this regard the truth commission in East Timor, 
established not by domestic actors, but by a legal act of the UN’s Human Rights Unit,146 
or the extremely close association between the International Center for Transitional 
Justice and the work of the Moroccan Equity and Reconciliation Commission (Instance 
Équité et Réconciliation, IER).147 The result may often be a truth-seeking process that is 
not as attuned to local needs and realities as one might expect. Thus, Cavallaro and 
Albuja observe that in some respects truth commissions tend to hew to a “dominant 
script” that has been established over time not because it was necessarily perfectly 
attuned to each new context, but as a result of “repeated information exchange and 
consultations.”148 Funding from international donors, training workshops by international 
NGOs, and the occasional “technical assistance” provided by international consultants 
likely contribute to this phenomenon.  
 More fundamentally, anthropologist Rosalind Shaw has argued that the truth 
commission as a global phenomenon is rooted in Western modes of truth telling and 
traditions of public confession and may not be appropriate in cultures with a different 
historical grounding.149 In Sierra Leone, for example, many people preferred a “forgive 
and forget” approach grounded in local practices of memory, healing, and social 
forgetting.150 Similarly, in Mozambique, Mani argues, the desire to remember to the truth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Unspeakable Truths, 214-15. A notable exception is El Salvador where the truth commission was 
under the administration and oversight of the United Nations, with an entirely foreign staff and set 
of commissioners. Ibid, 214.  
144 Rama Mani, “Rebuilding an Inclusive Political Community after War,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 
4 (2005): 519. 
145 See David Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the 
Enthusiasm?,” International Studies Review 6 (2004): 355-56 (noting that truth-telling is 
increasingly considered a necessary component of the post-conflict peacebuilding process, 
together with demobilization, disarmament, and the holding of postwar elections).  
146 See Carsten Stahn, “Justice Under Transitional Administration: Contours and Critique of a 
Paradigm,” Houston Journal of International Law 27 (2004-2005): 335-36. 
147 See Mark Freeman and Veerle Opgenhaffen, Transitional Justice in Morocco: A Progress 
Report (New York: ICTJ, 2005); see also International Center for Transitional Justice, Morocco, 
ICTY’s Role, http://ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/morocco.  
148 Cavallaro and Albuja, “The Lost Agenda,” 125.  
149 See generally Rosalind Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions; Lessons 
from Sierra Leone, United States Institute for Peace Special Report 130 (Washington: USIP, 
2005).  
150 See Ibid., 9.  
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did not even exist.151 The prevailing sentiment seemed to be that “the less we dwell on 
the past, the more likely reconciliation will be,” and traditional cleansing rituals were used 
to help reintegrate combatants into their communities and at the sites of massacres.152 
Assumptions about the purportedly universal benefits of verbally remembering violence 
that appear to undergird the work of most truth commissions, Shaw argues, may 
undermine and serve to displace these alternative approaches to dealing with the 
past.153 This may explain why many Sierra Leoneans attending truth commission 
hearings appeared to be less than enthusiastic about the process, though Kelsall notes 
that some hearings may have had unintended benefits once locals started to transform 
them though the incorporation of a process of community ritual.154  
From this, it can be said that many of the assumptions of truth commissions—
including the notion that personal healing promotes national healing, that truth-telling 
promotes reconciliation, and that forgetting the past necessarily leads to war—even if 
valid in some contexts and cultures, may not hold in others. For these and other reasons, 
Mendeloff argues that one should not be so quick to proclaim the necessity of truth 
commission in the aftermath of violent conflict.155 As with tribunals, the need for context-
specific approaches that take into account questions of local ownership, agency, 
priorities, values, and practices must be given greater weight if truth-seeking practices 
and institutions are to live up to their many promises.156  
 
 
C. The Promises and Pitfalls of the Local 
 
“Ultimately, no rule of law reform, justice reconstruction, or transitional 
justice initiative imposed from the outside can hope to be successful or 
sustainable … [w]e must learn better how to respect and support local 
ownership, local leadership and a local constituency for reform, while at 
the same time remaining faithful to United Nations norms and standards.” 
--U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN Doc. 
S/2004/616, ¶ 17 (Aug. 23, 2004).  
 
If an imperious global justice has in some contexts been stymied by a ham-fisted 
engagement with the local that has served to blunt both legitimacy and effectiveness, 
making the global in some ways part of the problem, can it be that giving greater weight 
to principles like “local ownership” will lead to better solutions in the transitional justice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Mani, “Rebuilding an Inclusive Political Community,” 519.  
152 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 197-203.  
153 See Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, 1.  
154 See generally Kelsall, “Truth, Lies, Ritual,” 361.  
155 See Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking,” 355.  
156 See Ibid., 358-361 (2004) (outlining claims made with respect to the beneficial effects of truth 
commissions on social healing and reconciliation, justice, the official historical record, public 
education, institutional reform, democracy, and deterrence).  
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context? In the UN policy literature in particular, the concept of local ownership has 
become nearly sacrosanct, with incantations to the local found across range of policy 
documents.157 Some see in the prominence of the concept an attempt to paper over the 
legitimacy crisis in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, sparked in part by criticism 
emphasizing their neo-colonial and overly Western character.158 But whatever the exact 
impetus, it is painfully clear that rhetorical tribute to local ownership has often failed to 
translate into meaningful changes “on the ground,” making the concept superficial and 
slippery in practice.159 At the same time, because of the intellectual currency that the 
concept has achieved in donor and policy circles, it continues to be invoked by different 
actors in different ways to assert influence over post-conflict policy processes.160 Bendix 
and Stanley, for example, observe that in the context of security sector reform donors 
demand local ownership to legitimize donor-driven policy prescriptions, local 
governments demand local ownership to secure their own power and influence, and 
non-state actors want local ownership as a means to give themselves access to the 
policy process.161  
Taken together, local ownership has become something of an empty signifier, 
employed by nearly everyone while at the same time remaining vague and poorly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 A 2011 UN report on the rule of law together with annexes invokes the word “ownership” no 
less than 17 times. See U.N. Secretary-General, Strengthening and Coordinating United Nations 
Rule of Law Activities, UN Doc. A/66/133 (August 8, 2011). While this may be an extreme 
example, Simon Chesterman, who has written widely about the concept of ownership in post-
conflict peacebuilding, has noted that “[e]very UN mission and development program now 
stresses the importance of local ‘ownership.’” See Chesterman, “Walking Softly,” 41. The concept 
itself is often traced to the field of economic development, and represents the evolution in some 
ways of concepts like “participatory development.” See Simon Chesterman, “Ownership in Theory 
and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations,” Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding 1, no. 1 (2007): 7; see also Benjamin de Carvalho and Niels Nagelhus Schia, Local 
and National Ownership in Post-Conflict Liberia: Foreign and Domestic Inside Out?, NUPI 
Working paper 787 (Oslo: NUPI, 2011), 6. For an example of what one might call a backlash to 
the growing discourse of local ownership, see Edward Joseph, “Ownership is Over-rated,” SAIS 
Review 27 (2007): 109.  
158 See Carvalho and Schia, Local and National Ownership, 1-6. 
159 See Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition?,” 5; see also Chesterman, “Ownership in Theory 
and in Practice,” 9. Indeed, far short of giving meaningful content to “ownership,” Longman has 
argued that “[g]overnments and international institutions, such as the United Nations, rarely, if 
ever, consult affected populations when formulating policies aimed at rebuilding post-war 
societies.” Longman et al., “Connecting Justice to Human Experience,” 206. But see Anna 
Triponel and Stephen Pearson, “What do You Think Should Happen? Public Participation in 
Transitional Justice,” Pace International Law Review 22 (2010): 103 (examining a trend toward 
increasing public consultation in the set up phase of transitional justice mechanisms).  
160 See Patricia Lundy, “Exploring Home-Grown Transitional Justice and Its Dilemmas: A Case 
Study of the Historical Enquiries Team, Northern Ireland,” International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 3, no. 3 (2009): 329 (arguing that “the concept of local/home-grown transitional justice is 
capable of being expropriated and manipulated to mask or serve other interests and ‘unjust’ 
practices”). 
161 Bendix and Stanley, “Deconstructing Local Ownership,” 101.   
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understood.162 Yet the opacity of the concept does not diminish its importance. As 
Donais has argued, “there are real limits on the ability of outsiders to shape, direct, and 
influence events within states emerging from conflict,” meaning that there is no real 
alternative to substantive local ownership over the longer term.163 International experts 
can run an international or hybrid tribunal in the short term and donors can fund a truth 
commission, but ultimately only “deep and locally owned social and political dynamics” 
can guarantee “well functioning institutions that produce substantive results.”164 
Compounding matters, successful initiatives require the kind of profound local 
knowledge of context and culture that international actors almost never possess.165 Yet 
even with ample awareness of context, interventions felt to be imposed “from the outside” 
are more likely to be seen as illegitimate, raising the possibility of backlash and ill will 
towards reforms.166 In this sense, the struggle to give greater significance to local 
ownership can be seen as profoundly pragmatic.  
More fundamentally, however, the concept of local ownership raises important 
normative questions, asking us to consider whether people have the right to determine 
their own destiny and make their own mistakes.167 As Stahn observes, to even ask the 
question suggests a certain paternalism,168 and could risk pathologizing and infantilizing 
entire post-war populations.169 The normative pull of principles of self-determination and 
democratic control emanating from the concept of local ownership is especially strong 
when you consider that even with the best of intentions, errors of intervention are likely, 
yet it is locals who must live with and bear the costs of these errors over the long term.170 
International actors, in contrast, will pack their bags and move on to the next crisis. In 
this sense, the concept of local ownership asks us to recognize that if the goals of post-
conflict peacebuilding include classic liberal goods of democracy, good governance, and 
the rule of law, divorcing control and agency over a set of post-conflict initiatives from 
accountability and cost bearing is ultimately a self-defeating exercise in contradiction.171 
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163 See Donais, “Haiti and the Dilemmas of Local Ownership,” 772.  
164 See Uvin, “Difficult Choices in the New Post-Conflict Agenda,”186. 
165 von Carlowitz, Local Ownership in Practice, 54 (observing that while they often possess 
technical knowledge and professional skills, international actors mostly lack sufficient knowledge 
of local structures and traditions).  
166 Talentino, “Perceptions of Peacebuilding,” 153.  
167 See Stahn, “Justice Under Transitional Administration,” 326; von Carlowitz, Local Ownership 
in Practice, 54 (observing that “local ownership might remain rhetoric because international actors 
are unwilling to allow their local counterparts to make their own mistakes.”); An-Na’im, “Editorial 
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168 Stahn, “Justice Under Transitional Administration,” 326. 
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no. 3 (2003): 64 (exploring tensions between unaccountable international intervention and the 
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Despite its obvious importance, the turn to the local in matters of post-conflict 
justice and peacebuilding is no panacea. In calling for better engagement with questions 
of locality, there is danger of propagating the myth of a virtuous local that may lead to a 
tendency to overlook its complexities.172 Even without such romanticization, making local 
ownership meaningful in the post-conflict context is extraordinarily challenging. The 
more intrusive international peace and justice interventions often occur in regions where 
there has been a profound breakdown in local political and normative structures and 
ordering.173 In some cases, the formal institutions of governance have been hollowed out 
or collapsed entirely, and much of the expertise that may have helped to re-build the 
country has fled, resulting serious deficits in terms of capacity and technical expertise.174 
Complicating matters further, with the ethnic, political, and economic cleavages that 
often lead to and continue in the aftermath of conflict, there is often no coherent set of 
“local owners” in the first place.175 Indeed, it has been argued that “[p]ostconlict spaces, 
almost by definition, are characterized far more by diversity and division than by 
unity.”176 In this context, post-conflict justice, like other interventions affecting 
distributions of power, can be utilized by post-war elites as a means of jockeying for gain, 
furthering partisan political agendas, and attempting to re-impose pre-conflict power 
structures that may be discriminatory or otherwise not in keeping with international 
human rights standards.177 Ultimately, therefore, as one set of waggish commentators 
put it, “the local ownership championed by the international community is not local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
need to plant the seeds of democratic politics in Bosnia); see also Stahn, “Justice Under 
Transitional Administration,” 330 (exploring how the United Nations Mission in Kosovo absolved 
itself of legal checks on its power, making accountability a one-way street where locals are 
expected to bear the costs).  
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ownership tout court but local ownership of a specific kind: the good kind.”178 
 If the post-conflict waters are sewn with mines that serve to make local 
ownership difficult in practice, navigation is made all the more complex by the role, 
expectations, and financial power of the international actors drawn to the scene. Taking 
concepts like local ownership seriously necessarily involves significant additional time 
and expense, yet international actors and donors tend to be impatient and anxious for 
results.179 At the same time, international standards for transitional justice interventions 
are institutionally demanding, tending privilege technocratic expertise over deep local 
contextual knowledge.180 When coupled with global-local imbalances in terms of financial 
capacity, the end result is that all too often post-conflict justice interventions tend to 
place less of a premium on local ownership in practice than the global policy rhetoric 
would suggest.  
Taken together, in many instances it might be said that true local ownership in 
the sense of full local agency and control is simply unrealistic.181 In the context of 
international and hybrid tribunals in particular, it may well be impossible.182 How, for 
example, could one truly have local ownership—again in the sense of agency and 
control—of a prosecution by the ICC, ICTY, or SCSL?183 Even outside the context of 
such tribunals, global power and funding structures, together with the momentum and 
politics of the international justice advocacy movement would seem to suggest that 
some degree of international involvement is inevitable as a practical matter.  
Building on this, it has been argued that in some cases full local ownership may 
not even be desirable, and that some degree of international involvement is necessary in 
at least a supporting role if not more.184 In many instances for example, “local violent 
conflicts are no longer local or traditional in their causation or dynamics,” having been 
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transformed by “interventions of regional and global actors.”185 In such cases, simple 
concepts of “local solutions to local problems” would seem to fail to capture the 
complexity of the situation. There are also arguments that some kind of global-local 
balance is required due to “capacity gaps” and the possibility of excessive 
parochialism.186 Might it be, for example, that a better global-local balance in the trial of 
Saddam Hussein could have resulted in something less like a show-trial?187 Similar 
weaknesses in the national judiciaries of Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and 
Cambodia led in part the creation of international hybrid tribunals.188 Finally, outside of 
the courtroom, other local experiments in transitional justice such as Gacaca in Rwanda, 
described in greater detail below, can and do conflict with international human rights 
standards—raising difficult question about whether and how to balance individual 
freedoms against principles of self-determination.189  
For these and other reasons, while the local is often seen as one of the keys to 
the legitimacy of transitional justice initiatives, perceived legitimacy is in practice quite 
complex and there are no guarantees that a process will be seen as legitimate at any 
level simply because there is a high degree of local ownership.190 In some instances, 
local constituencies might actually express a preference for an international prosecution, 
for example, due to perceptions that national courts are corrupt and lack 
independence.191 In the end, therefore, too much local may raise as many questions as 
too much global.192 As Mazlish argues, the local cannot simply be used as a talisman to 
ward off all possible intervention.193 The world over, someone’s local has often given 
way to a larger local—with the dismantling of segregation in the Southern United Sates 
being one example—the results of which are hard to disagree with in the long term.194  
 Simply put, while there is no alternative to local ownership in the long run, in the 
short-run at least, local ownership may at times be an impossible ideal. If this makes for 
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a very difficult needle to thread in terms of post-conflict programming, it may explain why 
so much of the literature on local ownership does little more than say that it is both 
important and hard.195 At the policy level, the tendency in the face of these dilemmas is 
to elide complexity, with local ownership becoming a sort of cheap bureaucratic trope to 
signal the need for local “buy in” and support rather than meaningful input or control.196 
Moving past this state of affairs in order to strike a better balance between global and 
local requires that we look more deeply into constructions of “global” and “local.” 
 
 
D. Striking a Better Balance Between Global and Local 
 
For all of their importance, there is a sense in which the dilemmas of the global 
and the local are false dilemmas created by rigid intellectual categories.197 As Goodale 
has observed, outside of the academic and policy literature, there is no place called 
“local” or “global”—any more than there is an “international plane,” an “international 
community,” or places called “on the ground” and “in the field,” yet these concepts are 
often spoken of as if they actually existed.198 The global-local binary is also problematic 
insofar as it implies that there are only two levels at which social processes emerge or 
unfold, and insofar as it implicitly invokes a normative hierarchy and teleology.199 Thus, 
both categories tend to essentialize and depoliticize sets of actors that are neither 
ideologically monolithic nor politically homogenous. For these and other reasons, some 
scholars have questioned the value of the concept of the local, arguing instead for more 
complicated notions of “glocality” and “translocality.”200  
Despite these problems, the global-local distinction remains a central theme in 
human rights discourse, and is useful for its ability to underscore power asymmetries in 
the transitional justice context.201 Similarly, as a policy trope and as an ideal, the concept 
of the local can provide an important counterweight to the centralizing and universalizing 
tendencies of transitional justice and liberal international peacebuilding more 
generally.202 There may be therefore be times when it is useful to categorize and 
essentialize to avoid pushing power differentials to the background, somewhat in 
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keeping with Spivak’s concept of “strategic essentialisms.”203 Thus, concepts of the local 
and the global retain utility for purposes of both analysis and policymaking, even if they 
do not accurately describe the full complexity of all transitional justice processes as they 
emerge and unfold. Working through the dilemmas of the local therefore requires a 
complicated analytical tightrope act. On the one hand, the global-local binary remains a 
useful construct for the reasons articulated. At the same time, understanding the 
complexity of global-local dynamics requires some deconstruction and destabilization, 
breaking down simple binary notions.  
 The analytical utility of breaking down simple binary notions of local and global 
can be illustrated by examining the Gacaca process in Rwanda.204 Historically, Gacaca 
served as a form of community-based informal arbitration employed to resolve minor 
disputes at the village level.205 Following the arrests of suspected génocidaires in the 
years that followed the 1994 genocide, Rwanda’s prisons population swelled to well over 
130,000.206 These figures grossly overwhelmed the capacity of Rwanda’s legal system, 
creating the very realistic possibility that thousands of individuals would either die in 
Rwanda’s severely overcrowded prisons before they would be granted a trial, or need to 
be released without trial.207 This led to pressure from a variety of actors to solve a very 
palpable human rights problem, and the idea adapting Gacaca to address genocide-
related crimes emerged.208  
While its exact provenance is somewhat murky, the idea of using Gacaca may 
have arisen out of a conversation between a researcher for Human Rights Watch and 
some professors from the National University.209 Alternatively, Oomen points to 
“evidence that it was representatives of the donor community who first raised the 
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idea.”210 Others point to a 1996 report by the United Nations High Commission for 
Human Rights, which concluded that Gacaca might play a role in dealing with genocide-
related crimes, but only as a sort of truth-seeking adjunct to the work of tribunals or a 
community reconciliation mechanism that should be buffered from too much government 
interference.211 Whatever the precise origins, the idea of drafting Gacaca into national 
service to address Rwanda’s post-genocide justice challenges was eagerly seized upon 
by the Rwandan government and members of the international donor community.212  
As adopted and adapted, the Gacaca of “tradition” was effectively transformed by 
the Rwandan government from a relatively informal community-driven conflict-resolution 
mechanism to a modernized and formalized public punitive justice institution backed by 
the power of the state.213 Whereas pre-genocide Gacaca was not applied in cases of 
cattle theft, murder, or other serious crimes, it was adapted to complex circumstances 
involving mass atrocities and genocide.214 This proved especially troubling to 
international human rights groups who questioned the lack of protections for the accused, 
minimal training for Gacaca judges, and issues of corruption, among other things.215 
Despite some of the controversy, Gacaca was initially welcomed by many 
outside Rwanda in the as an creative and pragmatic means to address a troubling 
backlog of cases relating to the 1994 genocide.216 It also appeared to enjoy widespread 
support by ordinary Rwandans.217 From a distance, it seemed to be the embodiment of a 
homegrown, locally owned, culturally embedded process—a Rwandan solution to 
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Rwandan problems—yet this obfuscates some of the complex reality.218 As noted, while 
loosely based on a traditional dispute resolution process and championed by the 
Rwandan government as the only possible solution, the impetus for Gacaca also owes 
much to discussion generated by Rwandan scholars, international human rights activists, 
UN reports, and donors to say nothing of sustained pressure from international NGOs 
and other entities to address Rwanda’s serious prison overcrowding problem. It was 
carried out in large part as a result of support from international donors.219 What was 
presented as “traditional” and “community based” was really a hybrid that moved back 
and forth between historical origins and capture by the nation state.220 Thus, to adopt the 
neologism of some scholars, it might indeed be correct to say that the origins and 
unfolding of the Gacaca process were very much “glocal” or “translocal.”221 In this way, 
the emergence and shaping of transitional justice processes might be seen as part of a 
continued dialectical process between multiple “levels”—global, regional, national, and 
community. Simple categories of global and local fail to capture this complexity.  
The complex reality of transitional justice processes only serves to further 
illustrate just how problematic simple notions of local ownership really are. Just as the 
global-local binary must be questioned and blurred, making better sense of global-local 
dilemmas and interactions also requires us to break down and unpack concepts like 
“local ownership” into constituent parts. In practice, I argue, the term has become a sort-
of catch all for concerns relating to actual control (agency, decision making, funding), 
process (whether a transitional justice initiative is “bottom-up,” participatory or 
homegrown, being shaped by input from “the grassroots,” or “top-down” and imposed; 
whether it is driven by the state or “the community”), and substance (whether a 
transitional justice initiative honors and resonates with local values and practices). While 
the control, process, and substance dimensions of local ownership are in practice often 
going to be highly related, it may not be necessary to satisfy concerns relating to all 
three for a transitional justice program to be perceived as legitimate. For example, 
hypothetically, a UN or otherwise “externally” controlled and funded program might be 
seen as legitimate by many local constituencies if it were heavily shaped by a bottom-up 
participatory process that put local priorities and practices at the heart of the program. In 
contrast, a transitional justice program might be fully controlled by a national government 
or other locals, and yet still be part of a state-centric solution imposed from the top-down 
upon local peasant communities without significant input, and ultimately be seen by 
many locals as lacking legitimacy. 
Both hypotheticals presented here would seem to suggest that the process 
dimension of local ownership is especially key to the design of transitional justice 
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interventions, not simply because process can help to generate feelings of (il)legitimacy, 
but also because, in practice, satisfying process concerns may tend to lead to 
transitional justice modalities that hit positive notes on the substance axis.222 At the 
same time, undue focus on the process dimension alone is potentially problematic as it 
has been observed in other contexts that ideas like “participatory development” can 
easily be co-opted by states and international institutions to their own ends.223 In the 
transitional justice context, it has similarly been noted that where efforts at “consultation” 
do take place, local communities are often asked for input into project implementation 
long after more fundamental questions of design and set-up have already been 
established, suggesting that process concerns are often treated as a shallow, technical 
exercise.224 There is therefore a danger that as notions of process, including 
participation, are mainstreamed, they become yet another bureaucratic planning tool, 
muddying useful distinctions between genuinely people-centered, bottom-up processes 
and top-down, technocratic ones.225 Finally, beyond process, one should not dismiss the 
importance of the control dimension, which—being intimately linked to the power and 
politics of transitional justice interventions—still plays an important role in global-local 
frictions and feelings of legitimacy.  
By offering this schema, the intent is not to suggest that categories of control, 
process, and substances are in any way definitive, or that local ownership could not be 
broken down into alternative or additional categories. The key point is that thinking of 
local ownership multi-dimensionally based on the unique history of each particular 
context is a much more useful exercise than the loose sloganeering that often takes 
place around the concept today. Again, the Gacaca process serves as a useful real-
world illustration of some of these complex dynamics.  
At the most superficial level, the Gacaca process was very much “locally owned” 
as compared to the ICTR, for example, in the sense that formal control was retained by 
Rwandans. Yet to end there would be to confuse local ownership with ownership by the 
national government, a distinction that is potentially problematic in a context where the 
government cannot be assumed to represent many local constituencies or to be subject 
to checks and balances if it fails to consider their input.226 The results of the Gacaca 
process illustrate that this kind of national ownership alone will often not be sufficient to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 See generally, Triponel and Pearson, “What do You Think Should Happen” (examining trend 
toward increasing public consultation in the set up phase of transitional justice mechanisms.  
223 See Lundy, “Exploring Home-Grown Transitional Justice,” 329. The concept of participation 
has a long history in the field of development, and is both revered and reviled in the literature for 
its power to both empower and co-opt. For a review of the history and trajectory of the concept, 
see generally Sam Hickey and Giles Mohan, “Towards Participation as Transformation: Critical 
Themes and Challenges,” in Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation?, eds. Samuel Hickey 
and Giles Mohan (New York: Zed Books, 2004).  
224 See Rubli, Transitional Justice: Justice by Bureaucratic Means, 12.  
225 See Hickey and Mohan, “Towards Participation as Transformation,” 4.  
226 Oomen, “Donor-Driven Justice,” 899-902 (discussing the “increasingly oppressive” and 
authoritarianism climate in Rwanda).  
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create legitimacy in the eyes of many local constituencies.227 Thus, the process 
dimension of local ownership, including whether a transitional justice initiative is carried 
out in a manner that is “bottom-up,” drawing upon meaningful input and participation by 
affected communities, remains critical.228 While the Gacaca process certainly involved a 
lot of participation by ordinary Rwandans in the hearings themselves, attendance at 
Gacaca hearings eventually dwindled and had to be coerced, and Rwandans had little 
space to contest dimensions of the larger Gacaca process itself.229 Thus, there was a 
very real sense in which the process was imposed from the top-down (with the top being 
Kigali rather than New York or Geneva).230  
Beyond control and process, there is also a substantive dimension to questions 
of local ownership, including the extent to which a transitional justice initiative honors 
and resonates with local values and practices. Even on this score, the Gacaca process 
receives mixed results. While initially greeted with enthusiasm by the Rwandan 
population as a distinctively Rwandan approach to post-conflict justice in contrast with 
the remote and Western ICTR, many Rwandans were ultimately alienated by the 
process and felt that it lacked legitimacy.231 In many respects, the process appeared to 
be more in tune with national (or government) values and priorities than community-
based ones in the sense that it was engineered to reinforce longstanding partisan 
narratives favored by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) political party by excluding 
crimes committed by the RPF from the Gacaca process.232 Thus, Gacaca illustrates that 
adapting the trappings of local practices, traditions, and rituals alone is not sufficient to 
generate a sense of legitimacy and good will toward a transitional justice program.  
With the process concluded as of 2012, Gacaca leaves an ambiguous legacy.233 
While it constitutes an important experiment in post-conflict justice programming, its 
glaring gaps and deficiencies also serve as something of a cautionary tale.234 Initially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Many ordinary Rwandans prefer the Gacaca courts over Rwanda’s national courts and the 
ICTR. See Ingelare, “The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda,” 51. At the same time, other Rwandans see 
it as an imposition from Kigali. See Burnet, “The Injustice of Local Justice,” 188; see also Oomen, 
“Donor-Driven Justice,” 904 (noting that “the public at large seemed to increasingly consider the 
[Gacaca] meetings as mandatory events to sit through, just like community service.”) 
228 See generally, Triponel and Pearson, “What do You Think Should Happen?” 
229 See Ingelare, “The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda,” 31, 46-47 
230 See Burnet, “The Injustice of Local Justice,” 188 
231 See Ibid. 
232 See Christopher Le Mon, “Rwanda’s Troubled Gacaca Courts,” Human Rights Brief 14 (Winter 
2007): 16. The RPF was the military victor in the Rwandan conflict and has effectively set the 
agenda for post-genocide Rwanda without much restraint. See Ingelare, “The Gacaca Courts in 
Rwanda,” 31-32. 
233 Phil Clark has written a comprehensive review of Gacaca, delving into strengths and 
weaknesses in great detail. See generally Phil Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice 
and Reconciliation in Rwanda; see also Ingelare, “The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda,” 51-57 
(evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of Gacaca).  
234 These include the fact that the Gacaca process actually led to increases in the numbers of the 
accused and detained. See Burnet, “The Injustice of Local Justice,” 178. It may have also 
increased conflict in some communities. See ibid., 74.  
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projected as an exemplar of local ownership in transitional justice, Gacaca was in 
practice another top-down, state-based solution imposed on affected communities, and 
ultimately suffered a loss of legitimacy as a result.235 Given the authoritarian political 
climate in Rwanda, this should not be surprising.236 Rather than transcending Rwanda’s 
post-genocide political culture, Gacaca was simply played out through its prism.237  
At a deeper level, Gacaca illustrates the almost inescapable pull of both universalism 
and particularism in transitional justice processes, with notions of what it means to do 
justice in the aftermath of conflict invariably shaped by contested global and local 
standards.238 More than that, however, it represents a clash of purportedly universal 
commitments, between liberal internationalism and international human rights, on the 
one hand, and conceptions of local autonomy, self-determination, and sovereignty on 
the other. Given the seeming inevitability of these competing forces in many transitional 
justice interventions, the disappointments and politics of Gacaca point not to the need to 
abandon alternative or “hybrid” approaches to post-conflict justice, but to consider 
possibilities that offer a better balance, including global-local balance, along the multiple 
axes of local ownership: control, process, and substance.239  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 See Oomen, “Donor-Driven Justice and its Discontents,” 906-07; see also Thomson and Nagy, 
Law, “Power and Justice,” 13 (describing Gacaca as a “state-imposed” project).  
236 See Thomson and Nagy, “Law, Power and Justice,” 13 (noting that legal systems, traditional 
or otherwise, “inescapably embody prevailing constellations of power.”) 
237 See Andrew Iliff, “Root and Branch: Discourses of ‘Tradition’ in Grassroots Transitional 
Justice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 6, no. 2 (2012): 8 (arguing that Gacaca was 
used to “bolster[] the current Rwandan government’s framing of the genocide as a singular event 
legitimating its authoritarian rule.”) 
238 For a review of the ways in which the universality debate in human rights can inform dilemmas 
of the global and the local that arise in the transitional justice context, see generally Lieselotte 
Viaene and Eva Brems, “Transitional Justice and Cultural Contexts: Learning from the 
Universality Debate,” Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 28 (2010): 199; see also Alexander 
Betts, “Should Approaches to Post-conflict Justice and Reconciliation be Determined Globally, 
Nationally, or Locally?,” European Journal of Development Research 17 (2005): 740-44 
(discussing the ways in which the universalism-versus-relativism debate played out in post-
genocide Rwanda).  
239 It is important to note that not all attempts to integrate local or “traditional” approaches to post-
conflict justice and reconciliation have been as controversial as Gacaca. These efforts have not 
typically substituted for trials and truth commissions, but have served as an important 
complement to them. For example, in East Timor’s Community Reconciliation Process, 
reconciliation between perpetrators and former combatants with members of their estranged 
communities was facilitated by drawing upon elements of local ritual, arbitration, and mediation 
practice. See generally Patrick Burgess, “A New Approach to Restorative Justice – East Timor’s 
Community Reconciliation Process,” in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-first Century, eds. Roht-
Arriaza and Mariezcurrena, 176-205. In Sierra Leone, the formal, state-sanctioned truth 
commission incorporated aspects of local ritual into its work. See generally Kelsall, “Truth, Lies, 
Ritual.” The non-governmental organization Fambul Tok (“Family Talk” in the Krio language) has 
also worked to facilitate a context-specific response to reconciliation. See generally Park, 
“Community-Based Restorative Transitional Justice.” All of these efforts have been marked by 
significant elements of global-local hybridity.  
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As noted in the area of hybrid courts, practices of genuine global-local hybridity hold 
promise, yet have not been adequately tested in practice, suggesting the need for further 
innovation. 240 For all of their promise, however, future experiments in alternative or 
hybridized justice and reconciliation are unlikely to involve easy compromise or simple 
solutions to the dilemmas of the global and the local. Better global-local balance requires 
a give and take on both “sides,”241 something that goes well beyond the lip service paid 
to tokenistic concepts of local ownership today.242 Moving beyond superficial concepts of 
local ownership will necessarily entail a fundamental re-consideration of the primacy of 
Western approaches to mass atrocity.243 Thus, reimagining the foreclosed possibilities 
will require more than a simple call to place greater emphasis on the local or non-
Western, 244 requiring instead a more fundamental re-consideration of what it means to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 The concept of hybridity has been offered in the broader context of peacebuilding as one way 
to begin to move beyond simple global-local debates and to better capture  
the complexity of the relationships between the many actors involved. See generally Roger Mac 
Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance. Rethinking Peace and Conflict (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011). Hybridized forms of peacebuilding that involve a mixture of 
conventional and local practices and models are also offered as one way to begin to move 
beyond the confines of liberal international peacebuilding. See Edward Newman et al, 
“Introduction,” in New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, eds. Edward Newman et al (United 
Nations University, 2009), 16. In addition to being a useful analytical tool, in some cases the 
concept is portrayed as “a desirable political project[] that could stimulate alternatives and counter 
what is perceived to be hegemonic, externally driven liberal programming.” Peterson, “A 
Conceptual Unpackaging of Hybridity,” 7. For the application of a hybridity lens to post-conflict 
justice more specifically, see generally, Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Post-Conflict Justice and 
Hybridity in Peacebuilding: Resistance or Cooptation,” in Hybrid Forms of Peace, eds. Richmond 
and Mitchell.  
241 Existing UN doctrine does not really allow for this. In a landmark 2004 report on transitional 
justice, for example, former Secretary General Kofi Annan notes that “due regard must be given 
to indigenous and informal traditions” yet suggests in the same sentence that “due regard” will 
only be extended insofar as there is “conformity” with international standards. U.N. Secretary-
General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies 
(2004),¶¶ 16-17, 36. As I suggest below, space must be made for a substantial “margin of 
appreciation.”  
242 See Lundy and McGovern, “Whose Justice?,” 279 (noting that “[d]espite being identified as 
key issues in international reports and development circles for years, the virtues of local 
ownership, empowerment, and participatory approaches have tended only to be implemented in a 
vague, weak, and ad hoc manner.”) 
243 See Weinstein et al, “Stay the Hand of Justice,” 35 (noting that “there has been little room for 
consideration of broader or alternative approaches, especially those that might emerge out of 
different or non-western conceptions of justice.”) 
244 See Moses Chrispus Okello, “Afterword: Elevating Transitional Local Justice,” 277 (noting that 
a call for greater weight to be placed on the local “does not in itself represent a shift in the 
underlying assumptions of the field—at most, it is a shift in emphasis.”)  
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do “justice” in times of transition.245 After all, it would be all too easy for mainstream 
transitional justice programs and professionals to embrace the local to the extent that it 
resonates with and resembles Western norms and institutions, using the trappings of the 
local in an attempt to boost legitimacy and buy-in to a larger set of projects.246 Yet this 
would represent at best a form of co-option, a leveraging of the local only insofar as it 
stands in conformity with the global.  
In the end, giving more than rhetorical weight to principles of local ownership in 
matters of post-conflict justice will require a significant “margin of appreciation”247 and 
acceptance of an at-times uncomfortable pluralism248—forcing us to stand on that 
tenuous yet inevitable middle ground between universalism and relativism.249 However, 
striking a global-local balance also means that one particular local will at times have to 
give way to a larger local.250 This reflects the simple recognition that neither global nor 




E. Conclusion  
 
Dilemmas of the global and the local are now firmly entwined in transitional justice 
narratives, sticky strands that we can neither remove nor let go. Those dilemmas call on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 See An-Na’im, “Editorial Note,” 197 (observing that the dominant transitional justice paradigms 
are so strong that “even the possibility of an indigenous alternative conception of justice is not 
taken seriously at a theoretical or empirical level.”)  
246 See Erin Baines, “Spirits and Social Reconstruction,” 411-12, 414-15. 
247 See Viaene and Brems, “Transitional Justice and Cultural Contexts,” 210 (reviewing the 
margin of appreciation doctrine that has developed under the European Convention on Human 
Rights). 
248 On the complexities of legal pluralism in international law more broadly, see generally Brian 
Tamanha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global,” Sydney Law 
Review 30 (2008): 375.  
249 Using different terminology, scholars from a range of disciplines have made attempts to carve 
out a position between strong universalism and strong relativism. See, e.g., Paul Healy, “Human 
Rights and Intercultural Relations,” Philosophical and Social Criticism 32 (2006): 513 (arguing for 
a middle ground between ethnocentric universalism and radical cultural relativism); Gérard 
Cohen-Jonathan, “Universalité et Singularité des Droits de l’Homme,” Revue Trimestrielle des 
Droits de l’Homme 53 (2003): 11 (discussing a “pluralist” conception of human rights); Anne 
Hellum, “Women’s Human Rights and African Customary Laws: Between Universalism and 
Relativism – Individualism and Communitarianism,” in Development and Rights; Negotiating 
Justice in Changing Societies, ed. Christian Lund (New York: Frank Cass, 1999), 96 (using the 
idea of “cultural pluralism” to create a space between universalism and relativism); Ronald Cohen, 
“Human Rights and Cultural Relativism: The Need for A New Approach,” American Anthropologist 
91, no. 4 (1989): 1015-16 (calling for a middle ground between “simplistic polarities of relativism 
versus universalism.”).  
250 See Mazlish, “The Global and the Local,” 99 (discussing the idea of local giving way to larger 
local);  
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us to interrogate the historical and ideological origins of the field, grounded as it has 
been in Western liberalism and legalism, and may even point to the need to abandon 
paradigms of “transition” altogether.251 While one should avoid simplistic notions of path 
dependency, an examination of origins remains useful in helping to identify some of the 
lingering assumptions and blindspots that have in part helped to generate many of the 
global-local frictions so often associated with transitional justice interventions today.  
At one level, attempts to resolve or at least manage these dilemmas reflect a healthy 
pragmatism and acknowledgement that transitional justice efforts are unlikely to 
contribute to larger aims of post-conflict reconstruction if they are not embraced by those 
who have to live with them, making questions of legitimacy and sustainability paramount. 
Yet beyond pragmatism, increasing attention paid to concepts like local ownership may 
reflect a deeper ambivalence with the imperiousness of international justice and some 
measure of discomfort with the sotto voce imperialism of liberal international 
peacebuilding more generally.252 Few Western countries or world powers, for example, 
would accept some of the more intrusive dimensions of international justice. At the same 
time, the local also inspires another sort of moral ambivalence. Global institutions now 
insist that the local must be given “due regard,” but wring hands over where due regard 
must give way to international standards and best practices.253 In the end, the dilemmas 
of the global and the local therefore express tensions between different normative 
commitments, between liberal internationalism and international human rights on the one 
hand, and principles of local sovereignty and autonomy on the other.  
Yet if we are to do more than repeat that addressing the dilemmas of the global and 
local is both important and hard, we must start by questioning simple categories and 
narratives of global and local, coming to understand transitional justice processes 
instead as part of a more complicated dialectical process that moves between multiple 
levels. At the same time, we must carefully parse what we mean by local ownership. The 
normative currency of the local is now such that concepts like local ownership can be 
used as a legitimate shield—as a form of resistance to the hegemony of liberal 
international peacebuilding and a way to carve out a legitimate sphere of autonomy in 
matters of post-conflict justice—but also as a talisman by enterprising elites who would 
seek donor dollars while furthering their own partisan political agendas.254 Coming to 
understand local ownership along its multiple dimensions or axes—including control, 
process, and substance—might help to clarify thinking in crafting future experiments in 
transitional justice. Such experiments will hopefully build upon more equitable global-
local partnerships, reflecting an acceptance of genuine practices of hybridity that take us 
beyond the self-imposed parameters of the transitional justice “toolbox.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 See generally An-Na’im, “Editorial Note.”  
252 See Uvin, “Difficult Choices in the New Post-Conflict Agenda,” 186 (arguing that “[t]aken to its 
extreme, the new post-conflict agenda, then, amounts to a license for interventionism so deep 
and unchecked it resembles colonialism.”) 
253 For an argument that so-called “best practices” tend to promote an undesirable uniformity and 
bias interventions towards the global rather than the local, see generally, Warren Feek, “Best of 
Practices?,” Development in Practice 17 (2007): 653.  
254 See Iliff, “Root and Branch,” 8. 
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Chapter II:  Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition1 
 
 
An increasing consensus has arisen at the level of practice, policy, and theory that the 
various mechanisms of transitional justice should be mobilized as part of a response to 
violent conflict and must serve as a pillar of postconflict peacebuilding.2 More than ever, 
the question is not whether there will be some kind of transitional justice, but what the 
timing, modalities, and sequencing might be and which of the mechanisms from the 
transitional justice “toolbox”—including trials, truth commissions, vetting and lustration, 
reparations, and broader institutional reform—will be put in place. Together with 
demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of ex-combatants, security sector reform, 
broader “rule of law” programs, and elections, transitional justice initiatives have become 
a routine part of the postconflict checklist.3 Viewed from an historical perspective, the 
emergence of this transitional justice consensus some twenty years after the term was 
coined is nothing short of remarkable.4 
Despite the seeming consensus as to the necessity to “do something,” the 
increasingly privileged place of justice in international affairs and postconflict 
reconstruction begs some very important questions: justice for what, for whom, and to 
what ends?5 In particular, while there is increasing momentum behind the notion that the 
tools of transitional justice must be marshaled in response to large-scale human rights 
atrocities and physical violence—including murder, rape, torture, disappearances, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This dissertation chapter was published as a contribution to my edited volume: Dustin Sharp, 
ed., Justice and Economic Violence in Transition (New York: Springer, 2014). That contribution in 
turn was adapted from an article I first published in the Fordham International Law Journal 35, no. 
3 (2012): 780-814.  
2 See Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice in a New Era,” Fordham International Law Journal 26, 
no. 4 (2002): 894 (noting the emergence of a “steady State” phase of transitional justice in which 
“the post-conflict dimension of transitional justice is moving from the exception to the norm”); see 
also Rosemary Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical Reflections,” Third World 
Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2008): 276 (noting the standardization of transitional justice). 
3 See International Crisis Group, Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, Africa 
Report no. 87 (Dakar/Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 2004), 9 (criticizing a 
mechanistic “operational checklist” approach to postconflict peacebuilding in which the 
international community assumes it can safely withdraw after rote implementation of a series of 
initiatives: deployment of peacekeeping troops, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of 
ex-combatants, the repatriation and return of refugees and internally displaced persons, security 
sector and judicial reform, transitional justice initiatives, and, finally, a first election). 
4 For an interesting discussion of how this seeming consensus masks a deeper politicization and 
debate, see generally Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2008): 95. 
5 See Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project,” 280–86 (employing the categories of when, 
whom, and what in order to challenge the “standardization” of field of transitional justice). For a 
discussion of the idea that it may not always be the case that we need to “do something” in the 
transitional justice context, see Prisilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and 
Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2011), 183-205. 
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other crimes against humanity—the proper role of transitional justice with respect to 
economic violence—including violations of economic and social rights, corruption, and 
plunder of natural resources—is far less certain. Indeed, historically, economic violence 
and economic justice have sat at the periphery of transitional justice work.6 To the extent 
that transitional justice has dealt with economic issues, these concerns have been 
treated as little more than useful context in which to understand the perpetration of 
physical violence.7 
In recent years, the need to address economic violence in times of transition has 
been the subject of increasing attention by academics, policymakers, and a handful of 
truth commissions, yet for the most part ignorance of economic violence continues to be 
one of the principle blindspots of the field of transitional justice. While the blindspots of 
transitional justice mirror historic divisions and hierarchies within international human 
rights law, they also parallel the liberal international peacebuilding consensus in which 
Western liberal market democracy is assumed to be the wished-for end product of 
postconflict reconstruction and a “package” of interventions is tailored to suit.8 This 
parallel suggests that despite some thirty years of evolution, the field of transitional 
justice has not moved far from its origins in which the “transition” in question was 
assumed to be a transition to a Western-style liberal market democracy. 
As the field of transitional justice moves beyond its historic origins in the wave of 
democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
away from its roots in law and legalism, to a United Nations (UN)-sanctioned global 
phenomena tied to peacebuilding and conflict prevention more generally, the almost 
exclusive emphasis on civil and political rights and justice for physical violence appears 
increasingly untenable. As has been noted by Zinaida Miller, such an emphasis leads to 
a distorted narrative of conflict premised on the notion that economics and conflict can 
be neatly separated.9 When seen through this lens, conflicts become one dimensional, 
when in reality they are a messy and complicated mix of political, social, economic, and 
cultural factors. Compounding matters, relegating economic issues to the background of 
transitional justice concern serves to limit and bias the range of policies imagined to be 
necessary in the wake of conflict. Because poverty and economic violence can be 
associated with the onset of conflict, exacerbated by conflict, and continue afterwards as 
a legacy of conflict, failure to strike a better balance between a range of justice concerns 
in transition is unlikely to generate policies and interventions that respond to “root 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Louise Arbour, “Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition,” New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 40, no. 1 (2007): 4 (discussing why “economic, 
social, and cultural rights have not traditionally been a central part of transitional justice 
initiatives”). 
7 See Zinaida Miller, “Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 275-76. 
8 See Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” International 
Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 56; see also Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Justice as Peace? Liberal 
Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice,” Global Society 21, no. 4 (2007): 580-81. 
9 See Miller, “Effects of Invisibility,” 268. 
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causes” and may serve to obfuscate and legitimate very serious human rights abuses.10 
The language of “never again” has little meaning if the self-imposed blindspots of the 
field distort our understanding of the conflict and limit our range of possible solutions. 
While greater inclusion of economic issues within the transitional justice agenda 
therefore seems necessary, it also raises difficult questions that have yet to be worked 
out at the level of theory, policy, and practice. For example, some would find 
unobjectionable the idea that transitional justice mechanisms should address 
accountability for egregious violations of economic and social rights that rise to the level 
of war crimes.11 In many ways, such a narrow approach to questions of economic 
violence would but mirror the traditional modalities of transitional justice that have tended 
to focus on accountability for egregious violations of physical integrity. Yet the question 
arises as to whether transitional justice should also engage deeper issues of distributive 
justice and structural violence that predate conflict and which may have in part helped to 
precipitate it. If we find ourselves focusing on issues of deep-rooted structural violence, 
is this the proper work of the field of transitional justice, or should it be left to the work of 
“development” and longer-term political and social processes?12 In sum, at what point 
would we be asking too much of transitional justice by suggesting that it grapple with 
larger and deeper dimensions of economic violence? 
This chapter seeks not to answer any of these questions definitively, but argues 
that a more nuanced, contextualized, and balanced approach to a wider range of justice 
issues faced by societies in transition is necessary. To this end, this chapter proposes 
that one way to achieve a more balanced approach is to reconceptualize and reorient 
the “transition” of transitional justice not simply as a transition to democracy and the “rule 
of law,” the paradigm under which the field originated, but as part of a broader transition 
to “positive peace,” in which justice for both physical violence and economic violence 
receives equal pride of place.13 Such a reorientation would not guarantee or even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy 
(Washington: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), 22 (arguing that civil wars are 
more likely in low-income countries, have disastrous effects on poverty rates, and have negative 
effects that persist well after formal cessation of hostilities). Collier once famously argued that 
over fifty percent of civil wars reignite within a period of five years of their supposed settlement. 
See Paul Collier and Anne Hoeffler, “On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa,” Conflict Resolution 
46, no. 1 (2002): 17. However, both figures have been disputed by some, and revised by Collier 
himself. See, e.g., Astri Suhrke and Ingrid Samset, “What’s in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of 
Civil War,” International Peacekeeping 14, no. 2 (2007): 197-98 (explaining how they and others 
have arrived at figures closer to twenty percent after using the Correlates of War data set, and 
citing Collier’s 2006 working paper, which established a twenty-three percent war recurrence rate 
for the first four years after the cessation of conflict). 
11 See Evelyne Schmid, “War Crimes Related to Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights,” Heidelberg Journal of International Law 71, no. 3 (2011): 3, 5, 9-17. 
12 See Roger Duthie, “Transitional Justice, Development, and Economic Violence,” in this volume. 
13 As discussed in greater detail below, the term “negative peace” refers to the absence of direct 
violence. It stands in contrast with the broader concept of “positive peace,” which includes the 
absence of both direct and indirect violence, including various forms of “structural violence” such 
	   68	  
mandate greater emphasis on economic concerns in all cases. The notion of “positive 
peace” could ultimately be subjected to limiting constructions and understandings that 
would in effect re-impose a version of liberal international peacebuilding, and thereby 
exclude many economic and distributive justice issues from its purview. Nevertheless, I 
argue that insofar as the very idea of “positive peace” has at its core issues of structural 
violence, it calls upon one to attend to a broader set of concerns than has historically 
been considered in transitional justice practice. Reorientation around the concept could 
be an important step in the direction of bringing economic violence into the foreground of 
transitional justice practice and policy. 
This chapter proceeds in three parts. The first part sets forth the traditional focus 
and preoccupations of transitional justice, a field which has historically been rooted in 
law, human rights, and the felt imperatives of a political transition to Western liberal 
democracy, but which is increasingly allied with broader notions of peacebuilding. The 
next part discusses the relationship between transitional justice and economic violence, 
a broad constellation of issues that have largely been excluded from transitional justice 
work to date. It articulates some of the arguments against inclusion of economic violence 
and argues that any costs are largely outweighed by the benefits. The final part 
examines the relationship between transitional justice and the emerging field of 
peacebuilding, including the critique of liberal international peacebuilding, and sets forth 
the heart of my argument that one way to promote greater focus on issues of economic 
justice in transition would be to reconceptualize the field of transitional justice as a 
transition to “positive peace.”  
A note about terminology is in order before proceeding. In this chapter, together 
with others in the volume, the terms “physical violence” and “economic violence” are 
used as shorthand to refer to a range of phenomena. “Physical violence” refers to 
murder, rape, torture, disappearances, and other classic violations of civil and political 
rights. In contrast, “economic violence” refers to violations of economic and social rights, 
corruption, and plunder of natural resources. While the violence that characterizes what I 
call “physical violence” is often direct, “economic violence” is typically more indirect. Both 
terms are clearly oversimplifications. For example, not all violations of civil and political 
rights involve direct physical violence, and many violations of economic and social 
rights—hunger and starvation, for example—are arguably a form of physical violence. 
While most of the “physical violence” discussed in this chapter constitutes a violation of 
civil and political rights under international law, the concept of “economic violence” 
includes, but is broader than, violations of economic and social rights under international 
law.14 Nevertheless, as a form of shorthand, both terms constitute loose categories that 
are useful to a discussion of the historical emphasis and blindspots of the field of 
transitional justice. In addition, the conceptualization of things like corruption as a form of 
violence is intended to convey the very real harm and suffering that it brings to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
as poverty, hunger, and other forms of social injustice. See generally Johan Galtung, “Violence, 
Peace, and Peace Research,” Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167. 
14 See, e.g., chapter by Chris Albin-Lackey in this volume, which explains how corruption may in 
some instances be tantamount to a violation of economic and social rights under international law, 
while in other instances such a case may be impossible to make. 
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individuals and societies, akin to the devastation caused by widespread acts of physical 
violence.  
 
A. The Origins and Preoccupations of Transitional Justice 
 
Many of the practices associated with the modern field of transitional justice—trials, truth 
commissions, reparations schemes, and broader reform of abusive institutions—have 
deep historical roots.15 Nevertheless, transitional justice, as a domain of policy, practice, 
and academic study, has its origins in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the wave of 
transitions in both Eastern Europe and Latin America that followed in the wake of the 
end of the Cold War.16 Definitions of transitional justice vary and have evolved and 
broadened over time.17 Broadly speaking, “transitional justice” relates to a set of legal, 
political, and moral dilemmas about how to deal with past violence in societies 
undergoing some form of political transition.18 Arguments for the necessity of some form 
of transitional justice are often grounded in notions of atrocity prevention and deterrence 
(“never again”), nation building (building or restoring democracy and the “rule of law”), 
and moral necessity (just deserts).19 While the precise type of political transition to be 
undergone is not always made explicit, the transitional justice practice, policy, and 
scholarship in the 1990s largely focused on the felt necessities and dilemmas of a 
transition from more authoritarian forms of government to Western-style democracy, with 
a consequent focus on those mechanisms thought best to bring about the specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For a review of the use of what have become known as the tools of transitional justice dating 
back to more than 2000 years ago in ancient Athens, see generally Jon Elster, Closing the 
Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). Other authors looking to the historical underpinnings of transitional justice practice identify 
the Nuremburg tribunal as a key juncture initiating the first “phase” of transitional justice. See Ruti 
G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003): 70. 
16 See generally Neil Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with 
Former Regimes, Volume I. General Considerations (Washington: United States Institute of 
Peace, 1995). While the term “transitional justice” was coined some twenty years ago, it has been 
argued that transitional justice did not coalesce as a distinct “field” until sometime after 2000. See 
Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 329-32 (tracing the history of the use of the 
term “transitional justice”); Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of 
the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 7 (arguing that 
transitional justice did not emerge as a distinct field until after 2000). 
17 Many of these definitions have been quite narrow and legalistic. For example, Ruti Teitel 
defines transitional justice as “the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, 
characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.” 
Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 69. For a review of how some of these definitions have 
broadened over time, see Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project,” 277-78. 
18 See Sriram, “Justice as Peace?,” 582-83. 
19 See Bell, “Interdisciplinarity,” 13 (discussing the different overlapping conceptions of the field of 
transitional justice). 
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political transition in question.20 As discussed in greater detail below, the notion of 
transition as transition to democracy was “crucial to structuring the initial conceptual 
boundaries for the field.”21 
Although a number of the concerns and preoccupations of transitional justice 
were similar to those of the human rights community from which many early transitional 
justice scholars and practitioners were drawn, including particularly concerns with 
accountability and impunity for massive human rights violations, the field of transitional 
justice distinguished itself in its attempt to balance twin normative aims: the demands of 
justice and accountability on the one hand, and the assumed needs of a political 
transition on the other.22 Thus, formative debates in the field focused on the possible 
dilemmas and trade-offs associated with justice in times of political transition, including 
the so-called peace versus justice debate.23 Influential articles by Guillermo O'Donnell 
and Samuel Huntington, canonized in Neil Kritz’s seminal three-volume work, viewed the 
parameters of justice in times of transition to democracy as a function of a series of 
bargains between elite groups, with more or less justice available depending on the 
extent to which elite perpetrator groups were able to dictate the terms of the transition.24 
Although dealing with massive human rights violations while undergoing a 
political transition might arguably call for the range of expertise of a variety of 
professions and disciplines, including history, psychology, economics, education, and 
religion, to name only a few, early transitional justice advocates were largely drawn from 
the legal and human rights communities, and early transitional justice scholarship was 
primarily anchored in law and political science.25 Today, the field of transitional justice is 
increasingly interdisciplinary, yet law, legalism, and human rights approaches to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 325 (arguing that transition to 
democracy was the “dominant normative lens” through which political change was viewed in the 
early years of transitional justice practice and scholarship); see also Patricia Lundy and Mark 
McGovern, “Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up,” Journal of Law 
and Society 35, no. 2 (2008): 273 (arguing that “‘[t]ransition’, as normally conceived within 
transitional justice theory, tends to involve a particular and limited conception of democratization 
and democracy based on liberal and essentially Western formulations of democracy”). 
21 See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 326. 
22 Ibid., 358. 
23 In recent years, transitional justice advocates have tended to see the various and sometimes 
contradictory goals of transitional justice as complementary. See Leebaw, “Irreconcilable Goals,” 
98. The mutual complementary of peace, justice, and democracy has also become a United 
Nations (“UN”) doctrine at least since the 2004 publication of a report on transitional justice. See 
United Nations Secretary General, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Post-conflict 
Societies,” UN Doc. S/2004/616 (August 23, 2004), 1 (arguing that “[j]ustice, peace and 
democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives”). 
24 See Samuel P. Huntington, “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,” 
in Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Volume I. 
General Considerations, ed. Neil Kritz (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1995), 65-
81; Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies,” in Kritz, Transitional Justice, 57-64. 
25 See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 333. 
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questions and dilemmas of transition continue to dominate in many ways, leading to a 
continued critique of the “narrowness” or “thinness” of traditional transitional justice work 
and calls to give greater attention to those issues often set in the background of legal 
and human rights discourse, including religion, culture, economics, and local tradition.26 
Since the birth of the field in the 1980s and 1990s, the more overt preoccupation 
with transition as transition to democracy has receded. Increasingly, transitional justice is 
associated with nation building and peacebuilding in the postconflict context more 
generally.27 Once considered a jurisprudence of exception and deviation from rule of law 
standards in times of political transition, transitional justice has been normalized, 
institutionalized, and mainstreamed.28 In attempting to trace “three generations” of 
transitional justice, starting with Nuremburg and moving into the present, Ruti Teitel 
refers to this latest phase as “steady-state” transitional justice in which the postconflict 
dimension of transitional justice is moving from the exception to the norm.29 The 
“transition” in transitional justice today is “ostensibly neutral” and the goals promoted, 
including conflict resolution and the rule of law, are less explicitly political.30 Other more 
recent and influential definitions of transitional justice make little use of the concepts of 
“transition” at all, rooting the field instead in the promotion of a number of goals, 
including accountability and reconciliation.31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See Kora Andrieu, “Civilizing Peacebuilding: Transitional Justice, Civil Society and the Liberal 
Paradigm,” Security Dialogue 41, no. 5 (2010): 541 (noting the “strong and persistent influence of 
legalism on transitional justice”); Bell, “Interdisciplinary,” 9 (discussing the broadening of the field 
to include disciplines beyond law); Kieran McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker 
Understanding of Transitional Justice,” Journal of Law and Society 34, no. 4 (2007): 417 
(criticizing the legalistic penchant of transitional justice and arguing that “legalism tends to 
foreclose questions from other complementary disciplines and perspectives which transitional 
lawyers should be both asking and asked”). See generally Wendy Lambourne, “Transitional 
Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass Violence,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 
1 (2009): 28 (calling for a revalorization of local and cultural approaches to justice and 
reconciliation). 
27 Chandra Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega, Johanna Herman, “Evaluating and Comparing Strategies 
of Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice,” JAD-PbP Working Paper Series No 1. (May 2009), 13 
(discussing increasing linkages between transitional justice and a broader set of peacebuilding 
activities). 
28 McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism,” 412. For an argument that the “dilemmas” of transitional justice 
are not exceptional, but in fact resemble those of “ordinary justice,” see generally Eric A. Posner 
and Adrian Vermeule, “Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice,” Harvard Law Review 117, no. 3 
(2003): 761. 
29 See Teitel, “Transitional Justice in a New Era,” 894; Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 
89-92. 
30 Leebaw, “Irreconcilable Goals,” 103, 106. 
31 For example, according to a landmark UN report, transitional justice “comprises the full range 
of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a 
legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels 
of international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, 
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The most iconic mechanisms associated with transitional justice continue to be 
prosecutions and truth commissions.32 Beyond this, however, the field has broadened a 
great deal since the early 1990s to include a range of mechanisms and practices 
designed to encourage reconciliation and forms of accountability far short of a prison 
sentence. Thus, fostering community-level dialogue between former perpetrators and 
survivors of human rights abuses and the construction of public memorials to preserve 
memory of the conflict are as much a part of transitional justice as a prosecution before 
a war crimes tribunal. Despite new and innovative practices around the margins, 
however, “steady state” transitional justice is persistently criticized for being “top-down” 
and “one-size-fits-all,” rote application of a mere template to contexts and situations to 
which it is perhaps ill-suited.33 It is perhaps to be expected that as transitional justice 
becomes mainstream, scholars and practitioners attempt to deconstruct the assumptions, 
constructed boundaries, limitations, and blindspots implicit in the template.34 
After several decades of evolution, transitional justice practice and policy is today 
stitched together from strands of overlapping and at times competing narratives. It is, at 
various times, a battle against impunity rooted in human rights discourse, a set of conflict 
resolutions techniques related to the formation of a new social and political compact in 
the wake of conflict, and a tool for international intervention and state building.35 The 
multiplicity of narratives suggests an open-textured project subject to contest and 
reconceptualization. At the same time, many transitional justice narratives share a 
common denominator of being firmly grounded in neutral, technical, and apolitical 
vocabularies of human rights and the rule of law that have the potential to obscure the 
politics of the transitional justice project itself.36 The decision to use the mechanisms 
associated with the transitional justice template—prosecutions, truth commissions, 
vetting and lustration, reform of abusive security institutions—and not other mechanisms, 
just like the decision to focus on abuses of civil and political rights and not economic and 
social rights is itself a political choice with important policy consequences that have 
implications for distributive justice in the postconflict context. The next Part explores the 
relationship between transitional justice and “economic violence,” a category that 
subsumes a wide range of issues rarely brought to the core of transitional justice work. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.” See United Nations 
Secretary-General, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice,” ¶ 8. 
32 See Ruben Carranza, “Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption 
and Economic Crimes?,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 315. 
33 See, e.g., Lundy and McGovern, “Whose Justice?,” 271 (criticizing the “one-size-fits-all” and 
“top-down” approaches to transitional justice). 
34 See Dustin Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries; The Preoccupations of Fourth Generation 
Transitional Justice,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 26 (forthcoming, 2013). 
35 Bell, “Interdisciplinarity,” 13-15. 
36 McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism,” 420-21 (positing that “a crude characterization of human rights in 
contemporary transitional justice discourses would suggest that human rights talk lends itself to a 
‘Western-centric’ and top-down focus; it self-presents (at least) as apolitical; [and] it includes a 
capacity to disconnect from the real political and social world of transition through a process of 
‘magical legalism’”). 
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B. Transitional Justice and Economic Violence 
 
As the Cold War recedes in time, conflicts across the globe are increasingly intrastate in 
nature, less fueled by a grand global ideological battle than by local struggles for 
resources and control of government.37 The majority of these conflicts now take place in 
some of the poorest countries on earth. As the reports of media, human rights, and 
conflict resolution organizations vividly illustrate, societies emerging from civil war and 
other forms of conflict are often completely devastated: civilians have been killed and 
traumatized; critical infrastructure—from roads and the electric grid to schools and 
hospitals—has been destroyed; and key institutions of governance have been hollowed 
out by years of conflict, corruption, and mismanagement. Despite the best efforts of local 
and international communities to build peace in the wake of conflict, a significant number 
of these conflicts will reignite in the years following their apparent settlement.38 
Transitional justice and international prosecutions are, of course, global 
phenomena. Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, both political and economic, it 
seems likely that much of their application in the coming years will be in the poorer 
countries of the global south, particularly sub-Saharan Africa.39 The causes of the 
conflicts that lead to calls for the application of transitional justice are multiple and 
complex, the full extent of which is beyond the scope of this chapter. While poverty and 
economic violence are only pieces of this larger conflict resolution puzzle, they remain 
important ones, central to conflict dynamics in many countries.40 It is against this 
backdrop of poverty and the persistent failure to resolve violent conflict in so many parts 
of the world that greater engagement with questions of economic violence by transitional 
justice institutions should be considered today. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 This is not to minimize the legacies of colonialism and Cold War politics, or the role of the 
modern-day scramble for resources in shaping many conflicts in the developing world. Indeed, 
there has been a persistent failure of transitional justice mechanisms to account for the effects of 
“outside actors” on the course of conflict. See Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 75–77. There are 
exceptions to this trend, however, including the work of truth commissions in Chad, Chile, El 
Salvador, and Guatemala. 
38 Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap, 155. 
39 Indeed, the sheer number of indictments emanating from the International Criminal Court 
involving African countries has generated significant controversy on the continent, leading in part 
to an African Union vote to halt cooperation with the Court with respect to the indictment of 
Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir. See BBC News, “African Union in Rift with Court,” July 3, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8133925.stm. Although countries such as China, Israel, Russia, 
and the United States also would likely benefit from the application of transitional justice practices, 
great-power politics and Security Council vetoes continue to make this appear less likely than in 
the smaller, poorer countries of the world. 
40 See Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap, 20-31, 53 (arguing that civil wars are more 
likely in low-income countries, have disastrous effects on poverty rates, and cause negative 
effects which persist well after formal cessation of hostilities). 
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i. Economic Violence in Transitional Justice Practice 
 
Violent conflict devastates both lives and livelihoods, yet ways of understanding what 
constitutes “violence” and who counts as a “victim” vary a great deal. From the trials at 
Nuremburg to the international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to truth 
commissions in South Africa and elsewhere, the conception of violence implicit in most 
transitional justice initiatives has been an exceedingly narrow one. The overwhelming 
focus of most transitional justice interventions across time has been on accountability for 
physical violence—murder, rape, torture, disappearances—and violations of civil and 
political rights more generally.41 A broader conception of violence that would encompass 
often equally devastating forms of “economic violence”—including violations of economic 
and social rights, endemic corruption, and large-scale looting of natural resources such 
as oil, diamonds, and timber—has been largely absent. 
To take a famous example, under the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (“TRC”) Act, the category of “victim” is limited to individuals who suffered 
gross violations of human rights, including killing, abduction, torture, or ill-treatment.42 
The social, economic, and political system of apartheid, in many ways the very 
embodiment of the concept of structural violence, was largely treated as context to 
instances of egregious bodily harm that became the TRC’s principal focus. When viewed 
through this lens, the quotidian violence of poverty and racism, and the victims and 
beneficiaries of the apartheid system itself, receded into the background.43 As we 
approach two decades since the end of white rule in South Africa, apartheid has ended, 
but the de facto economic and social status quo has not changed to the degree many 
would have hoped. Poverty, inequality, and crime remain high.44 Although transitional 
justice has addressed horrific forms of violence in South Africa that took place under the 
apartheid system, it may have also had the perverse effect of obfuscating and 
legitimating other abuses of power, leaving many of those who benefitted most from the 
apartheid economic system comfortable in the status quo. 
The “constructed invisibility” of economic concerns can have serious long-term 
effects, both in terms of our understanding of conflict itself and in terms of the remedies 
thought necessary to prevent recurrence.45 As Zinaida Miller argues, pushing economic 
issues to the periphery of transitional justice concerns helps to shape a distorted and 
one-dimensional narrative of conflict in which economics and conflict can be neatly 
separated.46 At best, economic issues become part of the context, helping to explain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project,” 284. 
42 See Pablo de Greiff, “Repairing the Past: Compensation for Victims of Human Rights 
Violations,” in The Handbook of Reparations, ed. Pablo de Greiff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 8. 
43 See Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project,” 284 (discussing the standardization of 
transitional justice). 
44 See Patrick Bond, “Reconciliation and Economic Reaction: Flaws in South Africa’s Elite 
Transition,” International Affairs 60, no. 1 (2006): 141. 
45 See Miller, “Effects of Invisibility,” 280-87. 
46 Ibid., 268. 
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why the physical violence that is the focus of a truth commission’s work may have 
occurred, but are of little further policy relevance. At worst, a truth commission’s work 
may be almost completely decontextualized, presenting a diagnosis of human rights 
violations that is abstracted from reality and the dynamics of social power and conflict.47 
If the dynamics that produced massive human rights violations are poorly 
understood, creating a distorted narrative of conflict that relegates economic issues to 
the background, this may in turn limit and bias the range of policies imagined to be 
necessary in the wake of conflict. When conflicts are viewed through a one-dimensional 
lens, prevention of human rights abuses becomes a simplistic function of punishment 
and impunity. At the same time, the emphasis on physical violence and violations of civil 
and political rights more generally likely means that the issues of economic violence and 
inequality that may have in part helped to generate the conflict will go unaddressed by 
the various mechanisms of transitional justice. Thus, we are more likely to see a focus 
on prosecution of a handful of members of abusive security services, vetting and 
dismissals, and perhaps more general judicial and security sector reform rather than 
things like affirmative action, redistributive taxation, or land-tenure reform.48 
Even where the mechanisms of transitional justice have looked to economic 
violence as part of their work, the human toll of economic violence rarely receives equal 
treatment when it comes to the recommendations and policies that are articulated as 
part of the work of prevention and follow-up. For example, the Commission for Reception, 
Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor actually documented violations of economic and 
social rights in some depth, yet when it came time to decide who was a “victim” for 
purposes of receiving reparations, the definition was limited to victims of violations of 
civil and political rights.49 Whether justified under the banner of resource constraints or 
not, such practices have the effect of promoting hierarchies of rights and granting de 
facto impunity to the architects and authors of economic violence. 
Where transitional justice mechanisms do grapple with the economic impacts of 
conflict and abusive governments, they rarely do so using a human rights paradigm, 
even though many of the abuses in question may constitute violations of international 
law.50 Lisa Laplante, for example, explores how truth commissions in Guatemala and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Lisa Laplante, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding: Diagnosing and Addressing the 
Socioeconomic Roots of Violence Through a Human Rights Framework,” International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 337. 
48 See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 362. 
49 See Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor Leste (CAVR), Chega!, The 
Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor Leste, Final Report 
(2005), 40-41, 140-45. 
50 Beyond the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, economic, social, 
and cultural rights have the status of binding law in a number of international human rights 
treaties. Examples include the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities; the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the European Social Charter; and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights. 
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Peru exposed decades of structural violence and other socioeconomic injustices as one 
of the causes of wars in their countries, but did not frame their analysis or 
recommendations in terms of violations of economic and social rights.51 While the work 
of these truth commissions is important in that it can help provide “a causal connection 
between violence and structural inequalities,” Laplante argues that the failure to help 
different constituencies understand that in many instances economic violence also 
constitutes a violation of economic and social rights deprived “national groups a powerful 
lobbying tool to challenge the government’s inaction or resistance.”52 Without rights-
based scaffolding, subsequent development programs and other initiatives targeting 
inequality then become mere charity or government largesse rather than responses to 
concrete violations of international human rights law to which individuals are entitled. By 
framing instances of physical violence in terms of violations of rights, yet failing to do the 
same with respect to violations of economic and social rights, this approach further 
contributes to the conception that economic and social rights are not “real rights,” but 
mere aspirations. 
 
ii. Understanding the Marginalization of Economic Violence in Transition 
 
From the potential for deterrence inherent in criminal prosecutions to the cries of “never 
again,” transitional justice has long been rooted in the rhetoric of the prevention of future 
abuses. Given the potential to misdiagnose the causes of conflict and bias the 
necessary remedies, understanding why an entire subset of issues so central to conflict 
dynamics has historically been so far from the core of transitional justice work and 
preoccupation is no easy task. While the factors underpinning historically narrow 
approaches to questions of justice in transition are many, there are at least two factors 
that are central to understanding the marginalization of economic violence in transitional 
justice work: (1) an importation of implicit distinctions and hierarchies from mainstream 
human rights discourse and practice, and (2) the consequences of viewing transitional 
justice as a transition to a Western-style democracy rather than a transition to positive 
peace. 
International human rights discourse and practice self-consciously wraps itself in 
an aura of impartiality and universality. It is part of an ostensibly apolitical project, and 
the rights contained in the core international covenants relating to both civil and political 
as well as economic and social rights are repeatedly said to be “indivisible,” as per the 
UN mantra.53 In practice, the seeming consensus regarding universality and indivisibility 
masks a series of deep and abiding controversies and debates relating to the proper 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See Laplante, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 335; see also Lisa J. Laplante, “On the 
Indivisibility of Rights: Truth Commissions, Reparations, and the Right to Development,” Yale 
Human Rights and Development Law Journal 10 (2007): 148, 159-61 (providing a more detailed 
analysis of the work of the Peruvian truth commission). 
52 Laplante, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 350. 
53 See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, “Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action,” UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, July 12, 1993; see also United Nations General 
Assembly, Resolution 55/2, “Millennium Declaration,” UN Doc A/RES/55/ 2, Sept. 18, 2000. 
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place of economic and social rights under international law. The Cold War roots of this 
debate, which split the atom of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into two 
separate covenants to be championed by competing world powers are well known and 
will not be rehearsed here in detail.54 Key for current purposes is the fact that the ripple 
effects of the implied hierarchical distinction between so-called “first generation” and 
“second generation” rights continue to be felt many years after the Cold War’s end. 
During much of the 1990s, the “formative years” for the field of transitional justice, 
even the world’s largest human rights organizations, Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch, were slow to include documentation of violations of economic and social 
rights in their work and did so only gradually. Although some of this reluctance has been 
attributed to “methodological difficulties,” it is also true that a number of high-profile 
activists of the time, including Aryeh Neier, were publically skeptical as to whether 
economic and social rights were “real,” and staunchly believed that civil and political 
rights should be the exclusive focus of human rights organizations such as Human 
Rights Watch.55 One might add that the historic ambivalence towards economic and 
social rights within the human rights community mirrors a similar ambivalence within 
mainstream justice and criminal law about social justice more generally.56 It is perhaps 
not surprising, therefore, that many of the lawyers drawn into the early human rights 
movement may have brought this ambivalence with them. As previously discussed, 
many transitional justice scholars and advocates were drawn from the human rights 
community of this period.57 
While the implicit hierarchies of rights created by decades of human rights 
practice are only slowly starting to unravel,58 the backgrounding and foregrounding of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 See Arbour, “Economic and Social Justice,” 6 (discussing the Cold War roots of the current 
status of economic and social rights). 
55 See Kenneth Roth, “Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced 
by an International Human Rights Organization,” Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 1 (2004): 64 
(explaining the particular methodological challenges associated with trying to apply a “naming 
and shaming” documentation strategy to violations of economic and social rights); See generally 
Curt Goering, “Amnesty International and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” in Ethics in 
Action; The Ethical Challenges of International Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations, 
eds. Daniel Bell and Jean-Marc Coicaud (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
56 See Arbour, supra note 5, at 5. 
57 See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 333. 
58 Human Rights Watch, for example, has in recent years published a number of reports looking 
at the linkages between natural resources, corruption, and violations of economic and social 
rights. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of Local 
Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria, vol. 19, no. 2(A) (New 
York: Human Rights Watch, January 2007), 15-18, 40-53 (contending that the local government 
in Rivers State, Nigeria, has violated its duty to progressively realize rights to health and 
education through widespread and flagrant corruption and mismanagement of oil revenues); 
Human Rights Watch, Some Transparency, No Accountability: The Use of Oil Revenue in Angola 
and Its Impact on Human Rights, vol. 16, no. 1(A) (New York: Human Rights Watch, January 
2004), 57-59 (arguing that, due at least in part to mismanagement and corruption, the 
government of Angola has impeded Angolans’ ability to enjoy their economic, social, and cultural 
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economic and social rights and civil and political rights in many ways mirror broader 
trends in human rights discourse and practice, which were also imported into transitional 
justice work. The following chart summarizes the various historic dichotomies and 
oppositions that have been broadly reflected in both human rights discourse and practice 
and in transitional justice policy and practice:59 
 
Set in the Foreground Set in the Background 
civil and political rights 
the public 





form, process, participation, procedure 
formal, institutional enforcement 
economic and social rights 
the private 






informal, cultural, social enforcement 
 
Critical literature in both transitional justice and human rights has attempted to bring 
elements of the background into the foreground of thinking and policy. Thus, one 
persistent trope in the critique of mainstream transitional justice is the need to re-
emphasize local rather than international agency, and local cultural traditions of justice 
and reconciliation rather than Western and international approaches.60 Similarly, there is 
a critique of the more technocratic and legalistic bent of mainstream transitional justice, 
and an effort to underscore the importance of considering local political contexts as well 
as the political and distributional consequences of certain approaches.61 In this way, one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rights, including healthcare and education, in violation of the government’s own commitments and 
human rights treaties to which it is a party). This is in stark contrast to their work in the previous 
decade when violations of economic and social rights would only be examined to the extent that 
they were associated with violations of civil and political rights such as racial or gender-based 
discrimination. 
59 While in some ways a gross oversimplification, the implicit politics of human rights discourse 
and practice that is embedded in these oppositions has long been the subject of criticism. See, 
e.g., David Kennedy, “The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?,” Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 15 (2002): 109-10 (discussing the foregrounding and backgrounding of 
human rights discourse); Makau Wa Mutua, “The Ideology of Human Rights,” Virginia Journal of 
International Law 36, no. 3 (1996) 604-07 (criticizing the peripheral nature of economic and social 
rights and local and traditional approaches to justice under the mainstream Western approach to 
human rights thinking and practice). 
60 For a review of some of the debates regarding the incorporation of local justice mechanisms 
into transitional justice initiatives, see generally Roger Duthie, “Local Justice and Reintegration 
Processes as Complements to Transitional Justice and DDR,” in Disarming the Past: Transitional 
Justice and Ex-Combatants, eds. Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo de Greiff, and Lars Waldorf (New York: 
Social Science Research Council, 2009), 228. 
61 See, e.g., Lundy and McGovern, “Whose Justice?,” 273-74; McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism,” 417-
18. 
	   79	  
might situate the emerging critique of the “constructed invisibility” of economic concerns 
within transitional justice as part of a wider project of resistance to mainstream 
transitional justice.62 
Beyond importation of implicit hierarchies from human rights discourse and 
practice, the second factor key to understanding the peripheral status of economic 
violence in the transitional justice agenda is found in the notion of transition itself. The 
idea of transition suggests a journey from a starting point towards an unspecified 
destination. It suggests a period of exception, of time-bounded rupture. While the exact 
duration of the transition in question is never made explicit, the very notion of transition 
might have the tendency to narrow one’s temporal focus to a relatively brief period of the 
most egregious abuses, excluding the potentially deep and complex socioeconomic 
roots of conflict, and to suggest measures that are themselves narrowly time limited. 
Thus, transitional justice institutions are more likely to view human rights abuses—
torture, for example—as functions of the excesses of certain segments of the security 
sector or possibly on the orders of higher-level government officials in an attempt to cling 
to power, and not as deeper expressions of racism, rampant inequality, historic 
deprivations, or other issues of structural violence. 
Because transition can also suggest a particular destination, it may dictate in part 
the exceptional measures necessary to reach the intended goal. Not only does the 
diagnosis affect the prescribed remedy, but our very notion of what it means to be 
healthy also helps determine the course or treatment. Thus, Paige Arthur queries, how 
might the transitional justice “toolbox” look different if the paradigmatic transitions in the 
1990s were considered to be transitions to socialism rather than transitions to 
democracy, and largely Western forms of democracy at that?63 Might there have been a 
greater emphasis on issues of distributive justice, including the need for progressive 
taxation in countries experiencing radical inequality, land-tenure reform in countries 
where land-based conflict has been a driver of violence, and affirmative action in 
countries with historically-marginalized classes? While one can only speculate, what can 
be said is that the notion of transition as transition to liberal Western democracy surely 
had a limiting and narrowing effect on the “toolbox” that exists today. 
 
iii. Potential Objections to Greater Focus on Economic Violence in Transition 
 
Putting these historical constructions and limitations aside, even while greater emphasis 
on issues of economic violence within the transitional justice agenda seems necessary, 
striking a better balance between physical and economic violence also raises difficult 
questions that have yet to be worked out at the levels of theory, policy, and practice. For 
example, while some would find unobjectionable the idea that transitional justice 
mechanisms should include in their ambit economic and social rights violations that took 
place during the conflict itself—a group of rebels stealing food from a village, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 For a much more detailed exploration of this point, see Dustin Sharp, “Interrogating the 
Peripheries.” 
63 See Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 359. 
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example, in violation of the laws of war, or a warlord who sold off diamonds and timber 
to buy weapons—should we also include broader distributive justice and structural 
violence issues that predate the conflict, and which may have, in part, helped to 
precipitate it? 
We might characterize these two approaches as broad and narrow means of 
addressing economic violence in the transitional justice context. Taking a relatively 
narrow approach and looking only at the economic violence perpetrated during the 
conflict itself might prove to be relatively uncontroversial. Suppose, however, that in a 
given country there is an attempt during a transitional period to address some of the 
deeper legacies of abusive systems of governance, such as income inequality, the need 
for deeply redistributive taxation, and wide-scale land-tenure reform. Such was arguably 
the case in South Africa at the end of apartheid, yet it is also recognized that leaving the 
economic status quo largely intact was one of the “bargains” struck and the price paid for 
a bloodless transition.64 While some have argued that addressing economic legacies of 
conflict in transition might in fact enlist more support from the general population and 
therefore be even more feasible than seeking accountability for violations of civil and 
political rights, this does not account for the role of elites.65 A group of elites might be 
willing to see a handful of army officers or warlords prosecuted, but attempting radical 
revision of the political and economic status quo that has existed for decades might be 
another story. In the end, many transitions depend in some measure on the “buy-in,” or 
at least on the lack of resistance on the part of elite constituencies. Thus, relatively 
robust or broad approaches to addressing historical economic violence might create the 
possibility of backlash, re-animating the “peace versus justice” debate along economic 
lines. 
While more thinking and research would be needed to predict the potential for 
backlash based on configurations of elites and their role in the transition itself, it should 
be noted that the risk of a hostile and possibly even violent response is not a dilemma 
unique to addressing economic violence in transition. Indeed, much has already been 
said about how the parameters of transition justice may be shaped by the extent to 
which elites and perpetrator groups dictate the terms of the transition.66 One might note, 
however, that in those few instances where truth commissions have made 
recommendations related to addressing socioeconomic inequalities, those 
recommendations tend to be ignored by policy makers.67 This may be a more likely 
outcome than backlash, though if framed properly, such recommendations might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See Bell, “Interdisciplinarity,” 14. 
65 See Roger Duthie, “Toward a Development-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 307. 
66 See, e.g., Huntington, “The Third Wave,” 65-81; O’Donnell and Schmitter, “Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule,” 57-64. 
67 See, e.g., Laplante, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 350 (discussing how the 
Guatemalan government largely ignored key recommendations of the Guatemalan Commission 
on Historical Clarification, including a progressive tax system and increased state spending on 
human necessities). 
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nevertheless serve as a strong lobbying platform for civil society actors who wish to 
press for reforms.68 
Beyond the potential for backlash, one of the most frequently noted objections 
relates to the additional cost and complexity that would stem from an expansion of the 
mandates of transitional justice mechanisms to include economic violence.69 It is a fact 
widely noted that the costs of even a narrow approach to transitional justice, particularly 
prosecutions, can be enormous, especially at a time when most governments, reeling 
from the effects of conflict, have little money to spare.70 Compounding the cost issue is 
the risk of expanding the mandate of truth commissions and other transitional justice 
mechanisms so broadly that it will be nearly impossible to fulfill in the limited time 
typically allotted.71 It would seem sensible to question whether this is really the context 
for trying to grapple with “broad-based development or distributive justice policies that 
aim to redress widespread violations of the economic and social rights of poor 
citizens.”72 But while the cost and time issues are far from specious, it should be noted 
that many transitional justice mechanisms are already funded in part by outside actors.73 
It is quite possible that measures to address economic violence in the transitional justice 
context would find support from complementary constituencies, particularly insofar as 
they touch upon questions of national economic development. Some have also argued 
that attempting to recoup money lost to economic violence in the form of embezzlement 
and corruption could be one way to help fund transitional justice initiatives focusing on 
economic issues.74 
There are also broader concerns associated with the dilution of the transitional 
justice enterprise.75 If one were to take a robust or broad approach to legacies of 
economic violence in times of transition, shifting the paradigm from transition to what 
some have called “transformation,” at what point does this better suit the work and 
expertise of traditional economic development actors and longer-term political and social 
processes?76 Seeking accountability for violations of physical integrity alone has been a 
monumental task, but over several decades, this work has made an impact on the 
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Transitional Justice and Development,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 
(2008): 256 (discussing the problems with the high cost of transitional justice measures in 
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75 For a powerful articulation of some of these concerns, see generally Lars Waldorf, “Anticipating 
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76 See Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 46 (advocating a “transformative” 
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normative and institutional global landscape.77 That is no small achievement, and trying 
to do too much could risk even the modest change that has been achieved. As Naomi 
Roht-Arriaza has argued, “broadening the scope of what we mean by transitional justice 
to encompass the building of a just as well as peaceful society may make the effort so 
broad as to become meaningless.”78 
While concerns that transitional justice efforts may become too diffuse are 
entirely legitimate and need to be taken seriously, ignoring a significant portion of the 
drivers of conflict and resulting violations of international law carries its own risks. There 
will always be a risk of trying to do too much, risking the legitimacy and capital of the 
transitional justice enterprise by reaching beyond the possibilities for social and political 
change at any given time. The point, however, is that the dividing line between “too 
much” and “too little” transitional justice should not be an arbitrary one based on 
distinctions between physical and economic violence. Rather, it should be based on a 
careful analysis of the drivers of conflict and the social, political, and financial capital that 
can be marshaled to effect change via the various mechanisms of transitional justice in 
the wake of conflict. 
In the end, working through these and other questions related to greater 
engagement with legacies of economic violence will require years of effort, 
experimentation, and study. In this sense, they are little different than the dilemmas and 
trade-offs associated with civil and political rights in the transitional justice context, most 
of which have yet to be fully worked out some thirty years after the birth of the field. Key 
to providing the impetus for such a complex and sustained process will be a change in 
thinking about the nature of the transitional justice enterprise and the notion of transition 
itself. The following Part explores what it might mean to reframe transitional justice not 
as a transition to democracy, the rule of law, or some kind of post-conflict stability, but as 
a transition to “positive peace.” 
 
 
C. Transitional Justice, Peace, and Peacebuilding 
 
In the context of transitional justice debates, the concept of “peace” has at times been 
mobilized as one of resistance to the advance of particular transitional justice 
mechanisms and policies.79 This is manifest most clearly in the so-called “peace versus 
justice” debate, in which some form of transitional justice, typically a prosecution, is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “The New Landscape of Transitional Justice,” in Transitional Justice 
in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice, eds. Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier 
Mariezcurrena (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1-8. See generally Kathryn 
Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2011) (discussing accountability in the context of prosecutions 
for human rights abuses). 
78 Ibid., 2. 
79 See, e.g., Chandra Lekha Sriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations: Justice vs Peace 
in Times of Transition (New York, Frank Cass, 2004). 
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imagined to stymie or preclude chances for a negotiated peace agreement.80 The debate 
also arises when it comes to the choice as among different elements of the transitional 
justice “tool box,” including whether to have prosecutions or a truth commission and 
whether to have international prosecutions or mechanisms of accountability rooted in 
local tradition and custom.81 While there are an increasing number of concrete examples 
in which prosecutions have arguably advanced the cause of peace, and while the UN 
has officially embraced the notion that peace and justice are mutually complementary, 
the “peace versus justice” debate has proved to be an enduring one, resurfacing most 
recently in International Criminal Court indictments of Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and 
Joseph Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda.82 
The concept of peace is not part of the daily working vocabulary of many lawyers 
and human rights advocates who comprise the communities that provided the initial 
intellectual capital to the transitional justice enterprise, and few transitional justice 
scholars today situate their work in the context of peace or peacebuilding.83 
Nevertheless, the notion of peace is perhaps no more or less nebulous than the 
concepts of “justice,” “accountability,” “reconciliation,” and the “rule of law” that typically 
pepper transitional justice discourse. Although rarely defined as such, the concept of 
peace that is put in opposition to justice in the context of the “peace versus justice” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 As an example of this phenomenon, in 2003, the then chairman of the Economic Community of 
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facilitate a negotiated settlement to Liberia’s civil war. See IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis, 
“Liberia: ECOWAS Chairman Urges UN to Lift Taylor Indictment,” June 30, 2003. 
81 Increasingly, there is a recognition that no one mechanism of transitional justice can hope to 
fulfill the many aspirations ascribed to it, and multiple overlapping mechanisms are thought to be 
necessary. For an exploration of the “truth versus justice” debate, see generally Miriam Aukerman, 
“Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crimes: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice,” 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 (2002): 39; Reed Brody, “Justice: The First Casualty of Truth?,” 
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generally Adam Branch, “Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention,” Ethics and 
International Affairs 21, no. 2 (2007): 179. 
82 See, e.g., United Nations Secretary-General, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice,” 1 
(positing that “[j]ustice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather 
mutually reinforcing imperatives”); Priscilla Hayner, Negotiating Peace in Liberia: Preserving the 
Possibility for Justice (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, November 2007), 8-9 (arguing 
that the indictment of Charles Taylor advanced the peace process in Liberia, even though it was 
criticized at the time as potentially undermining peace negotiations); Louise Arbour, “Justice v. 
Politics,” The New York Times, Sept. 16, 2008. (justifying her decision to indict Slobodan 
Milošević by showing that it ultimately advanced the cause of peace, even though it was criticized 
at the time for threatening the peace process). 
83 Andrieu, “Civilizing Peacebuilding,” 539 (noting that “few transitional justice scholars have yet 
situated their research in the context of peacebuilding, seeing it instead through the dominant 
lens of legalism and human rights”); see Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 29 
(noting that “few researchers have analysed the relationship between justice, reconciliation and 
peacebuilding”). 
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debate is typically that of “negative peace,” meaning the absence of direct physical 
violence.84 Thus, if the threat of prosecution is feared to prevent a group of rebels from 
signing a peace agreement, and the guns may keep firing, justice could be said to 
undermine (negative) peace.85 A similarly narrow view of peace can be found when Ruti 
Teitel expresses the fear that as transitional justice mechanisms become increasingly 
associated with nation building, they will give up on the “ambitious goals of establishing 
the rule of law and democracy” in favor of the more modest aims of “maintaining peace 
and stability.”86 
The notion of negative peace that has often been employed in transitional justice 
discourse and debates is a much narrower concept of peace than the notion of positive 
peace discussed in this chapter, which involves not just the silence of AK-47s and the 
absence of the direct violence of hot conflict, but also the absence of more indirect forms 
of violence, including forms of structural violence such as poverty, corruption, radical 
economic, social, civil, and political inequalities, and other forms of social injustice.87 
Positive peace may well embrace, but is broader than, many of the traditional goals of 
transitional justice, including establishing democracy and building the rule of law. After 
all, there are many modern democracies in which the rule of law is firmly established that 
nevertheless manifest high levels of poverty and other forms of structural violence.  
Without making use of the term, transitional justice advocates often seem to 
assume that accountability will lead to a type of positive peace.88 Thus, for example, the 
concept of peace might be marshaled by the advocates for transitional justice as part of 
an argument that a potential amnesty agreement will not secure “lasting peace” or that 
the particular type of justice to be meted out by transitional justice mechanisms is 
necessary to “long-term peace.” It is perhaps then assumed that the transition that is set 
in motion will allow the type of social and economic development that may lead to 
positive peace. As Alexander Boraine has argued, “[t]he overall aim [of transitional 
justice] should be to ensure a sustainable peace, which will encourage and make 
possible social and economic development.”89 More typically, however, transitional 
justice advocates debate issues of amnesty and prosecutions in a more legalistic idiom, 
asking, for example, whether there is a duty to prosecute under international law, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 See Galtung, “Violence,” 167; Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 34. 
85 See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman and Alexis Okeowo, “Warlord’s Absence Derails Another Peace 
Effort in Uganda,” The New York Times, Apr. 12, 2008 (discussing the refusal of Joseph Kony, 
leader of a rebel group known as the Lord’s Resistance Army that is responsible for widespread 
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86 Teitel, “Transitional Justice in a New Era,” 898. 
87 See generally Galtung, “Violence,” 167 (discussing different constructions of “positive peace” 
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88 See Alexander Boraine, “Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation,” Journal of International 
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whether amnesties are compatible with international law.90 In these discussions, broader 
notions of peace are often relatively absent.  
 
i. International Peacebuilding 
 
The concept of positive peace overlaps but is not synonymous with the evolving concept 
and field of peacebuilding. At the international institutional level,91 the field and practice 
of peacebuilding in the postconflict context evolved out of the much more limited 
peacekeeping operations of the Cold War in which neutrality, consent, and minimum 
force were considered paramount (often referred to as “first-generation” peace 
keeping).92 With the end of the Cold War, these limited operations soon gave way to 
more complex and multidimensional initiatives in which the UN was called upon to 
address underlying economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems inextricably 
linked with local politics. The seemingly inevitable involvement in increasingly complex 
postconflict initiatives culminated in the 2005 creation of the United Nations 
Peacebuilding Commission, which has been tasked with facilitating integrated 
approaches to postconflict reconstruction throughout the UN system and beyond. 
The term “peacebuilding” was not defined as part of the Peacebuilding 
Commission’s creation, but has continued to evolve along with emerging policy and 
practice. According to a working definition adopted by the UN Secretary-General’s Policy 
Committee in 2007, it “involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of 
lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for 
conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and 
development.”93 Despite the apparent breadth of this working definition, at the level of 
major international institutions, including the UN and multi- and bi-lateral donors, 
peacebuilding today typically consists of a more-or-less standardized package of 
initiatives that include demobilization, disarmament, reintegration, security sector reform, 
broader “rule of law” initiatives, elections, and, increasingly, the various mechanisms of 
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transitional justice.94 In this way, transitional justice initiatives have become a routine 
part of the “postconflict checklist” that is associated with liberal international 
peacebuilding.95 
  
ii. Using a Positive-Peace Paradigm 
 
The principal contention of this chapter is that one way of giving equal pride of place to 
justice for both physical and economic violence in the transitional justice context, thereby 
creating a more balanced approach to both civil and political, and economic and social 
rights, would be to reconceptualize transitional justice not as a simply political transition, 
democratic or otherwise—the paradigm out of which the field evolved—but as part of a 
broader transition to positive peace. Grounding the field in such a conception would be 
one way of helping to push past the boundaries of mainstream transitional justice and 
liberal international peacebuilding.  
Anchoring the field of transitional justice in the concept of positive peace could 
potentially have at least three positive effects. First, it would likely broaden the approach 
from a relatively narrow and legalistic one focused on physical violence and civil and 
political rights to one that would also grapple, where appropriate, with questions relating 
to legacies of economic violence. Second, as the achievement of positive peace is a 
long-term endeavor, the notion of justice for positive peace implies preventative 
strategies that look beyond the confines of an unspecified political transition. In doing so, 
transitional justice mechanisms may be conceptualized more holistically and 
implemented in ways that build synergies with broader development and peacebuilding 
initiatives associated with postconflict reconstruction.96 
Third, the notion of justice for positive peace suggests that the determination of 
the modalities and mechanisms of transitional justice should be grounded in a context-
based inquiry into the particular roots and drivers of the conflict in question. This stands 
in contrast to a package of mechanisms drawn from a toolbox of “best practices” with 
some sort of predetermined political endpoint, be it elections or democracy, or based on 
a more abstract set of deontological goals, including accountability and just deserts. Best 
practices, packages, and toolboxes in one country might have little relevance to building 
positive peace in another. For example, Paige Arthur has speculated that while many of 
the dominant themes and responses to violence of mainstream transitional justice 
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evolved out of the Latin American experience, these responses might not be optimal for 
countries with “different histories, cultures, and positions within the world economy.”97 
Many countries in Africa with a history of neopatrimonial government, corruption, and 
very weak state institutions might need to focus on a different set of issues through a 
different set of mechanisms.98 Focusing on positive peace as the ultimate goal of the 
mechanisms of transitional justice could be one way to refocus attention on the context-
specific interventions needed to move in that direction. 
A paradigm shift in the direction of positive peace would not dictate a broad or 
narrow approach to economic violence in transition, or even ensure that economic 
violence would be addressed at all. As with all transitional justice mechanisms and 
modalities, the needs and limits of the context would have to be considered. Depending 
on the context, addressing economic violence might not always be necessary, or even 
desirable. As Chandra Lekha Sriram argues, simply presuming that more justice 
necessarily generates or equates to more peace is potentially problematic.99 This 
presumption should be avoided with respect to both mainstream transitional justice and 
a more holistic form of traditional justice that would also grapple with legacies of 
economic violence. 
 
iii. The Critique of Liberal International Peacebuilding 
 
In attempting to ground the field of transitional justice in a paradigm of positive peace, it 
is important to be wary of limiting constructions in which the notion of positive peace 
would simply be reshaped to fit and support existing practices and paradigms. Despite 
the potentially expansive nature of the field and concept of peacebuilding as discussed 
above, a trenchant critique has been that actual peacebuilding practice, if not theory as 
well, tends to reflect a paradigm of liberal internationalism in which faith in market 
economies and Western-style liberal democracy is conceived as the unique pathway to 
peace.100 Because many developing countries have little experience with democracy, the 
emphasis on elections, democracy, and free markets associated with the typical 
package of postconflict peacebuilding interventions can be both dangerous and 
destabilizing.101 In a number of ways, the critique of liberal international peacebuilding 
parallels the critique of mainstreamed transitional justice, in which the transition is 
implicitly conceived of as a transition to Western liberal democracy and elements of 
economic violence and social justice are moved to the periphery.102 
These historic constructions of the fields of transitional justice and peacebuilding 
illustrate how the concepts of peace, peacebuilding, and justice can be marshaled in 
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100 See Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits,” 56; see also Sriram, “Justice as Peace?,” 580. 
101 For this reason, Roland Paris advocates what he calls “institutionalization before liberalization,” 
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Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits,” 57-58. 
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   88	  
ways that are both limiting and expansive; ways that can empower but also can 
obfuscate hierarchies of power and further perpetuate inequalities. Thus, any attempt to 
build the notion of transitional justice as transition to positive peace requires special 
attentiveness to these dynamics. Nevertheless, one might argue that the benefit of the 
positive-peace paradigm is not that it offers a concrete goal that is any more precise or 
less subject to being co-opted than “justice,” “democracy,” “reconciliation,” or the “rule of 
law.” In the end, these may all be “essentially contested concepts.”103 At the same time, 
because the very core import of the concept of positive peace calls upon one to attend to 
a broader set of concerns than has historically been the practice of both liberal 
international peacebuilding and mainstreamed transitional justice, it may offer a better 





In recent decades, the field of transitional justice has distinguished itself from its parent 
field of international human rights, in part due to its more overt grappling with the hard 
policy choices that lie at the intersection of law and politics and of justice and peace. At 
the same time, there has been an implicit politics at work in the backgrounding and 
foregrounding of various aspects of transitional justice concern. If mass atrocities and 
physical violence have been placed in the spotlight, issues of equally devastating 
economic and social justice have received little attention. 
The choice of which justice issues to focus on in a given context, be it physical 
violence, economic violence, or some combination of the two, is itself a political choice 
with distributional consequences. The goal of reorienting transitional justice as a 
transition to positive peace is not to remove politics or pretend that transitional justice is 
or ever could be an apolitical project. Rather, the concept of positive peace calls upon us 
to be attentive to these choices, whether justice is imagined to serve the needs of a 
political transition to liberal market democracy, or something else. Thus, the goal is not 
to do away with politics, but to bring them back to the surface and free them from the 
confines of a technocratic and legalistic discourse that too often serves to obscure and 
legitimize the implicit politics at work. 
While addressing a wider range of justice concerns than has previously been the 
case will create serious challenges, failure to address these concerns may ultimately 
undermine the goals of transitional justice itself, including the prevention of a relapse into 
conflict. The hope therefore is to replace the historic emphasis and exclusion of 
economic violence with a more nuanced, contextualized, and balanced approach to the 
full range of justice issues faced by societies in transition. In this, we would take one 
step forward in moving beyond the constructed and self-imposed blindspots and biases 
of the field of transitional justice.  
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Chapter III:  Economic Violence in the Practice of African Truth 
Commissions and Beyond1 
 
 
Over the last three decades, truth commissions in their various forms, together with 
other transitional justice mechanisms, have become an increasingly popular means of 
attempting to address legacies of violence.2 While mandates vary, the core mission of 
most truth commissions includes an attempt to diagnosis “what went wrong” in the lead 
up to the conflict or period of abuses, to document and understand the human rights 
abuses that were perpetrated, particularly from the perspective of those defined as 
“victims,” and to offer prescriptions for the future with a view to preventing recurrence of 
conflict. Given the tangled political, economic, and social roots of many conflicts, this is 
no easy task. Conflicts do not begin in a vacuum, isolated from deeper socioeconomic 
and historical forces, and their ripple effects rarely cease when the guns fall silent. While 
there is a tendency to associate conflict with the most extreme forms of physical violence, 
murder, rape, and torture for example, the violence of conflict is often carried out at 
multiple levels. “Economic violence” in various forms, including widespread corruption, 
theft and looting from civilians, plunder of natural resources to fuel wartime economies 
and fill warlords’ pockets, and other violations of economic and social rights, is also 
deeply woven into the narrative of many modern conflicts, as both driver and sustainer. 
In addition to violations of bodily integrity, many individuals lose life savings, homes, and 
the ability to sustain themselves in the future. For many victims, it is the combination of 
both physical and economic violence that makes conflict utterly devastating. As a result, 
the poverty and lack of access to basic social services that may have pre-dated the 
conflict are all the more crippling in the conflict’s aftermath.  
But while forms of economic violence are part and parcel of many modern 
conflicts, the great majority of truth commissions created in the wake of violent conflict 
have chosen to place almost exclusive emphasis on documenting and analyzing acts of 
physical violence and other civil and political rights violations. Issues of equally 
devastating economic and social justice have received comparatively little attention. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, for example, Latin American truth commissions in Argentina, 
Uruguay, and Chile, largely prioritized violations of civil and political rights, passing over 
the role of economic crimes in the violence that was perpetrated.3 The much-lauded 
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3 James Cavallaro and Sebastián Albuja, “The Lost Agenda: Economic Crimes and Truth 
Commissions in Latin America and Beyond,” in Transitional Justice from Below, Grassroots 
Activism and the Struggle for Change, ed. Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (Oxford and 
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South African truth commission focused on murder, torture, and other egregious acts of 
bodily harm, but not on the economic and structural violence of the apartheid system 
itself. Where some of these truth commissions have grappled with economic violence in 
limited ways, it has often been treated as context, useful in helping to understand why 
physical violence look place, but little more.4 Whatever merits the truth narrative woven 
by a commission following such an approach might have, it will inevitably be a truth 
distorted by the notion that there is a tidy and clean division between economics and 
politics, between some of the key drivers and sustainers of conflict, and its most 
egregious effects. Ultimately, the marginalization of the economic within the transitional 
justice agenda can also serve to distort the policies thought to be necessary in the wake 
of conflict.5  
In contrast with these historical patterns, an increasing number of truth 
commissions in the last decade, many of them African, have taken steps to shift 
economic violence into the foreground of their work. A few have even identified forms of 
economic violence as a “root cause” of the conflict in question and included among their 
recommendations measures intended to address the underpinnings of economic 
violence. This chapter will explore the pioneering work of five African truth 
commissions—Chad, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Kenya—using the case studies 
as a prism to explore some of the practical, legal, and policy dilemmas raised by the 
greater inclusion of economic violence in the transitional justice agenda. I argue that 
while these efforts have varied in terms of quality, rigor, and the amount of attention paid 
to economic violence, they nevertheless represent an important step in moving 
economic violence into the foreground of the transitional justice agenda, and in linking 
analysis and understanding of some of the drivers and sustainers of conflict with 
necessary peacebuilding initiatives in the wake of conflict. At the same time, while 
African truth commissions have made great strides in moving economic violence into the 
foreground, they have rarely chosen to frame the issues in question as human rights 
issues, even where claims of violations of economic and social rights would be strong. 
This represents a lost opportunity for addressing poverty and other issues of economic 
violence in the post-conflict context. Going forward, I argue that truth commissions 
choosing to address economic violence will need to find ways to retain focus despite 
broadening mandates. Focusing on an “economic violence-human rights nexus” would 
be one way to achieve such focus. 
This chapter will proceed in three parts. In part one, I discuss the role of truth 
commissions in transitional justice generally, describing their functions, ascribed 
purposes, and a few broad streams of critique that have been raised relating to their 
work. I analyze the historic focus of many truth commissions—what Cavallero and Albuja 
have called the “dominant script”—and the relative invisibility of economic issues therein. 
I also discuss the spectrum of approaches a truth commission might choose to take in 
addressing economic violence if it wished to counter these historic patterns. In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Zinaida Miller, “Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 275-76. 
5 Ibid., 266-268. 
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second part, I look at economic violence in the practice of five African truth commissions 
and beyond, using the case studies to outline the promises and pitfalls of attempting to 
move economic violence into the foreground of transitional justice work. The third and 
final part concludes the chapter with recommendations for improving the quality and 
rigor of work on economic violence.  
 A note about terminology is in order before continuing. In this chapter, I use the 
terms “physical violence” and “economic violence” as shorthand to refer to a range of 
phenomena. “Physical violence” refers to murder, rape, torture, disappearances, and 
other classic violations of civil and political rights. In contrast, “economic violence” refers 
to violations of economic and social rights, plunder of natural resources, and various 
forms of economic crime carried out by authorities in violation of generally applicably 
criminal law, including large-scale embezzlement, fraud, tax crimes, and other forms of 
corruption. While most of the “physical violence” discussed in this article constitutes a 
violation of civil and political rights under international law, the concept of “economic 
violence” includes but is also broader than violations of economic and social rights under 
international law.6 Though they discuss the phenomena I have grouped under the 
category of “economic violence,” the truth commissions I discuss in this chapter do not 
use the term as such. Many of them do not even refer to economic and social rights 
explicitly, preferring instead to talk about “economic crimes” under national law. I am 
therefore using the phrase “economic violence” in a relatively broad sense that 
encompasses the varied economic crimes and economic and social rights violations at 
issue in the work of the truth commissions used as case studies in this chapter.  
 
 
A. Truth Commissions and Transitional Justice 
 
Though many of the mechanisms associated with transitional justice have origins 
and parallels going back centuries if not millennia, as a domain of policy, practice, and 
academic study, the modern field of transitional justice emerged in the 1980s and 90s 
with the surge of political transitions in both Eastern Europe and Latin America that 
followed in the wake of the end of the Cold War.7 The field encompasses the diverse 
ways in which societies attempt to grapple with a legacy of widespread human rights 
abuses as part of a transition to a more democratic and peaceful future. In recent years, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Beyond the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, economic, social, 
and cultural rights have the status of binding law in a number of international human rights 
treaties. Examples include the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities; the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the European Social Charter; and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights. 
7 See generally, Neil Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with 
Former Regimes, Volume I. General Considerations (Washington: United States Institute of 
Peace, 1995). 
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transitional justice has come to be associated not just with narrow political transitions to 
democracy, but with post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding more generally.8 As 
endorsed by the United Nations in a landmark 2004 report, transitional justice is said to 
comprise 
the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s 
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in 
order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. 
These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with 
differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual 
prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and 
dismissals, or a combination thereof. 9 
Despite the increasingly open-ended nature of transitional justice, the paradigmatic “third 
wave” transitions at the origins of the field, transitions from authoritarianism and 
communism to Western liberal democracy, were “crucial to structuring the initial 
conceptual boundaries of the field,” and remain relevant today to understanding the 
field’s constructed boundaries and limitations.10  
Transitional justice is often said to be at once backward looking, insofar as it is 
preoccupied with abuses committed by various factions prior to the transition or conflict, 
and forward looking, insofar as it attempts to prevent recurrence and lay the groundwork 
for long-term peace by promoting accountability, reconciliation, and institutional reform. 
While the transitional justice “toolbox” has broadened to include a range of mechanisms 
and practices designed to encourage reconciliation and various forms of accountability, 
the most iconic, and perhaps most dominant mechanisms associated with transitional 
justice are prosecutions and truth commissions.  
 
i. The Rise of the Truth Commission 
 
When in 1984 Argentina’s Sábato Commission (Comisión Nacional sobre la 
Desaparición de Personas, CONADEP) charged with investigating disappearances in 
the course of Argentina’s dirty war published its final report, Nunca Más (or “Never 
Again”), it could hardly know that it was in the vanguard of a worldwide trend.11 In the 
nearly three decades that have followed, the concept of the truth commission has been 
exported throughout the world, with an average of over one new truth commission being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Chandra Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega, Johanna Herman, “Evaluating and Comparing 
Strategies of Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice,” JAD-PbP Working Paper Series No 1. (May 
2009), 13 (discussing increasing linkages between transitional justice and a broader set of 
peacebuilding activities). 
9 United Nations Secretary General, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Post-conflict 
Societies,” UN Doc. S/2004/616 (August 23, 2004), para. 8.  
10 Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009): 326. 
11 Nunca Más, Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared (New York: 
Farar, Strauss and Giroux, 1986). 
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created per year since the early 1980s.12 Priscilla Hayner, perhaps the world authority on 
the subject, has documented the existence of some 40 modern-day truth commissions.13 
While truth commissions have spanned the globe, ranging from South Africa and South 
Korea, to Morocco, Germany, and Greensboro, North Carolina, at least 65 percent of 
them have been split almost equally between Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
With the recent creation of truth commissions in Brazil and Côte d’Ivoire, the worldwide 
list will likely only continue to grow in the coming years. Truth commissions, together 
with other transitional justice mechanisms appear to have become a routine part of the 
“post-conflict checklist” that includes security-sector reform, judicial reform, and national 
elections. Increasingly, both rhetoric and actual policy choices suggest that the question 
is no longer whether something will be done in the wake of large-scale human rights 
abuses, but what should be done. Truth commissions in their various forms have been 
and will likely continue to be a consistent part of the response to that question in the 
years to come.  
At the most general level, truth commissions across the world have a remarkable 
similarity. As defined by Hayner, a truth commission: 
(1) is focused on the past, rather than ongoing events; (2) investigates a 
pattern of events that took place over a period of time; (3) engages 
directly and broadly with the affected population, gathering information on 
their experiences; (4) is a temporary body, with the aim of concluding with 
a final report; (5) is officially authorized or empowered by the state under 
review.14  
The purposes and goals ascribed to such bodies are far ranging, though some claims 
appear to be anchored more in articles of faith than rooted in robust empirical evidence. 
It is often assumed, for example, that establishment of “the truth” is a necessary 
precursor to reconciliation and national and individual healing, though the historical 
record and individual experience certainly provides examples that might lead one to 
question such claims. Others argue with more modesty that while they may be an 
imperfect mechanism for justice, truth commissions can at least help to create a bulwark 
against later denial of the abuses that took place, and of forgetting.15 Beyond 
establishing a historical record of events, truth commissions can also provide a national 
forum in which victims’ experience of conflict can be heard and publically acknowledged, 
often for the first time. Truth commissions have also been instrumental in articulating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 While Uganda and others can arguably lay the claim to having held the first truth commission, 
Argentina’s commission is of unquestionably higher influence in the spread of truth commissions 
around the world, and was the first to publish a report that became a best seller.  
13 Prisilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 11-12. 
14 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 11-12.  
15 See, for example, Alexander Boraine, “Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa,” in Truth v. 
Justice, eds. Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000), 141-157. 
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policy platforms for necessary change in the wake of conflict, occasionally leading to the 
implementation of reparations programs and a number of significant prosecutions.16  
Yet despite their popularity and the powers ascribed to them, truth commissions 
have not been without their disappointments, failures, and critics. Some truth 
commissions, including one of the case studies used in this chapter, Chad, have been 
seen as too partisan to do credible work and establish an unvarnished historical record 
of events. Others, including commissions in Bolivia, Zimbabwe, and the Philippines, 
have failed to even publish a report. Still others, such as the Liberian commission, have 
produced lengthy reports that are groundbreaking in certain respects, but nevertheless 
considered to lack the requisite rigor that the subject matter requires.17 Even when their 
work has been of relatively high caliber, the bulk of recommendations issued by truth 
commissions are in many cases simply ignored by governments. Finally, advocates from 
the mainstream human rights community have often argued against the use of truth 
commissions in the absence of prosecutions, calling them a “soft option” for avoiding 
hard justice, a choice all too readily welcomed by warlords intent on avoiding “real” forms 
of accountability.18  
As should come as no surprise, truth commissions have also faced withering 
criticism from academics. When it comes to the question of conflict prevention, political 
scientist David Mendeloff has argued that many of the core claims and assumptions 
underlying the creation of truth commissions—including the notion that personal healing 
promotes national healing, that truth-telling promotes reconciliation, and that forgetting 
the past necessarily leads to war—are flawed, and that “truth-telling advocates claim far 
more about the power of truth-telling than logic or evidence dictates.”19 In view of some 
of the questionable claims made, Mendeloff argues, one should not be so quick to 
proclaim the necessity of truth commission in the aftermath of violent conflict. Other 
critics like anthropologist Rosalind Shaw have argued that the particular model of truth 
commission that has been exported throughout the world, rooted as it is in Western 
traditions of public confession, sin, and forgiveness, may at times conflict with and even 
serve to displace local traditions of memory, healing, and social forgetting and that more 
context-specific approaches may be required.20 Yet despite these trenchant critiques 
from activists and academics, the truth commission as a worldwide phenomenon 
continues to flourish. 
 
ii. The Practice of Truth Commissions; Following a Dominant Script 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 5. 
17 For a critical take on the work of the Liberian truth commission, see, e.g., Jonny Steinberg, 
“Liberia’s Experiment with Transitional Justice,” African Affairs 109 (2009): 136. 
18 Reed Brody, “Justice: The First Casualty of Truth?,” The Nation, April 30, 2001, 25. 
19 David Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling, and Postconflict Peacebuilding: Curb the 
Enthusiasm?,” International Studies Review 6 (2004): 356. 
20 Rosalind Shaw, “Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions; Lessons from Sierra Leone” 
(United States Institute for Peace Special Report 130, 2005); see also Tim Kelsall, “Truth, Lies, 
Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone,” 
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Truth commissions are, of course, not a monolith and there is no single model that has 
been used throughout the world. With many different iterations across the globe, truth 
commissions have demonstrated variability and adaptability across a number of 
dimensions. They have varied as to the enacting authority establishing them, the scope 
of abuses addressed, the time and budget allocated to their work, whether they could 
pardon violators in exchange for a confession, whether to name names and use photos 
of those responsible in their final report, whether to provide compensation to victims, the 
scope of investigative powers, and the legally binding nature of any recommendations 
that they might issue. As variations in form, composition and powers demonstrate, the 
truth commission is an open-ended institution, combining some of the features of a court, 
an investigative legislative committee, and community therapy body, its ultimate form 
and power determined only by the institutional imagination of its creators, and the 
political and financial realities they face.  
Yet despite their variability and adaptability across the world, when it comes to 
the scope of abuses that they address, most truth commissions have generally worked 
within fairly established parameters that emphasize physical violence and civil and 
political rights violations, with dimensions of economic violence, including violations of 
economic and social rights, corruption, and other economic crimes pushed to the 
margins, if they are addressed at all. For example, one of the world’s first truth 
commissions, the Sábato Commission in Argentina focused exclusively on forced 
disappearances, despite the range of civil and political rights abuses in which the military 
had engaged, to say nothing of economic crimes and corruption. Truth commissions 
created shortly thereafter in Uruguay (1985) and Chile (1990-91) focused exclusively on 
disappearances. Though their mandates were somewhat broader, truth commissions in 
El Salvador (1992-93) and Guatemala (1997-99) focused on a relatively narrow band of 
the human rights spectrum. In South Africa (1995-2002), only those who had suffered 
“gross violations of human rights, including killing, abduction, torture, or ill-treatment” 
qualified as “victims.”21 The apartheid system itself, in some ways perhaps the 
embodiment of structural and economic violence, was largely treated as context to 
instances of egregious bodily harm that became the commission’s principal focus. As 
Cavallaro and Albuja have argued, the near invisibility of economic violence in the work 
of these truth commissions cannot be attributed to an absence of corruption and 
economic crimes in the countries and political regimes at issue.22 
That this pattern should be so marked notwithstanding geographic distance and 
great variability in the underlying conflicts at issue is in a sense remarkable. In tracking 
this pattern across the truth commissions of Latin America, Cavallero and Albuja have 
posited that the narrow focus of these early truth commissions developed not because it 
was particularly well suited to context specific needs, but due to a process of 
“acculturation” whereby a dominant script is replicated again and again as a result of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Pablo De Greiff and Roger Duthie, “Repairing the Past: Reparations for Victims of Human 
Rights Violations,” in The Handbook on Reparations, ed. Pablo de Greiff (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 8. 
22 Cavallaro and Albuja, “The Lost Agenda,” 128. 
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“repeated information exchange and consultations with prior commission members and 
a cadre of international scholars and practitioners in the area.”23 Paige Arthur has 
similarly documented the vital importance of conferences and information exchanges to 
the early development of transitional justice norms, practices, and institutional 
parameters.24 Once a dominant paradigm for truth commissions as “denouncing only a 
limited set of human rights violations developed legitimacy in world society,” Cavallero 
and Albuja argue, “modifying the script to include economic crimes and corruption—and 
thus undoing the process of socialization of the model—became extremely difficult.”25  
The script developed in Latin America subsequently became the model for export 
throughout the world. Perhaps most importantly in terms of truth commission genealogy, 
the narrow Latin American model was largely the one adopted in South Africa. As 
explained by Alexander Boraine, former vice chairperson for the South African 
commission: “In the work leading up to the appointment of the TRC, we were greatly 
influenced and assisted in studying many of these commissions, particularly those in 
Chile and Argentina.”26 The South African commission remains today perhaps the most 
famous truth commission in the world, and certainly the most influential in sub-Saharan 
Africa. In my dealings with human rights activists across sub-Saharan Africa over the 
last ten years, I have found that many are not even aware that the South African 
commission was preceded by other truth commissions, having come to see it as a 
uniquely “African” approach to addressing transitional justice issues.  
The narrow script of these early Latin American truth commission is of course not 
unique to the field of transitional justice, but reflects a deeper ambivalence regarding the 
proper status of economic and social rights within the international human rights 
community.27 Though formally universal and “indivisible”28 from civil and political rights, 
economic and social rights have long lingered at the periphery of the focus and action of 
the key players in the international human rights movement, including the largest and 
most influential NGOs, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.29 This was 
particularly true in the 1980s and 1990s when the Latin American script for truth 
commissions was being developed.  
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26 Boraine, “Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa,” 142-143. 
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iii. The Costs of Undue Narrowness 
 
Whatever the precise historic reasons for the exclusion of economic violence from the 
ambit of truth commissions, the invisibility of the economic in their work is not without its 
costs. As one of the means of defining the historical record and creating the officially 
sanctioned narrative of conflict, exclusion of the economic has the potential to distort our 
understanding of the governance regimes that helped in part to precipitate the conflict, 
and impoverish our understanding of the conflict dynamics themselves. For example, the 
impression shared by some that corruption was limited during some Latin American 
dictatorships may be due in part to the fact that truth commissions created to document 
abuses committed by these regimes paid little attention to issues of corruption, in spite of 
the economic mismanagement and abuses by elites that served as among the driving 
forces of the underlying conflicts.30 Looking back, regimes that perpetrated both 
economic violence and physical violence may come to be remembered as firm, perhaps 
occasionally abusive, but strict, orderly, and fiscally clean. There could be a danger of 
romanticizing such figures in the messy and often crime-ridden world of some modern 
Latin American democracies.  
As the number of truth commissions across the world has grown, many of them 
have come to play an increasingly important agenda-setting role for post-conflict 
governments, issuing detailed policy recommendations to a variety of actors on matters 
touching the rule of law, human rights, and broader governance more generally. In some 
cases, these recommendations are even binding as a matter of law, with Liberia and 
Sierra Leone being two examples. Where economic violence has played a key role in 
driving abuses both during and in the lead up to the conflict, excluding these issues as a 
matter of course risks producing a set of recommendations that are not well tailored to 
the crisis at issue, and which do not lay the proper groundwork to prevent recurrence of 
the dynamics that led to the conflict.  
The risk of such distortions will likely vary from country to country, and conflict to 
conflict. For example, whatever the relevance to certain Latin American countries of a 
more narrow approach to transitional justice that largely excludes economic violence, 
one might particularly question its applicability to other regions of the world with 
completely different legacies of conflict and governance. It has been argued, for example, 
that for many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with their history of neopatrimonial 
governance regimes based on systems of patronage and clientalism, dimensions of 
economic violence such as corruption might logically arise “as one of the central justice 
issues of such transitions.”31 In such cases, the seemingly self-replicating nature of the 
dominant script carries with it the risk of excluding issues that are potentially 
fundamental to post-conflict peacebuilding. In countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo where plunder of natural resources, 
corruption, and looting from civilians have featured so prominently, any truth commission 
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that would choose to ignore such major features of the conflict would produce a 
seriously distorted narrative and set of policy recommendations.  
In sum, exclusion of economic violence from the ambit of truth commissions 
carries the risk of distorting the historical record, hindering understanding of the drivers 
of conflict, and biasing the reforms and initiatives thought necessary in the wake of 
conflict. Whether dealing with conflicts in Africa, Latin America, or elsewhere, there is 
simply no compelling a priori reason that economic violence should be excluded from the 
ambit of transitional justice mechanisms. Rather, the scope of inquiry and work should 
be based on a highly contextualized understanding of the roots of the conflict in question 
and the needs of the transition.32 In many instances, I argue, such an analysis would 
lead to what has been alternately called a “deeper, richer, and broader vision of justice” 
and a “thicker” or more holistic version of transitional justice in which economic and 
physical violence are placed in the foreground.33  
 
iv. Writing a New Script 
 
To say that a truth commission should not exclude economic violence from the ambit of 
its work as a matter of course does not answer the question of how and to what extent 
economic violence should be addressed. As reflected in the case studies discussed later 
in this chapter, a truth commission might choose to take a relatively broad or narrow 
approach to issues of economic violence in transition. At the broadest end of the 
spectrum, a truth commission with a wide temporal and subject matter mandate might 
look deep into history, examining the socioeconomic underpinnings and structural 
violence that often predate conflicts by decades if not centuries. Such an approach might 
involve looking at instances of corruption and other economic crimes not only during a 
particular conflict period, including sale of natural resources and other national assets to 
fuel violent conflict, but in the years leading up to the violent conflict as well. At its most 
direct, such an approach would involve framing many such issues not simply as useful 
background to understand why fighting broke out, but as independent violations of 
international and national law, including violations of economic and social rights. If such 
a commission were to take a similarly broad and deep approach to its recommendations 
for legal, policy, and institutional reforms, one could imagine measures that would 
include, among others, affirmative action, land-tenure reform, redistributive taxation, the 
creation of anti-corruption commissions endowed with serious power, and special 
development assistance to regions most economically affected by the conflict. At the 
most extreme end, such measures might be hard to distinguish from the work of the field 
of economic development.  
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Of course, to say that in addressing economic violence a truth commission might 
choose such an approach does not mean that it would necessarily be wise to do so. At 
its most extreme, an especially broad approach to economic violence might risk political 
backlash from entrenched elites, dooming even more modest recommendations made 
by the commission to irrelevancy. Such a broad approach would also bring costs in 
terms of the extra time, expertise, and finances needed to address the range of both 
physical and economic violence that took place.  
At the narrow end of the spectrum, a truth commission might include economic 
violence within its ambit, but do so in a relatively restricted way, looking perhaps only to 
egregious violations of economic and social rights that rise to the level of war crimes 
committed during a relatively restricted period.34 One could also imagine an approach 
where a commission would choose to document violations of economic and social rights 
only to the extent they were concomitant with civil and political rights violations (seizure 
of assets from political prisoners, for example). Relatively narrow approaches to 
addressing economic violence in transition would be less likely to risk political backlash, 
and would be less of a strain on a commission pushing up against resource constraints, 
both temporal and financial.  
 
 
B. Economic Violence in the Practice of African Truth Commissions and 
Beyond 
 
While the dominant script described above has shaped the narrative of the majority of 
the world’s truth commissions, an increasing number of truth commissions, many of 
them African, have taken steps to shift economic violence into the foreground of their 
work. A few of them, Liberia and Sierra Leone, have even gone so far as identify forms 
of economic violence as among the “root causes” of the conflict in question and included 
in their recommendations measures intended to address the underpinnings of economic 
violence. In this section, I will present case studies examining the background and work 
of five African truth commissions, Chad, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Kenya. I will 
also briefly look at the work of two truth commissions outside of Africa, East Timor and 
the Solomon Islands. While they may not be the only examples of truth commissions that 
have focused on economic violence to more than a small degree, they represent many 
of the most prominent examples in the world today, and serve a prism to explore some 
of the practical, legal, and policy dilemmas raised by the greater inclusion of economic 
violence in the transitional justice agenda. 
 
i. Chad: The Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations 
Committed by Ex-President Habré, His Accomplices and/or Accessories (1990-
1992)35 
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Chad’s post-independence history has been tumultuous, punctuated at seemingly 
regular intervals by internal conflict and coups d’état. Though the relatively recent 
discovery of oil and the construction of a pipeline to facilitate its export have filled 
national coffers to unprecedented levels, landlocked and isolated, Chad remains one of 
Africa’s poorest, worst-governed, and most conflict-ridden countries.36 Chad’s most 
notorious military leader, Hissein Habré, served as president from 1982 until 1990, 
receiving significant support during his reign from both France and the United States 
who saw in Habré a bulwark against Libyan expansion in the region. Habré’s reign “was 
marked by paranoia, clanism, severe political repression, and torture.”37 The chief arm of 
terror in the police state created by Habré was the Directorate of Documentation and 
Security (DDS), the security force chiefly responsible for torture and other acts of 
political repression. Brought to the pinnacle of power in a bloody coup, Habré’s fall from 
power came when one of his former lieutenants, Idriss Déby (still serving as Chad’s 
president over two decades later) mounted a successful insurgency.  
 Almost immediately after Habré’s fall from power, President Déby authorized the 
creation of a “Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed 
by Ex-President Habré, His Accomplices and/or Accessories.” As suggested by the 
name given, the commission’s mandate included both classic violations of physical 
integrity, including “illegal imprisonments, detentions, assassinations, disappearances, 
torture, and acts of barbarity,” as well as crimes of an economic nature, including 
embezzlement and theft of public and private goods.38 From the start, however, the 
ambitious goals assigned to the commission were not matched by the resources or time 
allocated to it. With a total of eight months to do its work (after an extension was 
granted), a miniscule budget, the loss of two of its four vehicles for a period of time due 
to ongoing combat in parts of the country, and threats from members of the security 
forces they were investigating, the commission’s efforts were greatly hampered and 
delayed.39 Complicating matters further, due to a shortage of space, the commission 
was assigned to work in the former headquarters of Habré’s secret police, the DDS, an 
institution described by the commission as “the principal organ or repression and terror” 
of the Habré regime, perhaps the worst possible place to locate a truth commission in all 
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of Chad.40 The negative effects of this location on the willingness of former political 
prisoners to testify cannot have been eased when the commission began to use 
prisoners from the jails to perform mass exhumations at the sites of Habré’s largest 
atrocities.41 The commission’s report was published in early 1992. 
To some, the work of the commission was little more than a political hatchet job 
designed to make Habré look worse than the man who replaced him, a type of victor’s 
justice.42 Indeed, the loose language of the report’s opening pages does little to dispel 
this impression, with passages likening Habré to a “camel thief” with innate criminal 
penchants.43 The failure to fully account for the round figures offered in the report 
regarding of the number of victims—Habré is said to be responsible for 40,000 victims, 
80,000 orphans, and 30,000 widows—might also lead one to question the report’s 
rigor.44 But despite its many shortcomings, the Chadian commission’s report is 
groundbreaking in a number of respects: it was the first truth commission report to name 
names, publishing the actual photos of key torturers, many of whom were still serving in 
government at the time.45 The commission called for the prosecution of Habré, as well 
as torturers serving in government.46 Finally, the report also took an open look at the role 
of foreign powers (France, the United States, and others) in supporting the Habré regime, 
including the budgetary support and training provided to the DDS itself.  
Beyond these notable achievements, a perhaps underappreciated innovation in 
the commission’s work is the degree to which the report addressed a range of economic 
issues, going so far as to divide its report, and indeed its staff, into two sections, one 
looking at violations of physical integrity and the other at the embezzlement of public 
goods. As published in the commission’s final report, the efforts of the economic crimes 
section are a little disappointing. For the most part, it appears that the commission could 
not make sufficient sense of the maze of presidential accounts, national and 
international, to tease out the full workings of Habré’s financial system. The most 
concrete evidence of personal pillage appears to be the scramble for money on the eve 
of Habré’s fall from power when millions of dollars were stolen from the state’s coffers. 
The commission makes no attempt to link any of these large-scale financial crimes to 
economic and social rights and the general poverty that has plagued Chad during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Chadian TRC Report, 21. 
41 Chadian TRC Report, 150. 
42 Priscilla Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,” Human 
Rights Quarterly 16 (1994): 625. 
43 Chadian TRC Report, 18. 
44 Chadian TRC Report, 97. 
45 Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions,” 625. 
46 While the government of Chad has done little to follow these recommendations, a coalition of 
Habré’s victims and human rights NGOs have been attempting to prosecute Habré for violations 
of the Convention Against Torture since 1999. For a look at the genesis of these efforts, see 
Dustin Sharp, “Prosecutions, Development, and Justice; The Trial of Hissein Habré,” Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 16 (2003). For a review of more recent developments in the Habré case, 
see Laura Bingham, “Trying for a Just Result? The Hissène Habré Affair and Judicial 
Independence in Senegal,” Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 23 (2009).  
	   102	  
Habré regime and after. Given the complexity of the work, short staffing, and the limited 
amount of time allotted, the quality of the economic section’s work is perhaps not 
surprising.  
Despite the apparent inability of the financial crimes unit to do the type of forensic 
accounting that would crack the code of Habré’s alleged personal embezzlements, the 
Commission’s report nevertheless breaks ground in illustrating the links between political 
repression and violence, on the one hand, with economic violence on the other. In 
documenting the widespread torture and disappearances that characterized Habré’s 
brutal reign, the report documents in some detail the DDS practice of routinely seizing 
the family wealth of Habré’s thousands of political prisoners, including bank accounts, 
houses, cars and other physical goods. The proceeds were used not only to line the 
pockets of the members of the DDS and provide houses to Habré regime loyalists, but 
also to bridge DDS budgetary gaps.47 In a very real sense then, political terror in Habré’s 
Chad was directly fueled by economic violence. The combination of political and 
economic violence had huge implications for the extended families of political prisoners. 
To illustrate this, the commission attempted to estimate the number of indirect victims of 
Habré’s political violence by looking at the number of orphans and widows who lost all 
economic support as a result of the disappearance of a father or mother, together with 
the seizure of all of the family’s goods and eviction from their home. In doing so, the 
Chadian truth commission broke new ground in helping to illustrate the socioeconomic 
ripple effects of political violence.48  
 
ii. Ghana: The National Reconciliation Commission (2003-2004) 
 
Though Ghana is often known today for relative prosperity and stability in a troubled 
region, its post independence history has at times been overshadowed by authoritarian 
and military rule, including four military coups d’état since 1966. Human rights abuses 
occurred under all periods of military rule, but intensified under Jerry John Rawlings’ two 
socialist-inspired military regimes spanning a total period of 11 years from the late 1970s 
until the early 1990s. These periods were characterized by killings, abductions, 
disappearances, torture, and confiscation of property.49 While periods of civilian rule 
were generally associated with increased, if imperfect, respect for rights, such 
administrations where generally too short-lived to counter the impunity that had taken 
root. Ghana’s experience with military rule came to a formal close in 1993 after a new 
constitution came into effect and democratic elections were held returning Rawlings to 
power in a civilian capacity. The new constitution included an amnesty provision for past 
abuses.  
The second democratic elections of 2000, which replaced Rawlings with John 
Kufor brought a definitive close to Ghana’s experience with military rule. In the lead up to 
the elections, John Kufor promised an active policy of national reconciliation intended to 
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address Ghana’s troubled past.50 In early 2003, a National Reconciliation Commission 
(NRC) began its work in the same building where Kwame Nkrumah declared Ghana’s 
independence 46 years earlier. The NRC would be the first national initiative to provide 
Ghanaians opportunities to publically relate their experiences of abuse and to seek 
redress.  
 The creation of the NRC proved controversial in several respects. Some 
questioned the need for a commission some nine years into Ghana’s democratic 
transition. There was also a lively debate surrounding the time period and types of 
violations that would constitute the commission’s mandate, particularly whether the 
commission would focus only on periods of military rule, or, as ultimately decided, 
abuses under both military and civilian rule. With respect to the commission’s subject 
matter mandate, “Many raised the issue of whether the violations examined by the 
commission should be confined to violations of bodily integrity or extend to socio-
economic violations and the reproduction of structural injustice.”51 In the end, the 
commission was instructed to investigate violations and abuses of human rights relating 
to seven categories—“killings, abductions, disappearances, detentions, torture, ill-
treatment and seizure of properties”52—but it was also given the flexibility in investigate 
“any others matters” it deemed necessary to promote reconciliation.53  
To outsiders looking at the seven enumerated categories of abuses within the 
commission’s mandate, the addition of “seizure of properties” might appear anomalous, 
coming as it does after some of the most egregious violations of civil and political rights 
abuses imaginable. Seen through the lens of Ghanaian history, however, particularly 
periods of military rule under Rawlings’ two socialist-inspired regimes where contested 
economic narratives were central to the story of military repression, it would have been 
strange to exclude dimensions of economic violence from the work of any such 
commission. Under Rawlings’ military regimes, much of the political violence targeted 
economic actors accused of “kalabule,” or corruption and profiteering. Those thought to 
be rich and politically conservative, including the market women who controlled private 
trading businesses, were particularly targeted. Abuses against such figures included 
severe physical violence as well as property seizure. Such targeted violence may have 
reached its peak in 1979 with the execution without trial of two former heads of state and 
six senior military officers accused of corruption.54  
In documenting the economic violence perpetrated by soldiers during Ghana’s 
military regimes, the commission’s report helps to illustrate the complicated interplay 
between economic and political violence. Indeed, as presented in the report, forms of 
economic violence and political violence are almost inextricably intertwined during 
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certain periods of Ghana’s history. In tailoring its recommendations to the abuses 
documented, the commission ultimately urged a range of policies relating to the 
economic violence that was meted out, ranging from restitution, to a special memorial for 
traders, one of the groups heavily brutalized by a combination of physical and economic 
violence.55 Beyond property seizures, the commission also looked at labor violations as 
forms of economic violence. Unlike some dimensions of economic violence such as 
property seizure and the infamous burning of the central market in Tamale, which the 
commission does not generally conceptualize as violations of economic and social rights 
per se, it describes summary dismissals of public servants by various military regimes as 
“one form of human rights abuse.”56 
Despite its many achievements, the Ghanaian commission was criticized for 
being narrowly legalistic in its approach to truth and reconciliation, something reflected in 
the final report’s narrative style.57 The commission’s report does not, for example, 
contain a particularly deep analysis of the broader social conditions of wealth and 
poverty that may have in part inspired the abusive practices of “revolutionary” 
governments. Rather, it largely seeks to detail a rather atomized catalogue of abuses 
perpetrated by soldiers, from killing and abductions to property seizure. Unlike the work 
of the Chadian truth commission, there is little effort devoted to detailing the ripple 
effects of both economic and political violence on the lives of families and their ability to 
support themselves. Thus, although the report breaks important ground in documenting 
aspects of economic violence, in some ways it continues to represent a more 
decontextualized and conventional human rights approach to reporting on violations. 
The story told in the commission’s report becomes primarily a narrative of unchecked 
indiscipline by young rogue soldiers who mete out revolutionary zeal. The remedy to the 
problems evoked by such a narrative in turn tends to focus on the need to reign in 
unchecked security forces rather than to address broader social and economic 
conditions. This stands in contrast to the work of truth commissions analyzed later in this 
chapter such as Liberia and Sierra Leone that have explicitly identified large meta-
drivers of the conflicts and abuses in question such as poverty, disenfranchised youth, 
and the scrum for natural resources, and tailored recommendations to address these 
“root causes.” 
 
iii. Sierra Leone: Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2002-2004) 
 
In March 1991, a rag-tag group of disaffected students and would-be revolutionaries, led 
by Foday Sankoh and supported by Charles Taylor in neighboring Liberia, launched their 
first attacks in Eastern Sierra Leone under the banner of the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF). Though the RUF was in its earliest days loosely united against the endemic 
corruption and inept governance of President Momoh’s government, their efforts quickly 
degenerated into what appeared to be a war against the civilian population as drug-
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addled child soldiers raped, pillaged, maimed, and killed with impunity. In the eleven 
years that followed, the civil war enveloped the entire country, killing as many as 50,000 
people.58 Though notorious for its extreme brutality and mass amputations, it was also a 
conflict that gave the world a new vocabulary for thinking about the linkages between 
natural resources and violent conflict as factions vied for control of Sierra Leone’s 
lucrative alluvial diamond fields, the so-called “blood diamonds” that helped in part to 
sustain the conflict. The war only came to an end in 2002 with the intervention of the 
United Nations, Guinea, and the British army. The Lomé Peace Accord that brought a 
formal end to the conflict called for the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. Subsequently, the government also asked the United Nations for help in 
setting up a Special Court for Sierra Leone in order to try those who “bear the greatest 
responsibility.”59 
Tasked with making sense of a war that seemed to many to be without purpose, 
the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission took a historically deep and 
thematically broad view of the roots and drivers of the conflict. In interpreting its mandate, 
the commission adopted a broad view of the concept of human rights, comprising civil 
and political, economic and social, “as well as other categories such as the right to 
development and the right to peace.”60 It emphasized in its analysis dimensions of both 
physical and economic violence, going so far as to place corruption, poverty, and 
structural violence as the core building blocks for the conflict: “the central cause of the 
war was endemic greed, corruption, and nepotism that deprived the nation of its dignity 
that reduced most people to a state of poverty.”61 Rather than treat facets of economic 
and structural violence as mere context, the commission traces the intertwined nature of 
economic, physical, and political violence both before and during the conflict itself. Thus, 
for example, in documenting violence that took place in the course of the conflict, the 
commission lists destruction of property, looting of goods, and extortion, along with 
serious violations of bodily integrity such as killing, assault, and rape as among the most 
common “violations” that took place with no attempt to create hierarchies of suffering.62 It 
also examined and the secondary economic and social rights impacts of the conflict, 
such as the impact on the health and education of women and children.63  
The inseparable nature of economic and physical violence in the course of the 
Sierra Leonean conflict is perhaps expressed most clearly in the way that natural 
resources played into conflict dynamics, both before and during the conflict itself. While 
to many outsiders the conflict in Sierra Leone was often seen as little more than a brutal 
scrum for the nation’s diamond resources, in fact, it might more plausibly be argued that 
diamonds played into both greed and grievance dynamics. Thus, for example, in the 
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decades before the eruption of conflict, the commission examines the role of elites in 
siphoning off the country’s diamond wealth to the detriment of development and poverty 
alleviation, creating some of the conditions, including widespread frustration with 
corruption, that made the conflict possible. Once the conflict erupted, control of diamond 
production became a key strategy for several factions, influencing the targeting of certain 
areas with attendant human rights consequences. The commission found it important to 
emphasize, however, that this did not feature highly in the early years of the conflict, 
ultimately concluding that while diamonds helped to fuel and sustain the conflict, plunder 
was not the driving factor that precipitated the RUF’s initial brutal campaign.64 
 The report’s recommendations, which are in principle binding upon the 
government of Sierra Leone,65 are ambitious and wide ranging. While the bulk of the 
recommendations appear to target stronger rule of law and greater respect for civil and 
political rights, there are also recommendations tailored to dimensions of economic 
violence as expressed before and during the conflict, including a repeal of laws 
preventing women from owning land, the need for a stronger anti-corruption commission, 
better basic service delivery, and better and more transparent use of diamond revenues. 
Taken together, the recommendations of the Sierra Leonean TRC were perhaps the 
most comprehensive, and most holistic set of recommendations issued by any truth 
commission up to that time.  
In issuing its recommendations, the commission attempted to calibrate what was 
realistically achievable in the short, medium, and long term. In this respect, it is worth 
noting that recommendations targeting improvement of economic and social rights are 
more likely to be qualified by the commission as something the government must “work 
towards” rather than something that is “imperative.” While this is in part understandable 
given Sierra Leone’s resource limitations, it may also serve to reinforce the notion that 
these are “backburner” issues compared to more pressing issues relating to civil and 
political rights. In this regard, it is unfortunate that the commission did not more explicitly 
couch the economic violence that it documented in explicitly human rights terms. As 
things stand, though there have been notable exceptions, including the passage of 
Sierra Leone’s three gender bills,66 many of the commission’s recommendations have 
not been implemented. Understanding that misuse of diamond revenues and other 
instances of corruption can lead to violations of the rights to health and education, for 
example, might have given activists and citizens groups a tool to campaign and press for 
the implementation of certain recommendations.67  
 
iv. Liberia: Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2006-2009) 
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On Christmas eve 1989, former government minister Charles Taylor and a small group 
of Libyan-trained rebels launched an insurgency from neighboring Côte d’Ivoire in an 
attempt to topple the abusive regime of Samuel Doe, who ruled Liberia from 1980 to his 
death in 1990. The civil war that would consume Liberia for the next 14 years, 
punctuated only by a brief relative peace from 1996-1999, would result in the loss of as 
many as 250,000 lives and the displacement of one million individuals. While staggering 
in themselves for a country whose pre-war population numbered just over two million, 
such numbers only begin to capture the brutality of a conflict now famous for its use of 
child soldiers, widespread sexual violence, and rapacious looting as Charles Taylor and 
other rebel faction leaders encouraged their troops to “pay themselves.”68 Charles Taylor 
sustained his war effort in large part though plunder of Liberia’s natural resources, 
including timber and diamonds, many of which were trafficked from neighboring Sierra 
Leone. The war only came to a definitive end in 2003 with the combined interventions of 
neighboring (Guinea), regional (Nigeria), and international powers (the United Nations 
and the United States). In early 2006, a transitional government was replaced by Ellen 
Johnson Sirleaf, Africa’s first and only elected female head of state, and her new 
administration.  
The comprehensive peace accords of 2003 provided for the creation of a truth 
and reconciliation commission that was to “deal with the root causes of the crises in 
Liberia, including human rights violations.”69 The commission, which was not actually 
launched until early 2006, was tasked with investigating “gross human rights violations 
and violations of international humanitarian law,” including massacres, rape, murder, and 
extra-judicial killings. It was also mandated to investigate “economic crimes, such as the 
exploitation of natural or public resources to perpetuate the armed conflict.”70 In terms of 
temporal scope, the commission’s mandate actually stretched back to 1979, some ten 
years before the formal beginning of the civil war, the final year of Americo-Liberian rule. 
It was further permitted to look at “any other period preceding 1979.” This was a 
significant concession to many of Liberia’s so-called “natives,” who continue to view the 
tiny but still influential elite who ruled the country since its founding as a colony in 1822 
with some suspicion, and who associate the structural violence and disenfranchisement 
woven throughout Liberia’s history as fundamental to understanding the eruption of war 
in 1989. 
From the outset, the Liberian commission’s trajectory was a shaky one. The 
commission was cash-strapped, and its commissioners generally perceived as lacking 
the requisite stature and expertise. Disputes within the commission even led to a fistfight 
between two female commissioners. Of the former warlords who testified, some chose to 
grandstand and even express open contempt for the commission. At times, the conduct 
of commissioners appeared deeply unprofessional, including episodes of “giggl[ing] 
when victims narrated unusual forms of atrocities, including particularly creative forms of 
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(Liberian TRC Act), May 12, 2005, preamble. 
70 Ibid., Article IV, Section 4(a).  
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rape.”71 The commission’s final report has been criticized for lacking rigor, even 
described by one critic as “unsightly and horribly flawed.”72 Perhaps unsurprisingly, two 
of the nine commissioners refused to sign the final report.  
Despite these serious shortcomings, the commission’s final report was a 
bombshell. It recommended 98 people for prosecution and that 50 people be barred 
from public office for 30 years due to support they gave to Liberia’s warring factions. The 
list of those subject to censure included President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf herself, an icon 
of the international women’s movement and widely respected as an exemplar of good 
governance. While some welcomed the recommendations for prosecution and censure, 
they have arguably made enemies of even some of the report’s natural allies.73  
Given the drama surrounding the commission and the controversy arising out of 
its recommendations for prosecution and censure, it is perhaps unsurprising that some 
of the more progressive aspects of its work have been underappreciated. The 
commission was, for example, the first to take statements from citizens living abroad, 
particularly the large diaspora community living in the United States. It was also 
innovative in terms of its attempts to detail violations against women and children.74 
Finally, the commission broke ground in its relatively extensive exploration economic 
violence. Indeed, the report squarely identifies as among the “root causes of the conflict,” 
factors such as poverty, an “entrenched political and social system founded on privilege, 
patronage . . . and endemic corruption which created limited access to education, and 
justice, economic and social opportunities,” and “historical disputes over land acquisition, 
distribution and accessibility.”75  
In reading the commission’s account of the civil war, this more holistic approach 
makes clear that physical and economic violence are almost impossible to separate in 
attempting to understand the unfolding of Liberia’s civil war. For example, the 
commission details instances of Charles Taylor’s soldiers helping to guard the very 
logging companies who were paying Taylor for the privilege of operating in his territory, 
which in turn allowed Taylor to buy arms and take more territory, extorting even more 
companies and further diverting the proceeds of plunder and pillage into his war 
machine. Other aspects of the war economy, including widespread looting, are also 
documented. Though the report does not do so explicitly, one can trace in its narrative of 
the war economy an exaggerated form of the plunder and patronage system that in 
many ways started with Liberia’s colonization by repatriated slaves some 150 years 
earlier. 
Beyond the war economy, other dimensions of economic violence, such as 
issues of land-tenure, are treated rather breezily and without the necessary rigor that 
complex issues require. Similarly, while many of the recommendations relating to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Lansana Gberie, “Truth and Justice on Trial in Liberia,” African Affairs 107 (2008): 428. 
72 Steinberg, “Liberia’s Experiment,” 136. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Paul James-Allen, Aaron Weah, and Lizzie Goodfriend, “Beyond the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission: Transitional Justice Options in Liberia,” International Center for Transitional Justice 
(May 2010), 3. 
75 Liberia TRC Report, Vol. II, 16-17. 
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economic violence seem sensible enough, including further investigations into those 
individuals accused of economic crimes, repatriation of unlawfully acquired monies, and 
the building of a new culture of integrity in politics, in general the report’s 
recommendations section is unmoored from the rigorous documentation and empirical 
data one would expect to find in the body of a report. Thus, although the likelihood that 
many of its recommendations will be adopted has already been deeply undermined by 
the controversy surrounding its recommendations for censure, the overall shoddy 
workmanship of the report, including the general lack of congruence and consistency 
between the various sections of the report, and between the report and its 
recommendations, does not help matters.  
If its groundbreaking though incomplete treatment of economic violence is to be 
welcomed, one can lament the lost opportunity to make tighter connections between the 
economic crimes discussed in the report, and violations of economic and social rights 
under international law. Indeed, economic and social rights receive scant mention in the 
report as an explicit matter, though there are a few vague mentions of “economic rights.” 
In the end, the war economy detailed in the report comes to be seen as a product of 
unchecked greed and criminality by certain individuals, but there is little attention to the 
actual suffering it imposed on the people, an effect compounded by the near complete 
absence of victim voices throughout the report. In addition, the failure to cast economic 
violence as a rights issue robs would be activists and reformers of an important lobbying 
tool using a universal vocabulary that would serve to link war time violations of economic 
and social rights with violations before and after the conflict took place. The Liberian 
commission’s approach to economic violence is therefore both ambitious and 
progressive, but also serves as a cautionary tale. Documenting economic violence is a 
complicated exercise that requires time, finances, and expertise. A commission without 
these resources should think carefully about how best to pursue a broad mandate.  
 
v. Kenya: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (2009-ongoing) 
 
Compared to some of its more troubled neighbors, Kenya has, to outsiders at least, 
appeared to be a relatively stable and peaceful nation. Yet Kenya’s post independence 
history has a darker side, and has been “marked by authoritarianism, political repression, 
gross violations of human rights, and widespread corruption.”76 Ethnic cleansing, 
detention without trial and of political prisoners, torture, and extrajudicial killings have all 
featured in the nearly forty years of rule under presidents Kenyatta and Moi and the 
Kenya African National Union party (KANU).77 Shortly after historic elections brought an 
end to KANU rule, a new coalition government under President Kibaki created a task 
force to study the question of holding a public inquiry into past injustices. Based on 
broad-based consultations, the 2003 task force recommended the creation of a “Truth, 
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Justice, and Reconciliation Commission” (TJRC), but its recommendations were ignored. 
It would take the postelection chaos of 2007, where politically orchestrated violence left 
more than 1100 people dead, to provide the impetus for further action. In the wake of 
that violence, a national dialogue and reconciliation process mediated by former UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan helped to create consensus that “historical injustices,” 
issues at the core of the post-electoral violence, finally needed to be addressed. In 2008, 
the Kenyan parliament adopted an act providing for the establishment of the TJRC.78 
As established, the mandate of the Kenyan TJRC is spectacularly broad, not only 
in terms of temporal scope, going back to 1963, but in terms of the range of “historical 
injustices” it was authorized to investigate during its two-year operational period.79 Those 
issues range from egregious acts of physical violence, such as “abductions, 
disappearances, detentions, torture, sexual violations, murder, extrajudicial killings” to 
rather ill-defined “economic rights” and “economic crimes,” including irregular and illegal 
acquisition of public land, grand corruption, exploitation of natural or public resources, 
and “perceived economic marginalization of communities.”80 While the commission’s 
mandate is exceptional when viewed against the “dominant script” followed by most truth 
commissions throughout the world, the transitional justice narrative in Kenya has long 
seen forms of economic violence as central to the historical injustices that need to be 
addressed.81 Indeed, in tracing the history of transitional justice initiatives in Kenya, 
Godfrey Musila has argued that economic issues actually have a longer pedigree and 
are more central to most accounts of victimization in Kenya than civil and political rights, 
which “were late entrants to the Kenyan debate.”82  
The sheer breadth of the commission’s mandate, however, led to worry that its 
ambitious goals may not be manageable in terms of time and cost. Before the TJRC 
even began its work, Human Rights Watch, for example, argued that the commission 
should either be given a longer life, or the scope of its mandate reduced.83 In examining 
the possibility of overreach, the task force established to study the possibility of a truth 
commission in 2003 noted that, particularly in Kenya, “economic crimes are so 
intertwined with human rights violations that it is impossible to establish watertight 
compartments between the two types of violations.”84 Nevertheless, as a means of 
ensuring that an examination into historical injustices remains focused and manageable, 
it argued that that “a truth commission should investigate a selected set of economic 
crimes that directly lead to the violations of economic, social, and cultural rights.”85 In 
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80 The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act, 2008. 
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other words, by focusing specifically on an economic crimes-human rights violations 
nexus, a truth commission might frame and focus its inquiry into historical injustices in 
ways that are holistic, yet limited enough to be manageable. As adopted, however, the 
TJRC Act mentions “economic crimes” and “economic rights,” but the terms go largely 
undefined and their overlap with violations of internationally recognized economic and 
social rights is unclear. The apparent distinction made in the Act between “human rights,” 
on the one hand, with “economic rights,” on the other does little to clarify the muddied 
waters.  
As of this writing, release of the TJRC’s final report has been greatly delayed, 
and it remains to be seen whether it will produce a report without rigor, similar to the 
Liberian report discussed above, “mired in the enormous details of history that . . . 
obfuscate[s] and preclude[s] possibilities for legal accountability.”86 Thus, only time will 
tell whether the commission’s final product will be as rigorous and groundbreaking as its 
mandate is holistic and broad.  
 
vi. Economic Violence in the Work of Truth Commissions Outside of Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
Though this chapter has primarily focused on the role of economic violence in the work 
of African commissions, truth commissions outside of Africa have also begun to move 
beyond the dominant and relatively narrow script that has traditionally circumscribed the 
work of truth seeking bodies around the world. In East Timor, the report of the 
Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (2002-2005), often known by its 
Portuguese Acronym, CAVR, took an extended look at economic violence under the 
Indonesian occupation.87 The commission’s final report, Chega! (or “enough”), has a 
chapter explicitly dedicated to exploring violations of economic and social rights, 
including the rights to an adequate standard of living, health, and education. In general, 
the commission’s analysis is comparatively sophisticated, linking up a range of 
Indonesian policies with violations of economic and social rights in creative and 
unexpected ways, including the use of education as a propaganda tool as a violation of 
the right to education, forced resettlement of villagers into areas with poor soils and 
malarial conditions as a violation of the right to health, and the manipulation of coffee 
prices to fund military operations as a violation of the right to an adequate livelihood.88 
The tight linkage between the commission’s work on economic violence and specific 
violations of economic and social rights under international law continues into the 
recommendations section, with specific recommendations grouped under headings such 
as “right to education and self-determination” and “right to health and a sustainable 
environment.”89 Overall, the commission’s elaborate treatment of economic and social 
rights violations under Indonesian occupation stands in contrast with many of the African 
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case studies discussed above, which have examined various forms of economic 
violence, but rarely done so in explicit terms of economic and social rights. Nevertheless, 
despite offering perhaps the most extensive and explicit treatment of economic and 
social rights of any truth commission to date, for purposes of reparations, the East 
Timorese commission’s definition was limited to victims of violations of civil and political 
rights.90 While the necessity of such distinctions as a matter of resource constraints 
might be argued, such practices have the effect of promoting hierarchies of rights and 
granting de facto impunity to the architects of economic violence.  
Beyond East Timor, in 2009 the Solomon Islands Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission was created in order to examine the ethnic violence arising out of disputes 
over land ownership and economic displacement that wracked the region between 1997 
and 2003 in a period known as “the Tensions.”91 The scope of the commission’s work 
includes investigating and reporting on a relatively broad range of physical violence and 
civil and political rights, including killings, abductions, enforced disappearances, torture, 
rape, sexual abuse, forced displacements, deprivation of liberty and serious ill-
treatment.92 In contrast, the range of economic rights to be so investigated is 
comparatively limited, including only “the right to own property and the right to settle and 
make a living,” but the commission is also tasked with assessing the impact of the 
conflict on key sectors such health and education. The act establishing the commission 
makes clear than any such assessment is to be done “without diluting emphasis on 
individual victims.”93 It therefore appears that parliament was intent on precluding a 
loose and overly broad inquiry unmoored from concrete violations of human rights.94 
When the five-volume final report is made public, it will be clear whether economic 
violence has indeed been of significant if circumscribed importance to the commission’s 
work.95  
 
C. Broadening the Script, Yet Retaining Focus 
 
 
With few exceptions, the transitional justice institutions of the 1980s and 90s worked to 
build a justice narrative that was relatively narrow, focusing largely on egregious acts of 
physical abuse, while issues of economic violence were pushed to the sidelines. Seen 
against the backdrop of this “dominant script,” the work of the truth commissions outlined 
in this chapter is pioneering, even while the work of some individual commissions has 
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been deeply flawed. Taken together, the work of these commissions suggests that the 
dominant script is slowly giving way to a much more holistic conception of justice in 
transition in which economic violence is increasingly placed in the foreground.  
One might well ask why a number of African commissions appear to have broken 
from the dominant script to varying degrees. While the answer presented here is 
somewhat speculative, there are at least three plausible explanations. First, in the case 
of Chad, it appears to have worked in such splendid isolation that it was not heavily 
influenced by the dominant script to begin with.96 At the same time, Chad’s cash-
strapped government appeared to be desperate to reclaim some of the funds embezzled 
by Habré on the eve of his fall from power, making a focus on corruption important if only 
out of self-interest. Second, speaking more broadly, unlike the early Latin American 
commissions, most of the commissions outlined in this chapter were operating at a time 
when work on economic and social rights had become much more prevalent in the UN 
and NGO world more generally, with activists vigorously pressing the need to give both 
civil political and economic and social rights equal pride of place. If early Latin American 
commissions of the 1980s and 90s in some ways expressed the human rights zeitgeist 
of the era, they also represented the least common denominator of what could be 
agreed to at the time. Yet by the end of the millennium, the parameters of the possible in 
the world of human rights and transitional justice had expanded, as reflected in the work 
of the commissions discussed in this chapter. Finally, for at least some of the conflicts 
presented in this chapter, economic violence was so deeply written into the logic of the 
conflict that to focus exclusively on violations of physical integrity would have seemed 
wholly inadequate. It is simply not possible to understand conflicts in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia, for example, without reference to facets of economic violence.          
Whatever the precise reasons for this evolving work, the empirical evidence of a 
change in the dominant script that these commissions represent has been accompanied 
by signs of a normative shift in international policymaking. For example, a recent report 
of from the UN Secretary General observes “a growing recognition that truth 
commissions should also address the economic, social, and cultural rights dimensions of 
conflict to enhance long-term peace and security.”97 Given these emerging normative 
and empirical trends, now is the time to take stock of the work that has been done with 
an eye to improving future practice.  
One of the challenges illustrated in this chapter is that while the work of some truth 
commissions is starting to broaden, it is not clear that the budgets and time allocated to 
do this work has increased commensurately. Addressing legacies of economic violence 
in the context of a truth commission is challenging work, at times requiring new methods 
of research and documentation that call on particular sets of expertise. In many 
instances, such work does not lend itself to the relatively straightforward victim hearings 
that have been the mainstay of many truth commissions in the past. To some extent, the 
case studies discussed in this chapter reflect the dangers of broadening mandates 
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without at the same time broadening the resources needed to accomplish the work. In 
Chad, for example, the attempt to unravel Hissein Habré’s alleged financial schemes did 
not appear to benefit from the time, financial wherewithal, or expertise in forensic 
accounting that would have been required to thoroughly and convincingly expose the 
economic misdeeds of the former regime. In attempting to document aspects of 
economic violence in Liberia and East Timor, the truth commissions in question 
appeared to be especially reliant on secondary sources, a fact that may detract from 
credibility when so many other aspects of a commission’s work are based on primary 
fact-finding and first-hand testimony.98 Finally, analytically, the work and mandates of 
several of the truth commissions discussed in this chapter bear a confused and inexact 
relationship with economic and social rights recognized under international law, which at 
times gives the final reports a rather loose and freewheeling feel. 
Given the unlikelihood in the near term that the resources allocated to truth 
commissions will increase dramatically over historical levels, commissions addressing 
aspects of economic violence will need to find better ways to manage broadening 
mandates. To some extent, increased work on economic violence might give transitional 
justice more relevance to new constellations of actors and institutions, including 
development and financial organizations. Some issues of resources and expertise might 
therefore be addressed through new partnerships. In the end, however, the work of the 
Liberian truth commission illustrates that partnerships alone cannot ensure quality work, 
and many truth commissions will still need to find some kind of filtering device to tighten 
the focus on economic violence to manageable levels.  
One potential filter that might increase the rigor of work on economic violence would 
be to focus specifically on an “economic violence-human rights nexus,” looking primarily 
at those aspects of economic violence that most directly and egregiously impact 
economic and social rights recognized under international law. While this approach 
might at times exclude certain kinds of conduct from a commission’s purview—not every 
act of corruption might been seen to undermine the right to health or education, for 
example99—it could also provide some benefits in terms of requiring truth commissions 
to focus on the rights bearers themselves, the victims of economic violence, without 
getting lost in numbers and open-ended historical analysis. A sharper focus on the 
intersection of economic violence and internationally recognized economic and social 
rights would also likely give civil society and citizen groups a powerful mobilization tool 
once a truth commission issues its report. Given the extent to which the 
recommendations of many truth commissions are simply ignored by governments, this 
should not be overlooked. Of course, in focusing on a rights nexus, truth commissions 
should be wary not to become overly lawyerly and atomistic, losing the broader thread 
and historical context in which rights violations are produced. As with so many other 
questions of transitional justice, striking the right balance will be key. 
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Beyond looking to an economic violence-human rights nexus, there may be other 
ways of circumscribing mandates to manageable levels. Each truth commission will have 
to find a context-appropriate solution to addressing economic violence. But despite the 
risks of taking a more holistic approach to questions of justice in transition, there is 
simply no a priori reason to exclude economic violence from the mandate and work of a 
truth commission as a general mater. This is particularly true when economic violence 
has been written into the logic of the conflict itself, as illustrated in various ways by the 
work of the truth commissions described in this chapter. The script is slowly changing, 
and those changes bring new challenges. Just as the human rights movement has found 
that greater embrace of economic and social rights has required hard thinking about new 
advocacy strategies and research methods, so too the field of transitional justice needs 
to focus greater energies on devising more holistic yet rigorous and disciplined 
approaches to questions of economic violence and justice in transition.100 Examining the 
pioneering work of African truth commissions on economic violence helps to give some 
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International’s ambivalence towards economic and social rights). 
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Part III:   Towards an Alternative Transitional 
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Chapter IV:  Beyond the Post-Conflict Checklist; Linking Peacebuilding and 
Transitional Justice Through the Lens of Critique1 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, programs and interventions associated with both 
international peacebuilding and transitional justice have increasingly followed in war’s 
wake.2 Today, there is a growing demand for post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives, partly 
for humanitarian reasons, and partly for strategic reasons arising out of the 
conceptualization of failed and conflict states as a global security issue.3 At the same 
time, the growth of transitional justice practices may be creating a “justice cascade,” a 
new global norm of accountability that helps give rise to new trials and truth 
commissions year after year.4 More and more, the question is not whether there will be 
some kind of transitional justice post-conflict, but what the timing, modalities, and 
sequencing might be.5  
 In the post-conflict context, transitional justice and peacebuilding initiatives often 
share the same temporal and geographic space, and several United Nations (UN) peace 
operations have been given a mandate to address transitional justice as well as more 
general peacebuilding activities.6 Despite this, peacebuilding and transitional justice 
have not always been seen as part of the same enterprise,7 and linkages between them 
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organizations (NGOs). 
3 See Edward Newman et al, “Introduction,” in New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, eds. 
Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver Richmond (United Nations University, 2009), 3-9. 
4 See generally Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are 
Changing World Politics (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2011) (arguing that a global 
crescendo of human rights prosecutions demonstrates the emergence of a new international 
norm of accountability); Prisilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and 
Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2011) (discussing the phenomenon of truth commissions and their 
spread throughout the world). 
5 The various mechanisms associated with transitional justice are frequently applied in both post-
conflict and post-authoritarian scenarios. Because this article focuses on the overlaps between 
transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding, however, I refer here only to post-conflict 
transitional justice.  
6 Examples include the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Transitional Authority in East 
Timor (UNTAET).  
7 Scholars and policymakers have long examined the possibility for tensions between peace and 
justice initiatives, manifested in the so-called “peace versus justice” debate. See, e.g., Chandra 
Lekha Sriram, Confronting Past Human Rights Violations: Justice vs Peace in Times of Transition 
(Milton Park: Frank Cass, 2004), 1-2. In recent years, however, transitional justice advocates 
have tended to see the various and sometimes contradictory goals of transitional justice as 
complementary. See Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2008): 98.  
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have not generally received a great deal of attention by scholars.8 Indeed, despite 
proximities of time and space, there has historically been little coordination between 
traditional pillars of post-conflict peacebuilding, such as the demobilization, disarmament, 
and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, security-sector reform (SSR), and transitional 
justice initiatives.9  
There are signs that this historic, separate-tracks approach to peacebuilding and 
transitional justice programs is changing. Although peace and justice have at times been 
thought to be in tension with one another, rhetorically at least, they are now seen as 
mutually supportive.10 There is a growing interest in both academic and policy 
communities in exploring potential theoretical and programmatic linkages between 
peacebuilding and transitional justice.11 Some in those communities have called for 
better coordination in order to facilitate complementarity.12 At a policy level, there are 
early indications that this is in fact taking place. For example, in 2006 the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations set forth guidance encouraging greater 
linkages between DDR programming and transitional justice.13 Together with this new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Paul van Zyl, “Promoting Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies,” in Security 
Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, eds., Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggis (Geneva: 
DCAF, 2005), 209-10. 
9 See Lars Waldorf, “Introduction: Linking DDR and Transitional Justice,” in Disarming the Past: 
Transitional Justice and Ex-Combatants, eds. Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo de Greiff, and Lars Waldorf 
(New York: ICTJ, 2009), 16 (discussing lack of coordination between transitional justice and 
DDR); Alexander Mayer-Rieckh and Roger Duthie, “Enhancing Justice and Development 
Through Justice-Sensitive Security Sector Reform,” in Transitional Justice and Development: 
Making Connections, eds. Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie (New York: ICTJ, 2009), 222 (noting 
that the practices of SSR and transitional justice “rarely interact, either in practice or in theory”).  
10 The mutual complementarity of peace, justice, and democracy has arguably been a UN 
doctrine at least since the 2004 publication of a landmark report on transitional justice. See 
United Nations Secretary General, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Post-conflict 
Societies,” UN Doc. S/2004/616 (August 23, 2004), 1 (asserting that “[j]ustice, peace and 
democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives”). 
11 See generally, e.g., Chandra Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega, Johanna Herman, “Evaluating and 
Comparing Strategies of Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice,” JAD-PbP Working Paper Series 
No 1. (May 2009), 13 (discussing increasing linkages between transitional justice and a broader 
set of peacebuilding activities); Alan Bryden, Timothy Donais, and Heiner Hängi, Shaping a 
Security-Governance Agenda in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (Geneva: DCAF, 2005) (examining 
policy linkages between SSR, DDR, rule of law initiatives, and transitional justice); see also van 
Zyl, “Promoting Transitional Justice,” 210 (arguing that “[t]ransitional justice strategies should be 
understood as an important component of peacebuilding”). 
12 See, e.g., Johanna Herman, Olga Martin-Ortega, and Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Beyond Justice 
Versus Peace: Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding Strategies,” in Rethinking Peacebuilding: 
The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle East and the Western Balkans, eds. Karin Aggestam and 
Annika Björkdahl (Milton Park: Routledge, 2013), 50 (observing the importance “to find 
commonalities between the transitional justice and peacebuilding processes, particularly since 
activities in the field often overlap”).  
13 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Integrated Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), § 2.10 (DPKO 2006). 
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enthusiasm, some have urged caution, pointing to the need to manage potentially 
significant tensions between peacebuilding and transitional justice projects and 
programs.14 
Building peace with justice is a complex and long-term endeavor that calls for holistic 
solutions that address crosscutting challenges. While peacebuilding is ultimately a 
broader notion, both peacebuilding and transitional justice are open-ended concepts with 
substantial overlap that “are contrived to achieve a common purpose”: long-term positive 
peace.15 Both seek to rebuild social trust and social capital and attempt to address 
problems of governance, accountability, and the need for institutional reform. To these 
same ends, promoting synergies between peacebuilding and transitional justice 
programs and initiatives is a worthwhile goal for policymakers, academics, and 
practitioners alike. Indeed, the UN has recently overhauled its “peacebuilding 
architecture” with the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) precisely to avoid 
fragmented and duplicative efforts in the peacebuilding arena, broadly conceived.16  
And yet, as this article will argue, developing more integrated approaches to peace 
and justice issues in the post-conflict context may create its own problems and 
challenges. In particular, there is a danger that as transitional justice is mainstreamed 
into emerging best practices for post-conflict reconstruction by the PBC and other UN 
policy organs, together with DDR, SSR, rule of law assistance, and elections, it will 
increasingly come to be seen as yet one more box to tick on the “post-conflict checklist,” 
a routine part of the template deployed in the context of post-conflict peace operations.17  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See generally Herman, “Beyond Justice Versus Peace” (discussing the potential tensions 
between transitional justice, rule of law assistance, DDR, and SSR). 
15 Gerhard Thallinger, “The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Transitional Justice,” German 
Law Journal 8 (2007): 696. The term “negative peace” refers to the absence of direct violence. It 
stands in contrast with the broader concept of “positive peace,” which includes the absence of 
both direct and indirect violence, including various forms of “structural violence” such as poverty, 
hunger, and other forms of social injustice. See generally Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and 
Peace Research,” Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167. 
16 See Dustin Sharp, “Bridging the Gap: the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and the 
Challenges of Integrating DDR and Transitional Justice,” in Transitional Justice and 
Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants, eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram, et al 
(London: Routledge, 2012), 24-25.  
17 The problem of template-based or one-size-fits-all peacebuilding initiatives is a frequent trope 
in both academic and policy literature. See, e.g., Roger Mac Ginty, “Indigenous Peace-Making 
Versus the Liberal Peace,” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic Studies Association 
(2008): 144 (observing the existence of “set templates” and a “formulaic path” in internationally 
sponsored peacebuilding); Edward Newman, “‘Liberal’ Peacebuilding Debates,” in New 
Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, 42 (noting that “[a] core problem of contemporary 
peacebuilding is its tendency to be formulaic”); International Crisis Group, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, Africa Report no. 87 (Dakar/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 
December 2004), 9 (criticizing a mechanistic “operational checklist” approach to post-conflict 
peacebuilding in which the international community assumes it can safely withdraw after rote 
implementation of a series of initiatives: deployment of peacekeeping troops, disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, the repatriation and return of refugees and 
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In this regard, it is worth noting that traditional international peacebuilding 
programs—including DDR, SSR, and rule of law assistance—as well as a number of 
transitional justice initiatives have been subject to powerful, parallel critiques: that they 
are too often externally driven, being planned and implemented in a top-down and state-
centric manner that gives insufficient voice and agency to those most affected by the 
conflict;18 that they are biased toward Western approaches, giving too little attention to 
local or indigenous peace and justice traditions;19 that they are presented as 
technocratic, neutral, and apolitical solutions to highly contested or contestable political 
issues and choices;20 and that they ultimately reflect not local needs and realities, but a 
dominant “liberal international peacebuilding” paradigm that seeks to foster Western, 
market-oriented democracies in the wake of conflict without considering the tensions this 
may unleash in the immediate aftermath of conflict.21 Considered together, there is 
reason to worry that better integration and coordination between peacebuilding and 
transitional justice might exacerbate some of the tendencies that have given rise to 
these parallel critiques rather than alleviate them.  
As academics and policymakers begin to sound out linkages and synergies, viewing 
transitional justice and peacebuilding overlaps through the prism of these critiques might 
help us to strengthen policies that seek to promote complementarity. At the same time, 
addressing some of these critiques may cast doubt upon the prospects of more 
coordinated approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding altogether. The types of locally 
owned, context-specific, and bottom-up solutions frequently advocated in the literature 
may take us beyond the “post-conflict checklist,” but they also call into question the role 
of international organizations and international standards that are typically part and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
internally displaced persons, security sector and judicial reform, transitional justice initiatives, and, 
finally, a first election).  
18 See, e.g., Oliver Richmond, “The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare, Culture, and 
Peacebuilding,” International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 (2009), 
161-63 (discussing the tendency toward top-down institution building in a variety of “liberal” 
interventions); Kora Andrieu, “Civilizing Peacebuilding: Transitional Justice, Civil Society and the 
Liberal Paradigm,” Security Dialogue 41, no. 5 (2010): 54 (noting that “transitional justice seems 
to be strongly under the influence of [a] top-down state-building approach.”) 
19 See, e.g., Mac Ginty, “Indigenous Peace-Making,” 144-45 (noting that Western approaches to 
peacebuilding “risk[] minimizing the space for organic local, traditional or indigenous contributions 
to peace-making”); Wendy Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass 
Violence,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2009): 32-34 (calling for a 
revalorization of local and cultural approaches to justice and reconciliation). 
20 See, e.g., Newman, “‘Liberal’ Peacebuilding Debates,” 42 (critiquing attempts to “‘de-politicize’ 
peacebuilding and present it as a technical task”); Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, “Whose 
Justice? Rethinking Transitional Justice from the Bottom Up,” Journal of Law and Society 35, no. 
2 (2008): 276-77 (arguing that “wider geo-political and economic interests too often shape what 
tend to be represented as politically and economically neutral post-conflict and transitional justice 
initiatives”).  
21 See generally Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Nationalist Conflict 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Justice as Peace? 
Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice,” Global Society 21, no. 4 (2007): 579. 
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parcel of international post-conflict assistance. Yet from a pragmatic and realist 
standpoint, a balance between local and international agency in post-conflict 
programming seems both inevitable and desirable, and both “locals” and “internationals” 
have a stake in finding creative solutions to peacebuilding and transitional justice 
challenges, and learning from and applying the lessons of best practices elsewhere.22 
 Ultimately, striking a better balance might involve more hybridized forms of 
peacebuilding and transitional justice that involve a mixture of conventional and local 
practices and models.23 While this Article will not attempt to set forth a comprehensive 
and integrated approach along these lines, it will argue that attentiveness to some of the 
parallel critiques leveled against both peacebuilding and transitional justice interventions 
could lead to shifts that would strengthen policy in both areas in the process of 
promoting linkages. The possibility of integrating local reconciliation practices into both 
transitional justice mechanisms and reintegration schemes for former combatants is one 
such possibility that will be briefly examined in this Article.  
This Article will proceed in five sections. In Section II, I discuss the origins and 
evolution of both peacebuilding and transitional justice since the end of the Cold War. In 
Section III, I evaluate some of the broad and parallel critiques that have been leveled 
against peacebuilding and transitional justice. In Section IV, I examine the possibility for 
greater coordination between peacebuilding and transitional justice, looking to potential 
tensions and complementarity at a programmatic level, particularly through the lens of 
the longstanding critiques discussed in Section III. I argue that greater attention to these 
critiques might help to inspire modes of coordination and complementarity that will avoid 
some of the dangers of a standardized, checklist approach to post-conflict peacebuilding. 
Section V concludes the Article.  
 
A. Origins and Growth of Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice 
 
The growth and expansion of international peacebuilding efforts associated with the 
end of the Cold War has been paralleled by an explosion of interest in the various 
mechanisms associated with transitional justice. In post-conflict countries today, there is 
an increased likelihood that at least some of the various programs and initiatives 
associated with both international peacebuilding and transitional justice will be 
marshaled as part of a response to violent conflict. The following section briefly outlines 
the origins of both fields with a view to understanding the critiques that will be discussed 
in Section III of this Article.  
 
i. The Growth and Expansion of Peace Operations 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See Laura Arriaza and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Social Reconstruction as Local Process,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 2 (2008): 153 (arguing for strategies that 
“incorporate a perspective that encompasses bottom-up local efforts as well as top-down state-
driven or internationally driven ones”). 
23 See Newman, Paris, and Richmond, “Introduction,” 16. 
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With the end of the Cold War, the world experienced a rapid expansion in 
international peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and UN peace operations quickly grew in 
both sophistication and complexity. The thick, multi-dimensional mandates associated 
with UN missions today stand in contrast to the relatively thin approaches previously 
taken. During the Cold War, peacekeeping actions placed a premium on neutrality, 
consent, and minimum force—notions all central to traditional conceptions of 
sovereignty.24 So-called “first generation”25 or consensual peacekeeping often involved 
interposition of forces for the monitoring of ceasefires geared toward containing conflicts 
and maintaining stability.26 Such practices were largely based on the felt importance of 
maintaining international security between states as opposed to the intra-state conflict 
and civil wars that we often associate with conflict today.27 Rather than attempting to 
address “root causes” or to resolve conflict, the driving idea was to contain international 
instability in an era when a larger confrontation between great powers was to be avoided 
at all costs.  
If these early peacekeeping efforts were relatively minimalist and involved the 
avoidance of domestic politics, the end of the Cold War brought about a huge shift in the 
approach to conflict management, and the UN increasingly found itself called upon in 
these next generation initiatives to address underlying economic, social, cultural, and 
humanitarian problems premised on the idea that managing the often internal conflicts of 
the post-Cold War world required a multi-faceted approach. Thus, from managing 
conflict between states, there was a shift to the perceived need to build peace within 
states, from traditional acts of peacekeeping authorized under Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter,28 to more complex, and, from a traditional Westphalian perspective, more 
intrusive acts of peacebuilding that were frequently authorized under Chapter VII.29 This 
shift was bolstered by the belief that threats to security come not just from interstate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See Simon Chesterman, You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, 
and State-Building (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 238. 
25 Some refer to three different generations of peacekeeping, which evolved in quick succession 
in the early 1990s. See, e.g., ibid. Others, such as Roland Paris, simply distinguish between 
“traditional” peacekeeping and “peacebuilding operations.” See Roland Paris, “Peacekeeping and 
the Constraints of Global Culture,” European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 3 (2003), 
448-50.  
26 Examples of this approach to peacekeeping include the UN Military Observer Group in India 
and Pakistan (established in 1949) designed to monitor a ceasefire, the UN Peacekeeping Force 
in Cyprus (established in 1964) established to prevent fighting between Turk and Cypriot 
communities, and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (established in 1974) after the 
disengagement of Israel and Syria from the Golan Heights. 
27 See Newman, Paris, and Richmond, “Introduction,” 6. 
28 UN Charter Art. 11, ¶1.  
29 Examples of more complex, multi-dimensional peace operations include Cambodia, Angola, 
Burundi, Central African Republic, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Chad, Sudan, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Kosovo, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Timor-Leste, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, and Croatia.  
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wars, but also from weak, failing, and conflict-prone states, and, particularly in the post-
9/11 world, non-state actors.30  
The concept of “post-conflict peacebuilding” that has come to be associated with 
multi-dimensional UN peace operations is often attributed to UN secretary general 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his 1992 Agenda for Peace report, which defined it as “action 
to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in 
order to avoid relapse into conflict.”31 Since that time, the concept has been 
institutionalized across a number of organizations outside of the UN system that use it to 
frame and organize a variety of post-conflict activities.32 The term has come to comprise 
efforts to disarm previously warring parties, reintegrate former soldiers into society, 
demine and destroy weapons, rebuild the security and judicial sectors, repatriate or 
resettle refugees, and engage in various forms of democracy and governance 
assistance, including monitoring elections.33  
Twenty years after the UN offered its initial definition, the term peacebuilding has, 
if anything, come to be construed in even more expansive terms. According to a recent 
UN working definition, peacebuilding “involves a range of measures targeted to reduce 
the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all 
levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and 
development.”34 This definition is spectacularly broad and, together with the shift from 
first to successive generations of peacekeeping, could be seen as demonstrating a 
growing commitment on the part of the UN system to the idea of building “positive 
peace,” rather than simply maintaining “negative peace.”35  
The increasingly broad mandates and obligations of UN peacekeeping missions 
across the world to include various aspects of peacebuilding and statebuilding36 were 
not initially met with a significant evolution of the UN’s institutional doctrine or structure, 
leading to redundant and ad hoc efforts and a general lack of coordination.37 However, 
the seemingly inevitable involvement in increasingly complex post-conflict initiatives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See Newman, Paris, and Richmond, “Introduction,” 9. 
31 United Nations, Agenda for Peace, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace Keeping, 
UN Doc A/47/277–S/24111 (1992), ¶ 21. 
32 See Michael Barnett, et al, “Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?,” Global Governance 13, no. 1 
(2007): 45–48. 
33 See United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines 
(United Nations 2008), 26, online at 
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf (visited Apr 8, 2013). 
34 Ibid., 18. 
35 See generally Sharp, “Bridging the Gap.”  
36 For a discussion of the evolution of peacebuilding and statebuilding discourse, see generally, 
John Heathershaw, “Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding 
Discourses,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 36, no. 3 (2008): 597. In general, while 
peacebuilding is the more inclusive term, statebuilding tends to focus more narrowly on rebuilding 
the core institutions and apparatuses of a modern, liberal state in the aftermath of conflict.  
37 Liliana Lyra Jubilut, “Towards a New Jus Post Bellum: The United Nations Peacebuilding 
Commission and the Improvement of Post-Conflict Efforts and Accountability,” Minnesota Journal 
of International Law 9 (2011): 31.  
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eventually culminated in the 2005 creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), 
which has been tasked with facilitating integrated approaches to post-conflict 
reconstruction throughout the UN system and beyond.38 Today, the coordination, 
direction, and implementation of the vast majority of on-the-ground peacekeeping 
missions across the world is done by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO), and many such missions today have significant peacebuilding components.39 
 
ii. Transitional Justice: From the Exception to the Mainstream 
 
While definitions of transitional justice vary and have evolved over time, most of 
them attempt to capture a legal, political, and moral dilemma about how to deal with 
historic human rights violations and political violence in societies undergoing some form 
of political transition.40 The institutional mechanisms most closely associated with the 
field are trials and truth commissions, though reparations, lustration, and broader 
institutional reform are also central.41 Taken together, transitional justice is often said to 
be both backward looking, insofar as it is closely associated with justice and 
accountability for previous human rights violations, and forward looking, insofar as its 
advocates often claim that justice is essential to prevent recurrence and to lay the 
groundwork for longer term peace and stability.42  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See General Assembly Res No 60/180, UN Doc A/RES/60/180 (2005), ¶¶ 1–2; Security 
Council Res No 1645, UN Doc S/RES/1645 (2005), ¶¶ 1–2. The UN’s new peacebuilding 
architecture also includes a Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), which acts as a secretariat to 
the PBC, and serves the UN secretary general in coordinating UN agencies in their peacebuilding 
efforts, as well as a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), administered by the PBSO, intended to address 
immediate peacebuilding needs in countries emerging from conflict, and thereby fill a critical gap 
in post-conflict project financing.  
39 Of course, beyond DPKO, full implementation of peace operations around the world is also the 
work of many UN agencies, ranging from the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR).  
40 For a review of how definitions of transitional justice have evolved over time, see Rosemary 
Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical Reflections,” Third World Quarterly 29, no. 
2 (2008): 277-78. 
41 According to a landmark 2004 UN report, transitional justice comprises “the full range of 
processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy 
of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels 
of international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, 
institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.” United Nations, The Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice in Post-conflict Societies, ¶8. 
42 See, e.g., Andrieu, “Civilizing Peacebuilding,” 538 (noting that transitional justice has both 
forward- and backward-looking aspects); Mayer-Rieckh and Duthie, “Enhancing Justice and 
Development,” 224 (arguing that it would be a mistake to see transitional justice as solely 
backward looking); Andrew Valls, “Racial Justice as Transitional Justice,” Polity 36, no. 1 (2003): 
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As with peacebuilding, the birth and rapid growth of transitional justice is closely 
associated with political currents near the end of the Cold War. Specifically, as a field of 
policy, practice, and study, transitional justice has its origins in the so-called “third wave” 
of democratic transitions that swept Eastern Europe and Latin America in the late 1980s 
and 1990s43 Indeed, the origins of transitional justice in the deliberations of how new 
democracies ought to respond to massive human rights violations is key to 
understanding the parameters and practices of the field.44 Early thinking about justice in 
transition often focused on the need to deliver enough justice to contribute to building a 
new democratic order, without at the same time endangering the democratic transition 
itself.45 Like its parent field of human rights, transitional justice was preoccupied with 
accountability for abuses. It also sought to achieve justice in ways that would facilitate a 
transition not just to democracy but to something resembling Western liberal 
democracy.46  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 (arguing for a balanced approach to transitional justice that takes into account both forward- 
and backward-looking dimensions). 
43 See Generally Samuel P. Huntington, “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century,” in Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, 
Volume I. General Considerations, ed. Neil Kritz (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 
1995), 65. While the term “transitional justice” was coined some twenty years ago, it has been 
argued that transitional justice did not coalesce as a distinct “field” until sometime after 2000. See 
Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009): 329-32 (tracing the history of the use of the term 
“transitional justice”); Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the 
‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field,’” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 7 (arguing that 
transitional justice did not emerge as a distinct field until after 2000). Of course, the practices 
associated with transitional justice go back for centuries if not millennia. See generally Jon Elster, 
Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). (reviewing historic practices now associated with the modern field of 
transitional justice).  
44 See Thomas Hansen, “The Horizontal and Vertical Expansions of Transitional Justice: 
Explanations and Implications for a Contested Field,” in Transitional Justice Theories, eds. 
Susanne Buckley-Zistel, et al (Milton Park: Routledge, 2014). 
45 Political scientists of the period focusing on the dilemmas of transitional justice analyzed the 
role of bargains between elite groups in striking a balance been the demands of justice and the 
needs of the democratic transition. See generally Huntington, “The Third Wave”; Guillermo 
O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
About Uncertain Democracies,” in Kritz, Transitional Justice, 57. 
46 See Arthur, “How Transitions Reshaped Human Rights,” 325-26 (arguing that transition to 
democracy was the “dominant normative lens” through which political change was viewed in the 
early years of transitional justice practice and scholarship); see also Lundy and McGovern, 
“Whose Justice?,” 273 (arguing that “‘[t]ransition,’ as normally conceived within transitional justice 
theory, tends to involve a particular and limited conception of democratization and democracy 
based on liberal and essentially Western formulations of democracy”). For an argument that 
mainstream human rights practice of the period also sought to replicate essentially Western 
liberal models of governance, see generally Makau wa Mutua, “The Ideology of Human Rights,” 
Virginia Journal of International Law 36, no. 3 (1996): 589.  
	   128	  
In the quarter century that has followed the emergence of transitional justice 
discourse and practice, it has evolved from a discourse of exception and deviation—
something thought to be different from ordinary forms of justice to be deployed on an ad 
hoc basis during a period of rupture—to something that has in many ways been 
institutionalized, regularized, and mainstreamed.47 Increasingly, the question is not 
whether some kind of justice will be delivered during periods of transition but what the 
sequencing and modalities might be.48  
The upward trajectory and expansion of the field are in part reflected in its 
embrace by a landmark 2004 report by the UN secretary general.49 Indeed, over the last 
twenty years, the UN system as a whole has become heavily involved in a number of 
transitional justice processes around the world. The international criminal tribunals for 
the former Yugosoalvia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) were both created by the Security 
Council. In Sierra Leone, East Timor, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Lebanon, the UN created 
hybrid international tribunals. Today, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights has the lead responsibility for transitional justice issues, having supported 
transitional justice programs in some twenty countries around the world.50 The Bureau of 
Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) at the UN Development Programme also works 
to support transitional justice efforts. Although it does not have an explicit mandate to 
work on transitional justice issues and its record of practice is only beginning to be 
established, the newly created PBC has already identified support for transitional justice 
initiatives as key to peacebuilding.51  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See, e.g., Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice in a New Era,” Fordham International Law Journal 
26, no. 4 (2002): 894 (noting the emergence of a “steady state” phase of transitional justice in 
which “the post-conflict dimension of transitional justice is moving from the exception to the 
norm”); see also Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project,” 276 (noting the standardization 
of transitional justice); Kieran McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of 
Transitional Justice,” Journal of Law and Society 34, no. 4 (2007): 412 (observing that 
“[t]ransitional justice has emerged from its historically exceptionalist origins to become something 
which is normal, institutionalized and mainstreamed”). For an argument that transitional justice is 
not exceptional, and that the so-called dilemmas of transitional justice are in fact little more than 
the dilemmas of “ordinary” justice, see generally Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, 
“Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice,” Harvard Law Review 117, no. 3 (2003): 761. 
48 See Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project,” 276. 
49 See generally United Nations, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict 
Societies.  
50 See United Nations, Message by Ms. Navanethem Pillay at the Special Summit of the African 
Union (Oct 22, 2009) online at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/110E705F1034E048C1257657005814CE?opendoc
ument (visited Apr 9, 2013).  
51 For example, in Burundi, one of the first two countries added to the PBC’s agenda, the 
Commission identified lack of accountability for human rights abuses as a cause of the conflict 
and continued impunity as a factor contributing to potential relapse into conflict. With this in mind, 
support for transitional justice initiatives forms one of the pillars in Burundi’s strategic framework 
for peacebuilding. See United Nations, Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi, UN 
Doc PBC/1/BDI/4 (2008) ¶¶ 9–10, 30–31 (2007). 
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As transitional justice practices have become increasingly normalized and 
embraced by key global institutions like the UN, the field has begun to move beyond its 
roots and association with the political transitions of the late 1980s and 1990s to 
Western liberal democracy, and it has become associated with post-conflict 
peacebuilding situations more generally, even including those that do not involve a 
liberal transition.52 With this expansion have come calls to broaden the parameters of 
transitional justice work. Thus, arguments have been made that there should be greater 
linkages between transitional justice and development work,53 anti-corruption efforts,54 
security sector reform,55 the DDR of former combatants,56 and other peacebuilding 
activities.57 At the level of institutional mechanisms and practice, transitional justice has 
expanded well beyond trials and truth commissions, and there is an increasing interest in 
the embrace of more traditional and indigenous forms of justice and reconciliation 
work.58 Yet despite this expansion across multiple dimensions, in many ways transitional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 One prominent example is Rwanda, which, despite its association with several forms of 
transitional justice (ranging from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, to domestic 
prosecutions, to a nationwide accountability process known as gacaca loosely based on 
Rwandan tradition), could hardly be considered democratic. See generally Phil Clark and Zachary 
D. Kaufman, eds, After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and 
Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).  
53 See generally de Greiff and Duthie, eds., Transitional Justice and Development; Roger Duthie, 
“Toward a Development-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice,” International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 292 (2008); Rama Mani, “Dilemmas of Expanding 
Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus Between Transitional Justice and Development: 
Editorial,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 253.  
54 See generally Ruben Carranza, “Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with 
Corruption and Economic Crimes?,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 
310.  
55 See generally Mayer-Rieckh and Duthie, “Enhancing Justice and Development”; Corey Barr, 
“Making Connections: Bridging Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform to Confront 
Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence,” Praxis: Fletcher Journal of Human Security 
26 (2011): 5); Eirin Mobekk, Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform: Enabling 
Sustainable Peace (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Occasional 
Paper No 13, Nov 2006). 
56 See generally Sharp, “Bridging the Gap”; Patel, de Greiff, and Waldorf, eds, Disarming the Past 
(cited in note 9). 
57 See Sriram, Martin-Ortega, and Herman, “Evaluating and Comparing Strategies,” 13 
(discussing general linkages between transitional justice and a broad set of peacebuilding 
activities). 
58 Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Rwanda are but three examples of the incorporation of local 
tradition into larger transitional justice processes. See generally Patrick Burgess, “A New 
Approach to Restorative Justice: East Timor’s Community Reconciliation Process,” in Transitional 
Justice in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Christopher J. Le Mon, “Rwanda’s Troubled 
Gacaca Courts,” Human Rights Brief 14 (2007): 16; Augustine S.J. Park, “Community-Based 
Restorative Transitional Justice in Sierra Leone,” Contemporary Justice Review 13, no. 1 (2010): 
95.  
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justice institutions and mechanisms retain some of the hallmarks and limitations of the 
field’s origins in the democratic transitions of the late 1980s and 1990s, as discussed in 
Part III. 
 
B. Parallel Critiques of Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice 
 
As post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional justice have expanded and to some 
degree become both normalized and institutionalized in the post-Cold War era, they 
have also been subject to trenchant critiques from academics, activists, and 
policymakers. While the programs associated with international peacebuilding 
assistance, such as DDR and SSR, have historically had little connection to transitional 
justice initiatives, either in terms of theory or policy and practice, many of the critiques 
leveled against international efforts in both domains strongly echo each other. 
Particularly given calls for greater linkages between peacebuilding and transitional 
justice, these parallel critiques bear close examination. 
I have grouped the critiques into three loose general categories below: (a) the 
critique of liberal international peacebuilding; (b) the critique of politics as neutral 
technology; and (c) the debate about local versus international. These groupings are not 
meant to be definitive, and the critiques explored below are in no way exhaustive. For 
some scholars, such as Roland Paris, these critiques should all be disentangled from 
each other and do not necessarily go hand in hand.59 For others, many of the concerns 
raised below cannot be disassociated from what has become known as the critique of 
liberal international peacebuilding.60 What can be fairly said is that the critiques 
discussed below often share substantial overlap but that the groupings nevertheless 
serve a useful role for purposes of discussion and analysis.  
 
i. The Critique of Liberal International Peacebuilding 
 
For the last two decades, international post-conflict peacebuilding efforts have 
most often taken place in developing rather than developed countries.61 For explanation, 
one could point to evidence suggesting that poor countries are more prone to civil wars, 
but a fuller understanding would also need to account for the entrenched global power 
dynamics and Security Council vetoes that make interventions predicated on building 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies 36, no. 2 
(2010): 363.  
60 See generally Neil Cooper, Mandy Turner, and Michael Pugh, “The End of History and the Last 
Liberal Peacebuilder: A Reply to Roland Paris,” Review of International Studies 37, no. 4 (2011): 
1995. 
61 Examples are not in short supply, and include multi-dimensional UN peace operations in 
Cambodia, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Chad, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Kosovo, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Timor-Leste. 
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peace and justice more likely in the smaller, poorer countries of the world.62 Given these 
trends, it appears that both peacebuilding and transitional justice interventions will have 
a greater footprint in the developing world than the developed world for the foreseeable 
future.63  
With these broad trends as a backdrop, the critique of liberal international 
peacebuilding posits that in practice, peacebuilding interventions have largely been 
premised on a model of liberal internationalism that conceives of market-oriented 
economies and Western-style liberal democracy as the unique pathway to peace.64 The 
interventions contrived to bring about just such a liberal peace are seen to constitute a 
sort of modern-day mission civilisatrice.65 Yet because many of the post-conflict and 
developing countries in which peacebuilding interventions take place have a historical 
and cultural grounding that varies from that of the Occident, some argue that the 
emphasis on elections, democracy, and free markets associated with the typical 
package of post-conflict peacebuilding interventions can be both dangerous and 
destabilizing.66 The critique suggests they are potentially dangerous and destabilizing 
because rapid economic and political liberalization can give rise to grievances and 
political competition with which the often fragile or shattered institutions in post-conflict 
countries are as yet too weak to cope.67  
The combined effects of peace operations and development assistance 
facilitated by liberalizing international financial institutions such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund may therefore be to create instability and even a return 
to conflict.68 For this reason, some critics of liberal international peacebuilding have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See Paul Collier, et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy 
(Washington: World Bank, 2003), 22 (arguing that civil wars are more likely in low-income 
countries).  
63 For an argument that at least some of the patterns that have led to international interventions in 
the past are changing, see generally Scott Straus, “Wars Do End!: Changing Patterns of Political 
Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa,” African Affairs 111, no. 443 (2012): 179. Straus argues that 
wars, major forms of large-scale organized political violence, and episodes of large-scale mass 
killing of civilians are declining in frequency and intensity in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is worth noting, 
however, that, according to Straus, other forms of political violence, such as electoral violence 
and violence over access to livelihood resources, are increasing or persistent. Even the low-level 
insurgencies that Straus lists as exemplary of future trends, such as Darfur and the Lord’s 
Resistance Army in Uganda, have resulted in various forms of international intervention. 
64 See Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” International 
Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 56. 
65 See generally Roland Paris, “International Peacebuilding and the ‘‘Mission Civilisatrice’” 
Review of International Studies 28, no. 4 (2002): 637. 
66 See generally, Paris, At War’s End. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Without attempting to discern the cause, it is worth recalling in this regard that a significant 
portion of civil wars reignite within a period of five years of their supposed settlement. See Paul 
Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
46, no. 1 (2002): 17; Astri Suhrke and Ingrid Samset, “What’s in a Figure?: Estimating 
Recurrence of Civil War,” International Peacekeeping 14, no. 2 (2007): 197–98. 
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advocated “institutionalization before liberalization,” a focus on strengthening the 
institutions of economic and political governance prior to full liberalization.69 Of course, 
the disastrous rush to elections as a departure strategy that has been associated with 
some early UN peace operations has in fact been moderated in recent years with an 
increased emphasis on institution building, including broad categories of programming 
such as rule of law assistance, DDR, and SSR.70 Nevertheless, some critics argue that 
even in its current form, international peacebuilding may involve the imposition of 
Western institutional preferences that, at their core, are still largely premised on 
“neoliberal policies of open markets . . . and governance policies focused on enhancing 
instruments of state coercion.”71 Equally worrisome, the strongest critics argue, is that 
there is little space to dissent from the prevailing and hegemonic international 
peacebuilding paradigm.72  
Applying the critique of liberal international peacebuilding to transitional justice, 
Chandra Sriram argues that mainstream justice strategies “share key assumptions about 
preferable arrangements, and a faith that other key goods—democracy, free markets, 
‘justice’—can essentially stand in for, and necessarily create peace.” 73 To the contrary, 
Sriram argues that transitional justice processes and mechanisms may, like liberal 
peacebuilding, destabilize post-conflict and post-atrocity countries because “calls for 
justice are likely to generate tensions and exacerbate conflicts that have the potential to 
undermine peacebuilding.”74 And as with the other components of liberal peacebuilding, 
transitional justice strategies are often rooted in Western modalities of justice imposed 
from the outside.75  
While transitional justice processes have historically been linked to an emphasis 
on building Western-style democracies, these processes have not traditionally been 
associated with the push for free markets.76 Sriram therefore notes that transitional 
justice might not be as subject to this aspect of the critique of liberal international 
peacebuilding.77 However, it is worth noting that while trials and truth commissions 
around the world have tended to focus on accountability for violations of physical 
integrity (murder, rape, torture, disappearances) and civil and political rights more 
generally, issues of economic and distributive justice and economic and social rights, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 See Paris, “ Peacebuilding and the Limits,” 57–58.  
70 For a critique of the rush to rapid elections, see Chesterman, You, The People, 204–235. 
71 See Cooper, Turner, and Pugh, “The End of History,” 1995; Chandra Lekha Sriram, Olga 
Martin-Ortega, and Johanna Herman, “Promoting the Rule of Law: From Liberal to Institutional 
Peacebuilding,” in Peacebuilding and the Rule of Law in Africa: Just Peace?, eds. Chandra Lekha 
Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega, and Johanna Herman (Milton Park: Routledge, 2011), 1-2 (arguing 
that promoting institutionalization as a response to the critique of liberal international 
peacebuilding may also entail an imposition).  
72 See Cooper, Turner, and Pugh, “The End of History,” 1995. 
73 Sriram, “Justice as Peace?,” 579. 
74 Ibid, 583. 
75 See ibid, 591. 
76 See ibid, 580. 
77 Ibid. 
	   133	  
have often been placed in the background of transitional justice practice and concern.78 
The effect has at times generated outrage over acts of physical violence conceived of as 
exceptional evils, while leaving the larger economic and social status quo intact, perhaps 
thereby obfuscating and legitimating patterns of economic violence that may be equally 
devastating.79 In this sense, transitional justice has paralleled the neoliberal market 
orientation that is featured in the critique of liberal international peacebuilding. Thus, it 
would seem that the paradigmatic “third wave” transitions at the origins of transitional 
justice, transitions from authoritarianism and communism to market-oriented, Western-
style democracy, were crucial not only to structuring the initial conceptual boundaries of 
the field but also remain relevant to understanding the field’s existing practices today.80  
 
ii. Politics As Neutral Technology 
 
A second criticism of both international peacebuilding and transitional justice that 
is related to but distinguishable from the critique of liberal international peacebuilding is 
the argument that that they are both presented as technocratic, neutral, and apolitical 
solutions to highly contested or contestable political issues and choices. In other words, 
the choice as to the modalities of better forms of governance and questions that arise 
out of a desire for justice (for example, justice for whom, for what, and to what ends?) 
are highly political choices that have important consequences for the distribution of 
political, economic, social, and cultural power in the post-conflict context.81 Yet, a 
perennial feature of the various components of post-conflict peacebuilding, such as rule 
of law and democracy assistance, is that they are often imagined as fundamentally 
apolitical and neutral technologies—a misperception that obfuscates the difficult 
tradeoffs that need to be made to further important post-conflict objectives such as 
development, security, and human rights protection.82 Thus, critics of both peacebuilding 
and transitional justice have argued that the fundamentally political nature of both 
enterprises needs to be brought to the surface.83  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 See Zinaida Miller, “Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008): 275-76. 
79 Dustin N. Sharp, “Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition: Toward a Positive-
Peace Paradigm for Transitional Justice,” Fordham International Law Journal 35 (2012): 781-82. 
80 Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights,” 326. 
81 See Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project,” 280–86 (employing the categories of 
when, whom, and what in order to interrogate the limits of mainstreamed transitional justice). 
82 See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “Invoking the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Rebuilding: A Critical 
Examination,” William and Mary Law Review 49 (2008): 1349 (arguing that renewed enthusiasm 
for building the rule of law in the post-conflict context represents a “desire to escape from politics 
by imagining the rule of law as technical, legal, and apolitical”); Ole Sending, Why Peacebuilders 
Fail to Secure Ownership and Be Sensitive to Context (Security in Practice, NUPI Working Paper 
755 (2009)) (observing that the ends of liberal international peacebuilding are often imagined to 
be “a-historical and pre-political”). 
83 See, for example, Edward Newman, “‘Liberal’ Peacebuilding Debates,” 42–43 (critiquing 
attempts to “‘de-politicize’ peacebuilding and present it as a technical task”); Lundy and 
McGovern, “Whose Justice?,” 277 (arguing that the “rise in interventionism, based on Western 
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The need to more openly assess the tensions, tradeoffs, and debates that 
undergird peacebuilding and transitional justice interventions is all the more plain if we 
take seriously the notion that they serve to replicate essentially Western liberal economic 
and governance models. In this regard, it is important to examine the discourse of the 
local that has emerged in recent years in the critique of both peacebuilding and 
transitional justice.  
 
iii. The “Local” versus the “International” 
 
A third set of concerns leveled against both international peacebuilding and 
transitional justice broadly addresses the extent to which an appropriate balance has 
been struck between the “local” and the “international” in terms of agency, input, and 
authority over post-conflict planning and programming. Concerns about striking the right 
balance take a number of rhetorical forms, and include the worry that post-conflict 
agendas are “externally driven,” that they are planned and implemented in a “top-down” 
matter, or otherwise fail to give sufficient agency to local actors with respect to core 
issues and choices.84 A related concern is the extent to which mainstream peacebuilding 
and transitional justice initiatives are biased toward Western approaches, giving too little 
attention to local practices of promoting peace, justice, and reconciliation.85 In recent 
years, exploration of the complexity of the discourse of the local has experienced 
renewed interest in academic circles.86 At rhetorical level at least, the importance of local 
or national ownership has now become a virtual UN mantra in official policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conceptions of justice, has also been paralleled by reluctance on the part of many rule of law 
experts to acknowledge the political dimensions of such activities” and that “[e]xpressing 
transitional justice questions as a series of technical issues offsets this potentially troubling 
recognition”); Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals,” 98-106 (arguing that the seeming consensus 
as to the goals of transitional justice masks a deeper politicization and debate, but that it has 
become difficult to assess the tensions, trade-offs, and dilemmas associated with transitional 
justice to the extent that they have been re-conceptualized in apolitical terms). 
84 See, e.g., Richmond, “The Romanticisation of the Local,” 161-63 (discussing the tendency 
toward top-down institution building in a variety of “liberal” interventions); Andrieu, “Civilizing 
Peacebuilding,” 541 (noting that “transitional justice seems to be strongly under the influence of 
[a] top-down state-building approach”); Sriram, “Justice as Peace?,” 591 (noting that “[t]ransitional 
justice, and in particular trials, are frequently imported from the outside and occasionally 
externally imposed”). 
85 See, e.g., Mac Ginty, “Indigenous Peacemaking,” 144-45 (noting that Western approaches to 
peacebuilding “risk[] minimizing the space for organic local, traditional or indigenous contributions 
to peace-making”); Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 30 (calling for a 
revalorization of local and cultural approaches to justice and reconciliation).  
86 See generally, for example, Timothy Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local 
Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes,” Peace and Change 34, no. 1 (2009): 3; 
Richmond, “The Romanticisation of the Local,” 44; Simon Chesterman, “Ownership in Theory and 
in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations,” Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding 1, no. 1 (2007): 3. 
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documents.87 Yet despite all of the attention, the precise meaning of the discourse of 
local ownership in peacebuilding remains imprecise and poorly understood.88  
Broadly speaking, the mobilization of the concept of the local in the context of 
peacebuilding debates might be viewed as an argument over strategy in which context-
specific solutions are pitted against a perceived standardization or a checklist approach 
to post-conflict programming.89 Yet the discourse of the local could also be thought of as 
one of resistance to the perceived hegemony of liberal international peacebuilding itself 
insofar as it is conceived of or forms part of a larger effort to reconstitute post-conflict 
societies in the image of Western liberal democracies. At a deeper level, the local versus 
international debate might also be thought to capture one of the essential dilemmas and 
contradictory goals of post-conflict interventions in general. That is, while such 
interventions must be responsive to local context, traditions, and political dynamics in 
order to be perceived as legitimate, they often seek to challenge and transform many of 
the dynamics that may have led to the conflict in the first place, which can include 
traditional practices and power structures.90 Even were this not the case, in the 
immediate post-conflict aftermath, the very local political and cultural structures that 
might have ordinarily served as an interface point between the local and the international 
have often broken down, making it that much more difficult to find the ideal balance 
between local and international agency. Indeed, the very notion of intervention is 
predicated on some idea of local failure, which may imply the need for something 
outside of the local to set things right again.  
Along with the rise of the discourse of the local in academic and policy circles, 
many are quick to warn that it is important not to essentialize or romanticize the local.91 
In the field of transitional justice, for example, local justice and reconciliation practices 
have in some instances accompanied more standard (or Western) transitional justice 
interventions in intriguing ways that hint at great potential for furthering reconciliation and 
accountability.92 At the same time, local practices can occasionally be difficult to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See, e.g., United Nations, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies, ¶ 17 (arguing that the UN must “learn better how to respect and support local 
ownership, local leadership and a local constituency for reform”); United Nations, Report of the 
Secretary General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, UN Doc A/63/881–
S/2009/304 (2009), ¶ 7 (observing that “[t]he imperative of national ownership is a central theme 
of the present report”). 
88 See Chesterman, “Ownership in Theory and Practice,” 7-10 (reviewing the evolution of the 
concept of local ownership). 
89 See Lundy and McGovern, “Whose Justice?,” 271 (criticizing the “one-size-fits-all” and “top-
down” approaches to transitional justice). 
90 See Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” 117. 
91 See Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition?,” 11-13; Richmond, “The Romanticisation of the 
Local,” 153 (discussing the various unhelpful ways in which internationals tend to romanticize the 
local). 
92 In East Timor, for example, the Community Reconciliation Process brought together aspects of 
local justice, arbitration, and mediation in order to bring perpetrators and former combatants into 
dialogue with their estranged communities. See generally Burgess, “New Approach to Restorative 
Justice.” In Sierra Leone, the non-governmental organization Fambul Tok (“Family Talk” in the 
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reconcile with international principles.93 Supposedly local practices may also be subject 
to capture by elites who would use them for their own political purposes. In Rwanda, for 
example, the local dispute-settlement practice of gacaca was modified and adopted at a 
national level to address justice and reconciliation issues that followed in the wake of the 
1994 genocide. While this development was initially heralded by some, it has also been 
observed that gacaca has been implemented in ways that, while they serve the interests 
of the Kagame government, may not fully serve the needs of community justice and 
reconciliation.94 Thus, as the Rwanda case illustrates, the turn to the local in matters of 
peacebuilding and transitional justice offers no easy solutions, and ultimately the 
concepts of both local and international might be marshaled to further important 
emancipatory goals in the post-conflict context.95  
 
C. Building Linkages between Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice 
 
Although international peacebuilding and transitional justice efforts parallel each 
other in many ways, ranging from shared historical origins in post-Cold War dynamics 
and political currents to similarities in the sharp critiques that these efforts have 
generated, peace and justice initiatives have not always been seen to walk hand in hand. 
Indeed, over the last twenty-five years, the “peace versus justice” debate, in which the 
imperatives of justice are thought to threaten possibilities for peace and stability, has 
proved to be an enduring one, seeming to erupt nearly every time an international 
tribunal indicts a high-level official or former warlord.96  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
local Krio language) has worked to address some of the shortcomings of the national truth and 
reconciliation commission by implementing a program of local ritual and truth telling at the village 
level. See generally Park, “Community-Based Restorative Transitional Justice.”  
93 Roger Duthie, “Local Justice and Reintegration Processes as Complements to Transitional 
Justice and DDR,” in Disarming the Past, 243–45. 
94 For example, crimes committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Tutsi-led military force that 
stopped the genocide, are excluded from the gacaca process. See Le Mon, “Rwanda’s Troubled 
Gacaca,” 18. For a rosier assessment at the outset of the implementation of gacaca, see 
generally Timothy Longman, “Justice at the Grassroots? Gacaca Trials in Rwanda,” in 
Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century, 206. 
95 Sharp, 35 Fordham Intl L J at 800 (cited in note 79). 
96 See, e.g., Louise Arbour, “Justice v Politics,” The New York Times, Sept 16, 2008) (justifying 
her controversial decision to indict Slobodan Milošević even though it was criticized at the time for 
threatening the peace process); IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis, “Liberia: ECOWAS 
Chairman Urges UN to Lift Taylor Indictment,” IRIN, June 30, 2003 (discussing the argument of 
the then chairman of the Economic Community of West African States, President John Kufuor of 
Ghana, that the UN should set aside the indictment of Charles Taylor by the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone on the grounds that it was necessary to facilitate a negotiated settlement to Liberia’s 
civil war); Jeffrey Gettleman and Alexis Okeowo, “Warlord’s Absence Derails Another Peace 
Effort in Uganda,” The New York Times, April 12, 2008 (discussing the refusal of the leader of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army to attend peace negotiations due in part to indictments from the 
International Criminal Court). 
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Perhaps in part as a result of these perceived tensions, scholars and practitioners of 
transitional justice have not historically tended to ground their research or praxis in 
vocabularies of peace or peacebuilding.97 To a large extent, the connections between 
peacebuilding and transitional justice have been “under-researched.”98 Yet despite these 
historic tensions, current UN doctrine holds that peace and justice are mutually 
supportive, even if the timing, modalities, and sequencing of peace and justice initiatives 
need to be carefully considered.99 More recent transitional justice scholarship has 
tended to play down the potential for conflict between peace and justice.100 At the same 
time, the shared space and common goals of peacebuilding and transitional justice in 
the post-conflict context have led to an increasing interest by both academics and 
policymakers in exploring the possibilities for linkages and complementarity.101  
 
i. Acknowledging Both Tensions and Complementarity 
 
Given many of the shared goals of peacebuilding and transitional justice—
rebuilding social trust and social capital, addressing problems of governance and 
accountability, and fostering institutional reform, to name only a few—the desire to 
promote linkages and complementarity seems eminently sensible. And yet, a closer 
examination reveals that many of the traditional programmatic components of 
international post-conflict peacebuilding have the potential to both complement and 
conflict with transitional justice initiatives.102 As but two examples, I briefly outline here 
the potential for tension and complementarity between transitional justice and programs 
relating to the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants and 
security sector reform more generally.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See Andrieu, “Civilizing Peacebuilding,” 539 (noting that “few transitional justice scholars have 
yet situated their research in the context of peacebuilding, seeing it instead through the dominant 
lens of legalism and human rights”); Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 29 
(noting that “few researchers have analyzed the relationship between justice, reconciliation and 
peacebuilding”). A notable exception to this trend is Rama Mani whose pioneering work took a 
much more holistic approach to issues of justice and peace in the post-conflict context.  
98 See van Zyl, “Promoting Transitional Justice,” 210. 
99 See UN Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies, ¶ 21. 
100 See Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” 98. 
101 See, e.g., Sriram, Martin-Ortega, and Herman, Evaluating and Comparing Strategies of 
Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice, 13 (discussing increasing linkages between transitional 
justice and a broader set of peacebuilding activities); Bryden, Shaping a Security-Governance 
Agenda in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 20–22 (examining policy linkages between SSR, DDR, 
rule of law initiatives, and transitional justice); van Zyl, “Promoting Transitional Justice,” 210 
(arguing that “[t]ransitional justice strategies should be understood as an important component of 
peacebuilding”). 
102 See generally Herman, Martin-Ortega, and Sriram, Beyond Justice Versus Peace (discussing 
the potential tensions between transitional justice, rule of law assistance, DDR, and SSR). 
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 In the last twenty years, DDR programs have become a regular feature of post-
conflict peacebuilding.103 Of recent peacekeeping missions, at least seven of those 
established by the UN Security Council included DDR in their mandate.104 While 
programs vary in terms of their modalities, the basic goal of all such programs is to 
assure security and stability in the post-conflict context by removing weapons from the 
hands of former combatants and helping them to integrate socially and economically into 
society.105 If done well, DDR programs have the potential to contribute to the very 
stability that might be thought essential to getting larger development and justice 
initiatives off the ground. While few would therefore dispute the need for such programs, 
they have often been criticized for a short-term “guns for cash” approach that may 
shortchange some of the longer-term and more challenging goals of DDR, particularly 
the reintegration of former combatants back into the community.106  
Despite increasingly global experience and expertise with DDR, it has been hard 
to overlook the disappointing results of many DDR programs, ultimately leading the UN 
and others to stress the need for a more “integrated” approach.107 But while more 
integrated approaches sound laudable in the abstract, such efforts have the potential to 
create enormous challenges when dealing with fields such as DDR and transitional 
justice that, historically, have enjoyed few connections at the level of policy and 
practice.108 The historical separation between DDR and transitional justice may in part 
reflect a perception that they are meant to serve different constituencies for different 
purposes. Thus, while transitional justice mechanisms are often viewed as victim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Between 1994 and 2005, thirty-four different DDR programs were created around the world. 
Waldorf, “Linking DDR and Transitional Justice,” 18. For a more detailed exploration of tensions 
and complementarities between DDR and transitional justice in broad comparative terms, see 
generally Chandra Lekha Sriram and Johanna Herman, “DDR and Transitional Justice: Bridging 
the Divide?,” Conflict, Security, and Development 9, no. 4 (2009): 455. 
104 These are the United Nations Mission in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra 
Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC, 1999), the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL, 2003), the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI, 2004), the 
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH, 2004), the United Nations Operation in 
Burundi (UNOB, 2004), and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS, 2005). 
105 See IDDRS, § 1.2. 
106 United Nations Development Programme, Practice Note: Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (New York: UNDP, 2005), 18. 
107 See United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General: Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration, UN Doc A/60/705 (2006), ¶ 9(b); Mark Knight and Alpaslan Özerdem, “Guns, 
Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in 
Transitions from War to Peace,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 4 (2004): 513. The felt need 
for better integration helped in part to spur the publication of the Integrated Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), a policy guide that sets forth best practices 
for DDR programming and the various ways in which it can and should be linked with other post-
conflict programmatic areas, including transitional justice. See generally, IDDRS. 
108 See Waldorf, “Linking DDR and Transitional Justice,” 16.  
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oriented, DDR is seen to serve the needs of former perpetrators.109 While transitional 
justice focuses on justice and accountability for past violations, traditional approaches to 
DDR focus on military and security objectives.110  
With this backdrop in mind, it is not hard to imagine that the existence of robust 
accountability mechanisms might make some former combatants reluctant to come 
forward and lay down their arms. Moreover, to the extent that those who need to be 
disarmed are either embedded in state security forces or stand to be integrated into 
reconstituted state security forces as part of a larger SSR program, this too makes the 
prospects for restoration of the rule of law difficult since the very forces responsible for 
enforcing the law have the most to lose from the accountability measures that are part 
and parcel of transitional justice.111 Beyond this, the provision of reinsertion and 
reintegration benefits to former combatants, a typical feature of many DDR programs, 
can be contrasted with the relative paucity and lack of generosity of reparations 
programs for victims.112 The perception that former perpetrators are being rewarded for 
bad behavior while former victims are left to fend for themselves could ultimately make 
reintegration and reconciliation initiatives difficult.113  
Taken together, there is ample potential for tension between DDR programs and 
transitional justice initiatives. However, despite the potential to work at cross-purposes, 
DDR programs and transitional justice mechanisms also share common goals, including 
trust-building, prevention of renewed violence, and reconciliation.114 In terms of 
furthering these common goals, there are a number of areas of potential 
complementarity, particularly as regards the reintegration component of DDR programs. 
For example, while there is some evidence to suggest that parallel DDR and transitional 
justice initiatives might decrease former combatants willingness to come forward and 
engage in truth telling and reconciliation activities, it can also be argued that sending a 
strong public signal that only the “big fish” will be put on trial might allow victims to feel 
justice is being done, while at the same time making it clear that most combatants were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 The victim/perpetrator distinction can be problematic in several respects, particularly in the 
context of DDR where many former combatants are both perpetrators and victims at the same 
time. See Luisa Maria Dietrich Ortega, “Transitional Justice and Female Ex-Combatants: Lessons 
Learned from International Experience,” in Disarming the Past, 169. 
110 Kimberly Theidon, “Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
of Former Combatants in Columbia,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 1, no. 1 (2007): 
69.  
111 Herman, Beyond Justice Versus Peace. 
112 See Eric Witte, “Beyond “Peace versus Justice”: Understanding the Relationship Between 
DDR Programs and the Prosecution of International Crimes,” in Disarming the Past, 96. 
113 See generally Jeremy Ginifer, “Reintegration of Ex-Combatants,” in Sierra Leone: Building the 
Road to Recovery, eds. Mark Malan, et al (Institution for Security Studies, 2003), 39. 
114 According to one UN definition, the aims of transitional justice include ensuring accountability, 
serving justice, achieving reconciliation, and preventing human rights violations in the future. See 
United Nations, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 
4. The IDDRS similarly underscores the centrality of DDR programs to preventing renewed 
violence, encouraging trust and confidence, and reconciliation. See IDDRS, § 1.2. 
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not among the worst offenders and can be reconciled to their community.115 Beyond 
community-level reconciliation, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section, 
building stronger linkages between DDR and transitional justice would likely involve a 
greater focus on human rights vetting to ensure that abusive former combatants are not 
channeled into reconstituted security services.116 This mechanism, along with other 
accountability mechanisms, could ultimately enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the 
new forces, while at the same time lowering the chances of recurrence of abuses by the 
reformed security forces, even if the potential for some short-term frictions cannot be 
eliminated.117  
SSR is a process that could be thought to include DDR but which is at the same 
time much broader and more comprehensive. While definitions of SSR vary in scope, 
the UN generally understands it to comprise efforts to promote “effective and 
accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full 
respect for human rights and the rule of law.”118 Similar to DDR programs, there exists a 
significant potential for tension between SSR programs and transitional justice 
initiatives.119 The potential for conflict between members of the security sector, who risk 
possibly being downsized or excluded through vetting procedures, and transitional 
justice, which seeks to promote accountability and truth-telling for abusive members of 
those same security forces, is fairly straightforward and obvious. At the same time, 
without security and stability, accountability mechanisms associated with transitional 
justice will have difficulty functioning. Thus, the basic tension between the felt needs of 
stability and security on the one hand, and the exigencies of accountability and human 
rights on the other, renders the already complicated task of reforming or reconstituting 
the security sector all the more challenging. Perhaps in part due to this potential for 
tension, SSR and transitional justice “rarely interact, either in practice or in theory.”120  
Despite these tensions, it would be difficult to foster effective and accountable 
security “with full respect for human rights and the rule of law”121 without some attention 
to issues of past abuses and impunity. In particular, attention to these issues through 
both transitional justice and SSR mechanisms has the potential to provide a much-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 In Sierra Leone, for example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s outreach efforts included 
activities targeting ex-combatants to explain the meaning of the phrase those “who bear the 
greatest responsibility” for crimes within its mandate. The purpose of these efforts was to dispel 
rumors that the court intended to indict every fighter, from top to bottom. See Mohamed Gibril 
Sesay and Mohamed Suma, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Sierra Leone (New York: 
ICTJ, 2009), 18-19. 
116 See Mobekk, Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform, 68–71 (discussing the role of 
vetting in conducting reform of military forces, police services, the judiciary, intelligence services, 
and the governance sector). 
117 See ibid, 18 (discussing the role of SSR and transitional justice in engendering trust in critical 
state institutions).  
118 See United Nations, Securing Peace and Development, ¶ 17. 
119 See Herman, Martin-Ortega, and Sriram, Beyond Justice v. Peace, 15. 
120 Mayer-Rieckh and Duthie, “Enhancing Justice and Development,” 222. 
121 United Nations, Securing Peace and Development, ¶ 17. 
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needed sense of legitimacy for formerly abusive security forces.122 This, together with 
other potential avenues of complementarity, has given rise to a small but growing 
literature exploring the possibility of a “justice-sensitive” approach to SSR that would 
include, among other things, more robust human rights training and vetting.123 Thus, as 
with DDR, building better linkages between SSR and transitional justice could ultimately 
promote trust building, prevention of renewed violence, and reconciliation. 
As defined by some global institutions, the “security sector” extends well beyond 
traditional security actors like the police and the military to management and oversight 
bodies, broader justice and rule of law institutions, and non-statutory security forces.124 It 
is particularly in this broader conception of security sector reform, with its inclusion of the 
judicial sector and access to justice, that the potentially positive linkages between SSR 
and transitional justice might be more apparent. Therefore, while not always thought of 
as being part of SSR, programs that ensure access to justice, particularly access to 
justice for those abused by security forces, could be one way of fostering accountability 
long-term, and maintaining sustained “bottom-up” pressure for reform on the security 
sector as a whole.125  
 
ii. Building Linkages through the Lens of Critique  
 
The potential for both conflict and complementarity between transitional justice 
and peacebuilding initiatives highlights the need for coordination sufficient to mitigate 
tensions and promote positive overlaps. Indeed, recognition of the need to promote 
coherence and integration while avoiding the fragmented and duplicative approaches of 
the past helped in part to inspire the creation of the PBC in 2005.126 The many 
challenges associated with building peace and justice in the post-conflict context call for 
holistic solutions that address crosscutting challenges. For these reasons, this Article 
takes it as a starting point that promoting synergies between peacebuilding and 
transitional justice programs and initiatives is a worthwhile goal. At the same time, 
despite the seemingly unobjectionable nature of appeals for greater coordination, more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Herman, Martin-Ortega, and Sriram, Beyond Justice Versus Peace, 15–16. 
123 See, e.g., Mayer-Rieckh and Duthie, “Enhancing Justice and Development,” 215; Barr, 
“Making Connections: Bridging Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform,” 5; Mobekk, 
Transitional Justice and Security Sector Reform, 1–7; Laura Davis, Justice-Sensitive Security 
System Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (The Initiative for Peacebuilding, 2009), 
24-26. 
124 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD DAC Handbook on Security 
System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice (OECD, 2007), 5.  
125 For a review of the potential for “bottom-up” access to justice initiatives to effect larger rule of 
law reforms, see generally Stephen Golub, “The Rule of Law and the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission: A Social Development Approach,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20, no. 
1 (2007): 47. 
126 See General Assembly Res No 60/180, 1; Security Council Res No. 1645, 1 (emphasizing the 
need for a “coordinated, coherent, and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and 
reconciliation”); Jubilut, “Towards a New Jus Post Bellum,” 31 (discussing the problem of 
redundant and ad hoc efforts and a lack of coordination in peacekeeping missions of the past).  
	   142	  
integrated approaches to peace and justice issues in the post-conflict context may also 
create problems and challenges of their own.  
To begin, the UN’s historic track record on coordination leaves ample room for 
improvement, and initial assessments of the PBC’s ability to promote more integrated 
approaches to complex and multi-dimensional peacebuilding challenges have not been 
optimistic.127 Further complicating the task of coordination is the fact that post-conflict 
peacebuilding is a large and multifaceted task, with key roles being played by a variety 
of actors. Though this Article has focused largely on the UN, the larger post-conflict 
peacebuilding picture also includes actors over which the PBC has no direct authority, 
ranging from the World Bank and key bilateral donors such as the US, the EU, and 
Japan to national governments, civil society actors, and various local constituencies. 
Getting actors both in and outside of the UN system to work towards more integrated 
approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding is an enormous task, especially given the 
stove-piping, overlapping mandates, and bureaucratic territorialism that have plagued 
such efforts in the past.128 It is important to note that coordination difficulties stem not 
only from the magnitude of the task or difficulties of communication amongst all of the 
various players, but also because of underlying disagreements and uncertainties as to 
how to best accomplish peacebuilding objectives in the first place.129 
Second, beyond the inherent challenges of large-scale coordination itself, there 
is a danger of over-standardization and bureaucratization as best practices for the 
coordination of transitional justice and peacebuilding initiatives are taken up by the 
global institutions associated with post-conflict peacebuilding and development 
assistance that have the tendency to operate through standardized templates.130 It has 
been argued that as transitional justice practices have spread around the world, they 
have done so not necessarily by adapting themselves de novo to each new context, but 
through a process of “acculturation” whereby a dominant script or practice is replicated 
again and again as a result of repeated information exchanges and consultations.131 
Once a dominant paradigm or script develops, modifying that script to suit new 
conditions or circumstances can be extremely challenging.132 In the context of 
internationally driven peacebuilding initiatives more generally, the existence of “set 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 See United Nations, Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, UN Doc 
A/64/868–S/2010/393 (2010), ¶ 57–59. 
128 See Herman, Martin-Ortega, and Sriram, Beyond Justice Versus Peace, 17 (observing that 
improving connections between peacebuilding and transitional justice requires a level of 
coordination that large bureaucracies are not very good at). 
129 See Roland Paris, “Understanding the “Coordination Problem” in Postwar Statebuilding,” in 
The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, eds. 
Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (Milton Park: Routledge 2009), 72.  
130 As Roland Paris has argued, this is particularly true insofar as efforts at coordination give 
impetus to centripetal forces in policymaking. See ibid, 62.  
131 James Cavallaro and Sebastián Albuja, “The Lost Agenda: Economic Crimes and Truth 
Commissions in Latin America and Beyond,” in Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots 
Activism and the Struggle for Change, eds. Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (Portland: Hart, 
2008), 125. 
132 See ibid. 
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templates” and a “formulaic path” has similarly been observed.133 Given these 
tendencies, there is reason to worry that—notwithstanding paeans to national ownership 
and context-appropriate solutions—as transitional justice is mainstreamed into emerging 
best practices for post-conflict reconstruction, transitional justice initiatives will come to 
be seen as yet another item on the “post-conflict checklist,” a mechanistic part of the 
template deployed in the context of post-conflict peace operations.134 That post-conflict 
peacebuilding and transitional justice initiatives have frequently been criticized for being 
planned and implemented in a top-down, externally-driven, and Western-biased manner, 
only serves to highlight the concern of standardization.135 
 Third, as explored in Section III of this Article, international peacebuilding 
programs, as well as a number of transitional justice initiatives, have frequently been 
subject to powerful, parallel critiques, including the critique of liberal international 
peacebuilding, the critique of politics as neutral technology, and concerns about striking 
the right balance between the local and the international in post-conflict programming. 
Considered together with the danger of over-standardization, there is reason to worry 
that better integration and coordination between peacebuilding and transitional justice, 
especially insofar as it is carried out by the large bureaucracies traditionally associated 
with post-conflict assistance, might actually exacerbate some of the tendencies that 
have given rise to these parallel critiques rather than alleviate them. At a minimum, given 
historic patterns, there is no reason to think that simply linking peacebuilding and 
transitional justice, without more, will do anything to counter these tendencies.  
Given the potential problems and challenges inherent in attempting to build 
stronger linkages between peacebuilding and transitional justice initiatives, it would not 
be unreasonable to question the compatibility of more integrated approaches involving a 
strong international role with the types of locally owned, context-specific, and bottom-up 
solutions suggested by the critiques that have arisen in the academic and policy 
literature.136 On the other hand, from a pragmatic and realist standpoint, a balance 
between local and international agency in post-conflict programming seems both 
inevitable and desirable, due in part to the resources and expertise that internationals 
can at times bring to bear.137 With this perspective in mind, as scholars, practitioners, 
and policymakers begin to take a greater interest in sounding out potential linkages, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 See Sending, “Why Peacebuilders Fail to Secure Ownership and Be Sensitive to Context,” 7 
(observing that “international organizations, such as the UN and the World Bank, are bureaucratic 
organizations that operate through standardized templates”). 
134 See Elizabeth Stanley, “Transitional Justice: From the Local to the International,” in The 
Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and International Relations, ed. Patrick Hayden 
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 276 (observing that, together with other international 
interventions, “transitional justice practices have commonly become part of a longer list of 
‘tickboxes’ to attain peace and security”). 
135 See Section B, infra.  
136 See Section B, infra. 
137 See Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza, “Social Reconstruction as Local Process,” 153 (arguing for 
strategies that “incorporate a perspective that encompasses bottom-up local efforts as well as 
top-down state-driven or internationally driven ones”). 
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viewing transitional justice and peacebuilding overlaps through the prism of the critiques 
and concerns outlined in this article should prove instructive. Attentiveness to some of 
the parallel critiques and concerns that have been raised could lead to shifts that would 
strengthen policy in both areas in the process of promoting linkages.  
Ultimately, promoting linkages that reflect a cognizance of critique might involve 
more hybridized forms of peacebuilding and transitional justice that involve a mixture of 
conventional and local practices and models.138 For example, as previously discussed, 
DDR programs and transitional justice initiatives have the potential to both conflict with 
and complement each other, and careful coordination is called for if synergies are to be 
exploited. One of the areas where DDR programs have had the least amount of success 
is in the community reintegration element, sometimes known as the forgotten “R” of DDR, 
or the “the weakest link in the DDR chain.”139 This is an area where the reconciliation 
components of transitional justice initiatives might serve as a potential bridge, 
strengthening both DDR and transitional justice goals in the process.140 The potential 
use of local ritual and tradition in facilitating reconciliation generally and the reintegration 
of former combatants specifically might be one way of building linkages between 
transitional justice and DDR programs that gives deference to the critiques and concerns 
that have in the past plagued both fields (including that they are Western-biased and 
externally driven).141 Such approaches to reintegration have seen limited but intriguing 
use in Sierra Leone and Mozambique.142 Similarly, in East Timor, a post-conflict 
community reconciliation process combined aspects of arbitration and mediation 
grounded in local ritual in bringing former perpetrators and combatants into dialogue with 
their estranged communities and victims.143 In the future, it might be possible for 
coordinating bodies like the PBC to encourage the use of local ritual and tradition to 
bridge the gap between DDR and transitional justice. This could, of course, be a difficult 
needle to thread since too much international involvement in such affairs might be seen 
to co-opt or corrupt the authenticity of local practices. Nevertheless, the PBC could play 
a helpful role even if only to brief local constituencies as to the range of local ritual that 
has been successfully used in other contexts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 See Newman, Paris, and Richmond, “Introduction,” 16. 
139 Sami Faltas, DDR without Camps: The Need for Decentralized Approaches: Topical Chapter 
of the Conversion Survey (Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2005), 1; see also Macartan 
Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 51, no. 4 (2007): 549 (concluding that combatants who did not participate in DDR 
were reintegrated as successfully as those who did). 
140 For a longer elaboration of this argument, see Sharp, “Bridging the Gap,” 34–36. For an 
exploration of the application of local ritual in the context of the reintegration of former child 
combatants, see Roger Duthie and Irma Specht, “DDR, Transitional Justice, and the 
Reintegration of Former Child Combatants,” in Disarming the Past, 207–10. 
141 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden, Stockholm Initiative on DDR, Final Report 30 (Stockholm: 
March 2006); see also Theidon, “Transitional Subjects,” 90. 
142 See generally Duthie, “Local Justice and Reintegration Processes.”  
143 See generally Burgess, “A New Approach to Restorative Justice.” 
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 While this is but one example, we should be attentive to similar possibilities as 
we contemplate promoting greater linkages between peacebuilding and transitional 
justice. This Article does not attempt to set forth a comprehensive approach along these 
lines, but there are possibilities ripe for exploration. One such example might be the use 
of “bottom-up” approaches to rule of law assistance that attempt to effect reforms though 
grassroots legal empowerment.144 Another such example could be more comprehensive 
approaches to transitional justice and SSR programs that give greater emphasis to 
accountability for economic crimes and economic violence perpetrated in the course of 
the conflict.145 Additional possibilities that would cut against the grain of longstanding 
critiques of transitional justice and peacebuilding need to be developed by academics, 




Though historically seen as being in competition with the demands of peace, 
transitional justice is increasingly accepted as an important element of post-conflict 
peacebuilding. Along with the demobilization and disarmament of ex-combatants, 
security sector reform, rule of law programs, and elections, it has now joined a virtual 
checklist of post-conflict interventions spearheaded by the international community in 
post-conflict countries. This increasingly shared space between transitional justice and 
post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives has sparked new interest among both scholars and 
policymakers in sounding out potential connections between both fields. Although the 
pursuit of synergies between peacebuilding and transitional justice programs is a 
worthwhile goal, in developing these connections, we must also be keenly attentive to 
mutual shortcomings. Transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding have 
historically proceeded on separate tracks, yet there has been a remarkable similarity in 
the critiques and concerns that have been leveled against both fields in the last two 
decades. There are strong reasons to suspect that more integrated approaches to 
peacebuilding and transitional justice will have the tendency to exacerbate some of the 
tendencies that have given rise to these parallel critiques rather than alleviate them. 
Seeking synergies and overlaps through the optics of these historic concerns and 
critiques could be one technique of resistance to these tendencies. To be sure, 
exploiting overlaps while addressing critiques and pushing back against long dominant 
paradigms would bring its own challenges. At the same time, such efforts could take us 
one step forward in moving beyond the post-conflict checklist and towards the 
development of more holistic and innovative approaches to the challenge of building 
peace with justice in conflict’s wake. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 See generally Golub, “The Rule of Law and the UN Peacebuilding Commission.” 
145 See generally Sharp, “Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition,” (discussing the 
peripheral status of economic violence and economic justice in mainstream transitional justice 
initiatives); see also Carranza, “Plunder and Pain,” 310 (arguing that transitional justice must do 
more to grapple with corruption and other economic crimes that may have helped to precipitate 
the conflict).  
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When it first took the global stage in the 1980s and 1990s, transitional justice was largely 
thought of as a vehicle for helping to deliver important liberal goods in post-conflict and 
post-authoritarian societies, including political/procedural democracy, constitutionalism, 
the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Some three decades after the so-called 
“third wave” of democratic transitions associated with the field’s naissance, the idea of 
transitional justice as handmaiden to liberal political transitions—the “paradigmatic 
transition” of transitional justice—remains a deeply embedded narrative that has helped 
to shape dominant practices and conceptual boundaries.2 
 In recent years, this traditional transitional justice narrative has become 
increasingly intertwined with a view of transitional justice as a component of post-conflict 
peacebuilding more generally, including in societies not undergoing a paradigmatic 
liberal transition.3 To the extent that “peace” invokes more holistic sets of objectives than 
the narrower goals associated with facilitating liberal political transitions, the turn to 
peacebuilding might be seen to represent a broadening and a loosening of earlier 
paradigms and moorings, making this a significant moment in the normative evolution of 
the field. Yet with few exceptions, there has thus far been little scrutiny as to what 
“transitional justice as peacebuilding” might actually mean or how it might be different 
than “transitional justice as liberal democracy building.”4 In many instances, analysis of 
the linkages between transitional justice and peacebuilding goes little further than the 
loose sloganeering of “no peace without justice” or simplistic assertions that peace and 
justice go hand in hand.5  
 Considered more critically, it is entirely possible that “transitional justice as 
peacebuilding” will prove to be a distinction without a difference from what came before.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This dissertation chapter was originally published in the International Journal of Transitional 
Justice (2015).  
2 See generally Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History 
of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 321. 
3 Examples of transitional justice outside of paradigmatic liberal transitions include Rwanda, 
Kenya, Uganda, Chad, and elsewhere.  
4 For the most part, transitional justice scholars have not framed their work in terms of peace or 
peacebuilding. Kora Andrieu, “Civilizing Peacebuilding: Transitional Justice, Civil Society and the 
Liberal Paradigm,” Security Dialogue 41, no. 5 (2010): 539. There are, of course, notable 
exceptions to this trend, including Rami Mani, Chandra Lekha Sriram and Wendy Lambourne. 
See, for example, Rama Mani, Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War 
(Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2002); Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Justice as Peace? Liberal 
Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice,” Global Society 21, no. 4 (2007): 580-81; 
Wendy Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass Violence,” International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2009): 28-48.  
5 See U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
conflict Societies, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) (arguing that “[j]ustice, peace and 
democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives”). 
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Historically, the “peace” associated with international post-conflict peacebuilding efforts 
spearheaded by the United Nations and major international donors has typically been 
conceived of as a narrow liberal peace predicated on free markets and Western-style 
democracy.6 Thus, insofar as the goals of liberal international peacebuilding and the 
historic goals of transitional justice are essentially one and the same, “transitional justice 
as peacebuilding” may be little more than a dressed up tautology. More darkly, an 
amorphous transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding narrative may prove useful to autocratic 
regimes that would seek to use the tools and rhetoric of transitional justice to consolidate 
abusive regimes in the name of “peace,” just as victors have often done in the name of 
“justice.”7 
 In this light, it is worth recalling that concepts of both peace and justice have 
emancipatory dimensions, yet both have also been associated with colonial logics and 
dominant ideologies and power structures throughout history. While both concepts are 
often presented as neutral and apolitical, devoid of inherent ideological content, they 
have at times been used to legitimate a world order characterized by economic and 
structural violence enforced by military interventionism.8 In short, there are reductionist 
notions of peace, just as there are reductionist notions of justice. Bearing in mind Robert 
Cover’s observation that institutions and prescriptions do not exist apart from the 
narratives that locate and give them meaning,9 I argue that the particular “peace” and the 
particular “justice” that serve to undergird any emerging transitional-justice-as-
peacebuilding narrative matter a great deal. 
 In this article, I explore what it might mean to emancipate the emerging 
transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding narrative from the bonds of the one-size-fits-all 
reductionist logic of the paradigmatic transition that has historically served to undergird 
transitional justice and liberal international peacebuilding more generally. I argue that 
(re)conceptualizing transitional justice as a form of peacebuilding has the potential to 
reinvigorate the field, challenge longstanding blindspots and assumptions, and open the 
doors to more creative thinking, policies, and practices that take us beyond the confines 
of the increasingly rote transitional justice “toolbox,” but this cannot be taken for granted.  
 As a step in this direction, it will be important to deconstruct several key 
assumptions that might implicitly undergird transitional-justice-as peacebuilding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See generally Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
7 On “victor’s peace,” see Oliver Richmond, “Emancipatory Forms of Human Security and Liberal 
Peacebuilding,” International Journal 62 (2007): 462.  
8 I employ the term “economic violence” throughout this article in ways that overlap with Galtung’s 
concept of “structural violence,” but with at least one very important distinction. While Galtung’s 
“structural violence” is conceived of as being less “personal,” “direct,” and “intentional” than 
physical and psychological violence, many acts of economic violence—including corruption, 
plunder of natural resources, and violations of economic and social rights more generally—cannot 
be so characterized. In that sense, they often share much in common with direct physical 
violence. See Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Peace Research 6, no. 3 
(1969): 170-73.    
9 Robert Cover, “Nomos and Narrative,” Harvard Law Review 97 (1983): 4.  
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narratives, including: (1) the idea of “transition” as necessarily suggestive of a narrow 
liberal teleology; (2) ideas of “justice” as synonymous with legal and atrocity justice; and 
(3) the idea of “peacebuilding” as synonymous with what has come to be known as 
“liberal international peacebuilding.” I offer several concepts from critical peacebuilding 
theory—including “positive peace,” ” “popular peace,” “the everyday” and “hybridity”—
that might serve as useful correctives to these narrow assumptions. Taken together, I 
argue, critical reflection along these lines can help to lay the groundwork for a 
transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding paradigm that reflects a commitment to human 
rights ideals and the consolidation of a more open-textured, contextually relevant, and 
genuine positive peace.  
 
 
A. Transitional Justice and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 
 
The historical and ideological origins of transitional justice, rooted largely in the liberal 
democratic transitions that swept Latin American and other parts of the world in the final 
decades of the twentieth century, have been well documented.10 Scholarly work 
associated with these early political transitions tended to situate the origins of liberal 
democracy in choices by elite groups and legal-institutional reforms, rather than being 
the product of social conditions or some more “bottom up” process.11 To these 
assumptions were added both a preoccupation with accountability for human rights 
atrocities, and a deeply held belief that grappling with the legacies of the past would help 
to strengthen key liberal goods, from political democracy, to human rights and the rule of 
law. As Paige Arthur has observed, those origins remain relevant, having helped to 
create a paradigm and sets of assumptions that have served to shape transitional justice 
theory, policy, and practice up through the present day.12  
 In the decades that followed the birth of the field, the “dominant script” of the Latin 
American model has, in essence, been exported throughout the world, having 
significantly shaped the parameters of the so-called transitional justice “toolbox.”13 One 
can now point to over three dozen truth commissions and scores of human rights 
prosecutions as evidence of a global “justice cascade.”14 This sense of cascade or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See generally Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights.” 
11 See Samuel P. Huntington, “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,” 
in Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Volume I. 
General Considerations, ed. Neil Kritz (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1995), 65-
81; Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies,” in Kritz, Transitional Justice, 57-64. 
12 See Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights.” 
13 James Cavallaro and Sebastián Albuja, “The Lost Agenda: Economic Crimes and Truth 
Commissions in Latin America and Beyond,” in Transitional Justice from Below, Grassroots 
Activism and the Struggle for Change, eds. Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2008), 125. 
14 See Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing 
World Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011), 21. 
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crescendo has in turn helped to cloak some of the more overt ideological origins and 
assumptions of the field in an aura of naturalness and inevitability. After all, it might be 
said, how else should one respond to mass atrocities if not through the mechanisms of 
transitional justice? Thus, for many, the question is no longer whether transitional justice 
is needed in the wake of dictatorship or mass atrocity, but how it should be 
implemented.15 Implementation in turn implicates a transitional justice that has been 
institutionalized and mainstreamed, embraced by the United Nations, and buttressed by 
an emerging industry of international NGOs, expert consultants, dedicated staff positions 
at the United Nations, and academic journals.16  
 A similar trajectory can be seen in the history of post-conflict peacebuilding, itself 
born out of the same ideological and political currents associated with the end of the 
Cold War and the seeming triumph of Western liberal democracy. In particular, both 
transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding share a faith that the world can be 
fashioned by liberal ideas and institutions, and that weak, failing, and conflict-prone 
states—now conceptualized as threats to global security—can be relocated from a 
sphere of conflict to a sphere of peace through a process of political, social, and 
economic liberalization. The term “peacebuilding” came into the modern international 
lexicon and policyscape thanks in part to Boutros Boutros Ghali’s 1992 Agenda for 
Peace report, which defined the term as: “action to identify and support structures which 
will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict.”17 While 
this and other definitions are incredibly expansive, as implemented by the United 
Nations and major international donors, the term has come to stand for a fairly narrow 
and established checklist of programs and initiatives, including efforts to disarm 
previously warring parties, re-integrate former soldiers into society, demine and destroy 
weapons, reform the formal “security sector,” repatriate or resettle refugees, and various 
forms of democracy, governance, and rule of law assistance, including monitoring 
elections.18 As with transitional justice, post-conflict peacebuilding efforts have become 
normalized and institutionalized—evidence of which can be seen in the expanding 
number of peace operations that include robust peacebuilding components and the 
creation of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission in 2005—a seemingly natural 
and inevitable response to conflict and mass atrocities.19 After all, it might be thought, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Kieran McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice,” 
Journal of Law and Society 34, no. 4 (2007): 412. 
16 Laura Arriaza & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Social Reconstruction as Local Process,” International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 2 (2008): 152. 
17 United Nations, Agenda for Peace, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace Keeping, 
UN Doc A/47/277–S/24111 at 6, ¶ 21 (1992). 
18 See United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines 26 
(United Nations 2008), online at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf. 
19 Examples of more complex, multi-dimensional peace operations are not in short supply: 
Cambodia, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Chad, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Kosovo, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Timor-Leste, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, and Croatia, 
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how should the “international community” respond to violent intrastate conflict and civil 
war if not through these initiatives? 
 Despite the significant overlap in terms of origins and assumptions, there has been 
relatively little formal connection between transitional justice initiatives and the staples of 
post-conflict peacebuilding programming, either in theory or practice.20 In recent years, 
however, this has started to change and there is a small but growing literature looking at 
potential linkages between peacebuilding and transitional justice generally,21 and in 
particular with respect to specific initiatives like Security Sector Reform (SSR) and 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR).22 Embraced in a landmark 2004 
report by the Secretary General,23 the United Nations has developed a wealth of 
transitional justice experience over the last twenty years and has itself begun to 
elaborate policies to facilitate linkages with post-conflict peacebuilding.24 It has 
developed guidelines noting that approaches to transitional justice should take into 
account “the root causes of conflict or repressive rule,”25 an important addition to the 
individual accountability model that characterized many earlier transitional justice 
initiatives. At the same time, peacebuilding efforts have increasingly incorporated rule of 
law reform programming more generally,26 and a growing number of humanitarian and 
peacebuilding organizations are framing their efforts in ways that draw upon transitional 
justice discourse.27 If transitional justice has its own “toolbox,” said to include, among 
other things, prosecutions, truth telling, vetting and dismissals, and reparations, perhaps 
it can simply be subsumed into the larger post-conflict peacebuilding template. 
 The seeming gradual convergence of peacebuilding and transitional justice has led 
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Bryden and Heiner Hänggis, Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (Geneva: 
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), 209-10. 
21 See, for example, Chandra Lekha Sriram, Olga Martin-Ortega, and Johanna Herman, 
Evaluating and Comparing Strategies of Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice 13 (JAD-PbP 
Working Paper Series No 1, May 2009) (discussing increasing linkages between transitional 
justice and a broader set of peacebuilding activities) 
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Transitional Justice, March 2010, 7. 
26 Michael Schoiswohl, “What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Role of Law in Post-conflict 
Democratization and Its (Flawed) Assumptions,” in ed. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh Rethinking 
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to calls for better coordination to promote mutually shared goals.28 Yet there are also 
grounds for caution. It has been noted, for example, that transitional justice and 
peacebuilding initiatives such as DDR and SSR may at times work at cross-purposes.29 
But even where that is not the case, transitional justice may, much like liberal 
peacebuilding, occasionally serve to destabilize post-conflict societies that may be ill 
prepared for the forces that rapid political, social, and economic liberalization may 
unleash.30 Moreover, if both peacebuilding and transitional justice share much in 
common in terms of history, aspirations, and assumptions, they have also been dogged 
by parallel critiques, including, among other things, that they have been externally driven, 
being planned and implemented in a top-down state-centric manner that tends to 
marginalize local values and practices; and that they are presented as neutral and 
apolitical solutions to highly contestable questions.31 Greater convergence might well 
exacerbate some of the tendencies that have given rise to these critiques, not make 
them better.32  
 Thus, neither transitional justice nor peacebuilding should simply be accepted as 
unquestionably “good,” and it should not be assumed that conjugating transitional justice 
with peacebuilding will necessarily lead to greater “peace” or “justice” in the broader or 
even narrower senses of those terms. In considering the value of any emerging 
transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding narrative, we must therefore scrutinize potential 




B. “Transitional Justice as Peacebuilding”; Three Potential Assumptions  
 
i. “Transition” as Narrow Liberal Teleology  
 
The felt need to grapple with the moral, legal, and political dilemmas that arise in the 
aftermath of periods of intense repression and large scale human rights abuses, has, for 
the past several decades, been conceptualized through the lens of “transitions.” In the 
abstract at least, the “transition” of transitional justice connotes unspecified change. Yet 
for Ruti Teitel, who arguably coined the term “transitional justice” in 1991,33 the transition 
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Routledge, 2012), 48-50. 
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at issue is essentially a political one involving “the move from less to more democratic 
regimes.”34 This conceptualization of transition is hardly unique to Teitel, and indeed it 
can be said that liberal democratic transitions constitute the “paradigmatic transition” of 
transitional justice.35 Implicit in this understanding of transition is a sort of teleological or 
“stage theory” view of history.36 If barbarism, communism, and authoritarianism lie at one 
end of the narrative, then Western liberal democracy sits at the other “end of history.”37 
With law as the master discipline and lawyers as the high priests, the mechanisms of 
transitional justice become a sort of secular right of passage symbolizing political 
evolution.38  
 If we put to the side for one moment the problematic assumption that history tends 
towards definite ends—something that seems especially questionable given the rise of 
religious extremism and the resurgence of geopolitics, spheres of influence, and 
muscular authoritarianism39—one fundamental problem with this historic and narrow 
conception of transitions in transitional justice is that it is simply empirically inaccurate. 
The label “transitional justice” has for some time been applied to contexts that do not 
involve a liberal political transition (Rwanda, Chad, Uganda, Ethiopia) if they involve a 
political transition at all (Kenya, Colombia), or which involve transitions from one 
nominally liberal ethno regime to another (Cote d’Ivoire). Beyond illiberal transitions, the 
term has also been invoked to describe the use of truth commissions and other 
commissions of inquiry in consolidated liberal Western democracies (Australia, Canada). 
Taken together, these cases make clear that the mechanisms of transitional justice are 
not a one-way ratchet of liberal betterment, but can in fact be used to reinforce illiberal 
ideologies and to consolidate the power of illiberal regimes, just as they can be invoked 
in regimes that are decidedly liberal but which may be undergoing normative transitions 
with respect to historic injustices.40 In both liberal and illiberal contexts, the law and 
legalism associated with transitional justice may serve to obfuscate the very real power 
dynamics and contestable political choices at the heart of any set of transitional justice 
mechanisms. According to Hansen, scholarship has largely ignored the complexity and 
diversity of such patterns because of a deep-rooted assumption that transitional justice 
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is inherently “good.”41  
 Observing these trends, McAuliffe argues for the retention of a traditional and 
somewhat narrow understanding of “transitional justice” on the grounds that transitional 
justice mechanisms can best and most fairly be evaluated under the conditions of the 
classic paradigmatic liberal democratic transition.42 This argument is certainty buttressed 
by empirical data suggesting that transitional justice initiatives may have the largest 
positive impact in countries already well on the path to democracy.43 McAuliffe also 
worries that the range of contexts to which the term “transition” is being applied might be 
stretching the coherence of the term. Thus, taken together, McAuliffe suggests, we might 
want to make a distinction between paradigmatic transitional justice, understood in the 
context of liberal democratic transitions, and the mere use of transitional justice 
mechanisms “in societies which radically depart from the traditional type of transitions 
where it is most useful.”44 While not denying some of the cogency of these arguments, it 
can also be said that, rather than reserving the term “transitional justice” for a narrow 
subset of paradigmatic transitions where it might work optimally, what is needed is a 
better understanding of the ways in which transitional justice mechanisms function in a 
range of contexts, from the paradigmatic political transition to the normative and 
ideological transitions seen in consolidated democracies. Moreover, to the extent that 
the intelligibility of the term “transition” is being stretched by application to contexts other 
than that of the paradigmatic political transition, any incoherence depends in large 
measure on the extent to which the field remains intellectually wedded to an exclusively 
liberal and political understanding of that term. Thus, as developed below, there certainly 
are other and broader ways to conceptualize “transition” than a liberal political one.  
 Finally, one might also note that, for better or worse, the horse of a more 
expansive notion of transitional justice may be out of the proverbial barn. The current 
transitional justice moment is characterized precisely by a willingness to question and 
push back on the historical peripheries and paradigms of the field.45 Whether this 
expansion is due to resistance to the limitations of the narrow founding paradigm of 
transitional justice, or simply the result of an emerging industry that seems eager to 
make itself increasingly relevant to new contexts, the result is much the same: returning 
to a more narrow conception of applicable context and aspirations seems improbable.  
More pragmatically, what is needed is a (re)conceptualization of our understanding of 
transitions that captures the complex realities of an expanding field, while addressing 
some of the blindspots and limitations of the founding paradigm. 
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 One possible reason for the expansion and growth of transitional justice in 
situations far removed from the “third-wave” democratic transitions that helped to 
establish the original mold is an increasing tendency to see transitional justice as a tool 
for promoting not just democracy, but peace and human security in a more diverse 
range of contexts.46 This raises the question as to whether the transition of transitional 
justice might be better seen as a transition to peace, broadly understood, and perhaps 
specifically as a transition to “positive peace,”47 rather than something like liberal 
democracy, more narrowly understood. In considering such a (re)conceptualization, one 
must of course acknowledge that many have questioned the utility of the “transitions” 
lens altogether, irrespective of the imagined destination.48 Over the years, alternatives to 
the transitions paradigm have included “overcoming the past”49 and Rama Mani’s 
concept of “reparative justice,” a concept that is at once holistic, placing a greater 
emphasis on distributive justice and “root causes,” while also suggesting something 
permanent and incremental, rather than transitional, temporal, and incomplete.50 In a 
similar vein, Wendy Lambourne and, more recently, Paul Gready and Simon Robins 
have argued for the adoption of a “transformative justice” approach with a view to 
placing greater emphasis on, inter alia, structural violence and local agency as part of 
the transitional justice process.51 Each of these proposals has, in its own way, attempted 
to address some of the assumptions and limitations of the field’s foundational paradigm 
and has been anchored in the broader and more holistic conceptions of peace and 
peacebuilding associated with “positive peace.” In that sense, (re)conceptualizing the 
transition of transitional justice as a transition to positive peace is meant to build upon 
and draw together these various proposals rather than oppose or replace them, while 
expressing a particular and explicit consonance with a conception or transitional justice 
as a form of peacebuilding.  
 While a (re)conceptualization of the field to involve a transition to positive peace 
would of course retain the transitions lens and while peace is itself a teleological concept, 
it might nevertheless distinguish itself from the paradigmatic transition model insofar as 
all countries have gone through war and peace throughout history. In this sense, 
transitional justice as a transition to positive peace might come to suggest not a specific 
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destination, and not a project for the backward rest rather than the liberal West—a 
moment that occurs at “the end of history”—but something that all societies will need to 
revisit at multiple junctures. As (re)conceptualized, transitional justice would be as 
relevant to addressing historical injustices in consolidated democracies like Australia as 
it is to the immediate post-conflict context of Liberia or Sierra Leone.  
 Positive peace is inherently holistic, and a destination never fully arrived at. In this 
sense, it carries with it the potential to address issues relating to the narrowness of the 
paradigmatic transitions lens. As I discuss in the following sections, however, peace, and 
even “positive peace,” may be subject to narrow and limiting constructions. After all, 
liberal peacebuilding, with its shallow emphasis on free markets and democracy as the 
pathway to “peace,” reflects much more than a simple attempt to guarantee “negative 
peace,” understood as the absence of overt hostility. Liberal peacebuilders might rightly 
claim that they are working toward a sort of “positive peace.” Yet Galtung’s concept of 
positive peace would not stop there, and is intimately bound up with considerations of 
social and distributive justice that have been largely absent from mainstream practice in 
the fields of both peacebuilding and transitional justice.52 I explore these distinctions in 
greater detail in the following sections, including the necessity of conjugating positive 
peace with other concepts from critical peacebuilding theory.  
 
  
ii. “Justice” as Synonymous with Legal and Atrocity Justice 
 
If “transition” as narrow liberal teleology is a potentially problematic assumption in any 
emerging transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding paradigm, we must also consider the 
conceptualization of “justice” in any such narrative. As Nagy has noted, to speak of 
“justice” in times of transition begs the question: justice for what, justice for whom, and 
justice to what ends?53 Considered most expansively, “justice” could be understood as a 
broad social project and a condition in society. To “do justice” with such a conception in 
mind would likely involve a wide spectrum of efforts involving components of retributive, 
restorative, and distributive justice.54 Yet this holistic view of justice stands in contrast to 
a narrower human rights legalism often associated with transitional justice that has 
tended to see justice as a relationship to the state,55 has tended see “accountability” for 
mass atrocities as synonymous with individual accountability rather that a broader 
collective or institutional model, and which has imagined justice to be something that can, 
to some extent, be engineered and delivered through legal mechanisms and reforms. 
Seen through these more lawyerly optics, justice is primarily about rights, and not social 
welfare and well being per se. If this is the conception of justice animating the field, we 
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can then ask whether “transitional justice” is not just a simple byword for “law” or “legal 
justice.”56  
 While most would agree that transitional justice is no longer confined to a lawyer’s 
thinking and discourse,57 the field remains heavily anchored in a conception of justice 
that is close to synonymous with legalistic human rights and atrocity justice. This is not 
to say that highly legalized, rights-oriented approaches to transitional justice focusing on 
individual criminal responsibility are not valuable or that the advocates of such 
approaches are found only in the liberal West (on the contrary). Yet to conflate such 
approaches with what it means to “do justice” in times of transition without probing their 
potential blindspots and limitations would be highly problematic. Such dissection reveals 
that, consistent with the liberal ideology that has historically served to undergird the field, 
“doing justice” has tended to suggest addressing violations of physical integrity rights—
murder, rape, torture, and disappearances—and civil and political rights more generally. 
If these issues have occupied the foreground of traditional transitional justice concern, 
questions of economic violence (economic crimes, plunder of natural resources, 
economic and social rights violations)—to say nothing of broader conceptions of 
economic, social, and distributive justice—have been pushed to the periphery. They 
have tended to be relevant to the extent they provide useful context for helping us to 
understand why civil and political rights have been violated.58  
 If some lament the narrowness of the justice historically promoted by the field, 
others argue that to take a broader view of what it means to do justice in times of 
transition may be to overburden the field with an expansive concept of justice and sets of 
expectations upon which it cannot possibly deliver.59 Without doubt, justice in its fullest 
and most expansive sense must necessarily remain a broader concept than transitional 
justice.60 However, to the extent that questions of economic violence and distributive 
justice help to drive conflict, instability, and human rights abuses, their positioning at the 
periphery of transitional justice concern may ultimately be self-defeating. Thus, whatever 
the dividing line between abuses that will be addressed or go unaddressed by 
transitional justice mechanisms, it makes little sense to draw a simplistic one that reifies 
historic dichotomies of civil and political versus economic and social rights.61 
(Re)conceptualizing the transition of transitional justice as a transition to “positive peace,” 
which includes at its core a preoccupation with questions of resources and inequality, 
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could be one way of helping to ensure that a greater balance is struck between a wider 
range of justice concerns.62 Such a paradigm shift would not of itself render transitional 
justice indistinguishable from broader projects of development or necessarily dictate 
radical resource redistribution. More cautious approaches might, for example, focus on 
those patterns of economic violence with the greatest negative impact on economic and 
social rights, just as transitional justice prosecutions for violations of civil and political 
rights have tended to be relatively limited and selective.63 Much will depend on context, 
but whether issues of economic violence are addressed is a question largely bound up 
with practical and methodological challenges, not fundamental or structural 
impossibilities.64 
 There are increasing signs of a willingness to address the constructed invisibility of 
the economic in transitional justice. A small but growing literature has emerged 
questioning the marginalization of economic violence in the transitional justice context.65 
At the level of policy, the UN Secretary General has noted that transitional justice must 
seek to address violations of all rights, including economic and social rights.66 At the 
level of practice, an increasing number of truth commissions, including Chad, Ghana, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Kenya, and East Timor have examined questions of economic 
violence more squarely, even if their recommendations with regards to questions of 
economic violence have seldom been implemented.67 The trend is therefore a modest 
one, but it may at least help to shift the terrain of the debate from whether questions of 
economic violence should be addressed at all, to whether it makes sense to do so in 
view of the particular roots and drivers of the conflict in question, and how it might be 
done within the transitional justice context in ways cognizant of prevailing financial and 
temporal resource limitations.  
 While these are welcome developments, the longer-term viability of this trend may 
hinge, at least in part, on whether any emerging transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding 
narrative comes to be thought of broadly, grounded in what Galtung refers to as more 
“extended” understandings of both peace and violence.68 Such a narrative would provide 
a frame for both policy and action conducive to the strengthening of this trend. In 
contrast, a narrower transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding narrative that dovetails with the 
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liberal international peacebuilding project, a project that has historically been associated 
with neoliberal socioeconomic polices, would likely prove less so.  
 
 
iii. “Peacebuilding” as Synonymous with Liberal International Peacebuilding  
 
Any emerging transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding narrative begs the question of what 
we mean by “peace” and “peacebuilding” in the first place. During the Cold War at least, 
the concept of peace in the West was often seen as vaguely and suspiciously 
subversive, leftist, and political.69 With the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the 
Soviet Union, however, those associations began to ease and the concept has now 
forcefully entered the discourse and practices of policymakers accompanied by the tacit 
assumption that peace is an uncontested and non-ideological concept.70 In the last 25 
years, the United Nations Security Council has demonstrated an increasing willingness 
to intervene in conflict and post-conflict environments under the aegis of peace, at times 
giving liberalism and the concept of peace an aggressive face. 
 The minimalist peacekeeping activities of the Cold War have long given way to 
comparatively intrusive acts of peacebuilding. Thus, if the concept of “peace” was 
marshaled during the Cold War to support interposition of forces and the monitoring of 
ceasefires—efforts predicated in large part on neutrality, consent, and minimum force—
the peace operations of the last 25 years (as seen in East Timor, Kosovo, and Liberia, 
for example) have involved intensive involvement in social, political, and economic 
questions that would have once been considered exclusive “sovereign” or “internal” 
affairs. Such efforts have included drafting new laws and constitutions, monitoring and 
certifying elections, and helping to run or reform various institutions of governance in 
ways that can only be likened to neo-trusteeship.71  
 From a legal standpoint, the shift has been reflected in the increasing use of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, where the use of force is permitted in the name of peace 
(as seen in Cote d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and does not 
require the consent of the host state.72 Parallels of this willingness to go so far as to 
wage war in the name of peace can also be seen in concepts of “humanitarian 
intervention,” which has been given a new lease on life in the post-Cold War context, 
and its sibling, the so-called “responsibility to protect.”73 Through these shifts in both 
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norm development and practice, sovereignty is rendered increasingly permeable and 
conditional, and the distinction between waging war and making peace elided.74 Taken 
together, concepts of peace and peacebuilding in the post Cold War world have become 
critical tools of global governance,75 helping to construct, reproduce, and maintain a 
particular vision of order predicated on political, social, and economic liberalization. 
Together with transitional justice initiatives, international peacebuilding has become one 
of the ways in which liberal values—including political and economic relations—are 
projected globally, from the core to the periphery, and a new world order enforced.76   
 As a global project, liberal international peacebuilding has been subjected to 
serious and sustained critique. As with all critiques, there is a danger of painting with too 
broad a brush, homogenizing diversity and difference.77 Yet even with that caveat, the 
contours of these critiques are worth bearing in mind when we ask what the particular 
“peacebuilding” in any emerging transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding narrative should 
mean. At its core, liberal international peacebuilding has tended to see peace through a 
narrow, reductionist lens, with economic and political liberalization—free markets and 
Western style democracy—as the unique pathway to peace.78 The assumption is 
therefore that key liberal goods necessarily bring peace and not the other way around, or 
some other way. The problem is that this simplistic formula has a rather rocky track 
record, having worked well except for when it has not. Thus, for example, the rush to 
democracy did not bring peace in Angola, Bosnia, or Afghanistan. Rapid market 
liberalization has proven similarly destabilizing, having created huge dislocations in the 
former Soviet block, not to mention the economic violence that flowed from structural 
adjustment programs of the 1980s and 90s.  
 The realization that rapid liberalization may be destabilizing led to a chastened 
liberal peacebuilding paradigm that places greater emphasis on institution building—
reform of the security and judicial sectors, for example—as a prelude to greater 
liberalization.79 Programming modeled on this “institutionalization before liberalization” 
critique tends to focus almost exclusively on building formal, national-level liberal 
institutions required for the Western, Weberian state and its centralized monopoly on the 
use of force. Thus, while key national-level institutions of the state are showered with the 
attention and dollars of international reformers, the everyday security and needs that 
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ordinary people need to survive—housing, water, jobs, electricity—are often 
shortchanged. This focus on central state institutions seems to assume that 
peacebuilding and statebuilding are essentially one and the same,80 and that institutions 
induce liberalism rather than the other way around, or some other way.  
 For many if not most critics of the liberal international peacebuilding model, the 
problem is not that human rights, the rule of law, good governance, democracy or other 
key liberal goods are themselves undesirable. One need not therefore jettison liberalism 
itself; many aspects of the ideology are invaluable. Indeed, many of the critiques of 
liberal peacebuilding are themselves reflective of decidedly liberal principles.81 Thus, 
there are certainly readings of the liberal tradition that would give greater weight to local 
autonomy, participation, and decision making, to everyday needs and distributive justice, 
and which would reflect greater contextual openness and adaptability—principles which 
would go a long way to addressing the various critiques leveled against liberal 
international peacebuilding. Much of the frustration therefore stems from the 
reductionism, chauvinism, and arrogance of a narrow liberal international peacebuilding 
model that tends to privilege certain forms of expertise and knowledge, has too often 
been associated with exogenous imposition, and which tends not to question its own 
blindspots, assumptions, and checkered history. The goal, therefore, is to question the 
assumption that liberal democracy and capitalism—as they have been narrowly and 
simplistically understood—are somehow a unique pathway to grappling with legacies of 
violent conflict, and to strip the liberal international peacebuilding project of its sense of 
naturalness and inevitability, of the illusion that it somehow represents an escape from 
politics and ideology.  
 
 
C. Critical Peacebuilding Theory 
 
 If liberal peacebuilding is therefore a dubious foundation for any emerging 
transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding narrative, a key challenge has been that scholars 
have tended to be long on critique and short on concrete alternatives. At the end of the 
day, the liberal international peacebuilding model remains mainstream and dominant, 
and there is no rival competing paradigm. That said, even if they do not provide a 
comprehensive solution, there are concepts from critical peacebuilding theory that can 
serve as possible correctives to help address some of the more problematic aspects of 
the narrow liberal international peacebuilding model that has been the subject of such 
sustained critique. As will be evident, these concepts are overlapping and mutually 
supportive, perhaps lacking sharp edges and crispness, but this does not diminish their 
importance or utility.   
 Several concepts from critical peacebuilding theory call for a shift in perspective—
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a reprioritization of emphasis and resources from the state and its core security 
institutions to the needs of communities and individuals—and an increased emphasis on 
understanding and generating local legitimacy. Together, they serve to envision a 
peacebuilding process that goes well beyond the state-centric liberal international 
peacebuilding paradigm with its comparative emphasis on elections, restored courts, 
and re-trained and re-equipped security forces, etc. David Roberts, for example, invokes 
the concept of “popular peace” to emphasize the need for greater focus on everyday 
problems faced by ordinary individuals and communities as part of the peacebuilding 
process:  social services delivery; economic and social rights; basic needs such as 
shelter, clean water, sanitation, electricity, jobs; and human security.82 If liberal 
international peacebuilding tends to reflect a paradigm of peacebuilding as top-down, 
institutional engineering, or “trickle-down” peace,83 Roberts argues that attention to local 
needs is key to generating a desperately needed sense of legitimacy for both local 
government and international peacebuilding initiatives in the post-conflict context, which 
can in turn serve as a key to macro-level stability and peace.84 This shift in emphasis 
offered by the concept of “popular peace” therefore involves a broader imagining of 
security and peace, one which “trickles up” from micro to macro rather than the other 
way around.85  
 The concept of “popular peace” is helpfully understood in tandem with the concept 
of “the everyday” found in critical peacebuilding scholarship.86 In contrast to the 
dominant liberal peace paradigm, an “everyday peace” is one “in which a population’s 
preferences are recognized . . . beyond narrow liberal confines.”87 As many scholars and 
observers have noted, the sense that peacebuilding processes are remote or irrelevant 
to the everyday lives, preferences, and social reality of the very individuals those 
processes are ostensibly intended to benefit may spark resistance,88 leading those 
affected by these programs to attempt to reconfigure them “so that they begin to reflect 
their own everyday lives rather than structural attempts at assimilation.”89 Thus, 
peacebuilding processes that ignore the lived realities and needs of “the everyday” in the 
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post-conflict context risk generating needless and counterproductive friction and struggle.  
 If concepts such as “the everyday” and “popular peace” call for a shift in focus and 
perspective, the concept of “hybridity” provides an additional layer of complexity and 
critique, asking us to think about the intricate interaction between top-down and bottom-
up forces and processes in liberal international peacebuilding. Hybridity calls upon us to 
consider the ways in which peacebuilding initiatives are made and remade through a 
complex cocktail of local resistance, cooptation, and appropriation.90 Thus, it suggests 
that peacebuilding does not involve a dynamic of external actors introducing new ideas 
and practices to static local societies,91 but is in practice a “glocal” phenomenon.92 
Hybridity presents itself more as a description of the messy, awkward, and complex 
nature of internationally driven peacebuilding, of the heterogeneity and diversity in 
societies, than a conscious policy aim.93 In this way, the concept of hybridity allows us to 
assess the prominence of liberalism in both peacebuilding and transitional justice without 
collapsing into a stereotype of an all encompassing ideological behemoth;94 to stand in a 
place where we neither romanticize the local, nor demonize the hegemonic, liberal 
West.95 Taken together, hybridity helps to shift the focus in peacebuilding from efficiency 
to the need to generate a sense of local legitimacy that has often been sorely lacking.96 
Thus, like the concept of “the everyday,” and “popular peace,” understanding the reality 
of hybridity calls upon us to move away from solely elite-level analysis—from the state 
and its institutions—and to take the roles and needs of non-elites seriously.  
 
D. Critical Peacebuilding Theory and Transitional Justice 
 
Given the parallel origins, ideological assumptions, and critiques of both liberal 
international peacebuilding and transitional justice, it would be dangerous to assume that 
“transitional justice as peacebuilding” will come to reflect more holistic rather than more 
reductive concepts of peacebuilding. Thus, longstanding critiques relating to the 
inaccessibility, neo-colonial undertones, and inappropriateness97 of transitional justice to 
local wants and needs are unlikely to be addressed unless greater thought is given to 
the particular kind of peace and peacebuilding with which transitional justice should be 
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associated: whether a kind of emancipatory peace resonant with critical peacebuilding 
theory ideals of “positive peace,” “the everyday” and “popular peace,” or a more 
classically narrow and reductionist (neo)liberal one. To the extent that there are 
emerging efforts to seek greater complementarity between the staples of liberal 
international peacebuilding programming and initiatives associated with transitional 
justice, building linkages and programming with a cognizance of the parallel critiques 
that have historically dogged both fields would also be an important step.98 
 Viewed in their ensemble, the concepts discussed throughout this article—
including “positive peace,” “the everyday,” “popular peace,” and “hybridity”—ask us to re-
consider the priorities and praxis of both peacebuilding and transitional justice and 
provide a useful prism for helping to imagine what more emancipatory transitional-
justice-as-peacebuilding might entail. Their key value may be as a set of constructs or 
guiding principles that can help to facilitate an important perceptual and attitudinal shift. 
Thus, while not presented here as a panacea to the realities of narrow liberal 
international peacebuilding or the parallel problems that have bedeviled transitional 
justice, they at least call for greater attention to historic blindspots and assumptions and 
might be a first step in moving liberal international peacebuilding and transitional justice 
in the direction of greater pluralism, contextualism, and global-local balance, bringing 
some of the historic peripheries of the field into the foreground: 
 
Historic Foreground Historic Background99 
the global, the Western 
the modern, the secular 
the legal 
civil and political rights  
physical violence 
the state, the individual 
formal, institutional, “top-down” change 
the local, the non-Western “other” 
the traditional, the religious  
the political 
economic and social rights 
economic violence 
the community, the group 
informal, cultural, social, “bottom-up” change 
 
 If the historic foreground remains important to the work of transitional justice, 
neither is it obvious that peace and justice are best advanced by heavily privileging 
those items while pushing others to the margins. Thus, while concepts from critical 
peacebuilding theory do not themselves provide a “roadmap” for negotiating the many 
complex questions, choices, and tradeoffs involved in striking a better balance between 
historic foreground and background, the shift in perspective they afford, together with the 
emphasis on the need for multiple levels of legitimacy, suggest that they offer a starting 
point for thinking, policy, and action that stands in refreshing contrast to the 
preoccupation in the earlier years of the field of transitional justice with elite bargains and 
decision making.100 Taken together, they allow us to imagine a world where those 
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developing transitional justice programming and policy ask themselves, at the outset, 
how those items traditionally pushed to the margins might be given genuine importance, 
value, and where needed, priority. It is thought provoking to imagine, for example, what 
a transitional justice process might look like that did not privilege international “expertise” 
at the expense of local agency; nation or capital-based justice at the expense of 
community and rural based justice; largely Western legal modes of justice at the 
expense of “traditional” or “local” modalities of justice; the prosecution of the so-called 
“big-fish” at the expense of a focus on reparations and community needs; and physical 
violence and civil and political rights at the expense of economic violence and economic 
and social rights.101 We have as yet few empirical examples of such “alternative” 
transitional justice approaches, though the Fambul Tok project in Sierra Leone, with its 
emphasis on community-based reconciliation grounded in traditional ritual and practice, 
provides an intriguing, if occasionally flawed, example.102 
 Perhaps less ambitiously, concepts of “positive peace,” “popular peace,” “the 
everyday,” and “hybridity” might at least work together to serve as a sort of bulwark 
against the slide towards expediency that would continue to privilege the historical 
foreground of transitional justice work, answering sustained critique with only superficial 
appropriation. After all, even important themes evolving out of the critical studies 
literature like “participation” and “local ownership” intended to address some of the 
longstanding critiques of transitional justice and peacebuilding practice are easily co-
opted by international institutions and donors who would turn them into a sort of 
ritualized mantra devoid of substance.103 The concepts from critical peacebuilding theory 
discussed in this article are then a reminder that we must resist these gravitational 
forces by continually asking whose peace (or whose justice) we are building, based on 





If transitional justice is gradually moving beyond the peace versus justice debates of the 
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past to be seen as a critical component of peacebuilding itself, the import of any future 
transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding narrative will hinge to a large extent on our 
understanding of concepts of “transition,” “justice,” and “peacebuilding.” The potential 
assumptions I have outlined above with regard to these three concepts are not meant to 
be exhaustive. And while those assumptions have been painted with a fairly broad brush 
both due to reasons of space and to illustrate a point more vividly, it seems probable that 
they will in some form help to color our understanding of transitional justice as a form of 
peacebuilding going forward. This is especially true in a world where transitional justice 
and liberal peacebuilding have been mainstreamed and institutionalized, where the 
centripetal pull of dominant and mainstream practice is strong.105  
 Even so, there are emancipatory concepts of peace and peacebuilding that carry 
with them the potential to challenge longstanding blindspots and assumptions and to 
increase the possibility of a transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding project that is true to 
human rights ideals while becoming more open-textured and attuned to local needs and 
context. To these ends, I have argued that thinking of the transition of transitional justice 
as a transition to “positive peace” where the perspectives of “popular peace,” “the 
everyday” and “hybridity” are paramount could be an important step in helping to 
emancipate the field from the bonds of the paradigmatic transition and serve to resist a 
simple elision of transitional justice and liberal international peacebuilding.  
 Some have worried that thinking of transitional justice more expansively (perhaps 
even along the lines suggested by this article) will somehow overburden the field—
jeopardizing even the narrow aims of combatting impunity for violations of physical 
integrity, for example.106 The goal, however, is not to conflate transitional justice with 
social justice writ large or with the greater peacebuilding enterprise itself. Rather, by 
carefully considering and deconstructing assumptions implicit in the narratives of the 
field, both historic and emerging, it may be possible to liberate policymaking from narrow 
pathways and paradigms that may stymie creativity and thinking, and possibly 
underserve the goal of the consolidation of a long-term, robust, and positive peace. 
 There is therefore a strong need for greater critical theoretical and empirical 
attention to the links between transitional justice, peace, and peacebuilding that take us 
beyond the “no peace without justice” debates and sloganeering of the past, and which 
build upon the work of pioneering scholars.107 To be clear, the claim is not that these 
ideas and questions cannot and have not been arrived at by constructs outside of critical 
peacebuilding theory. Indeed, critiques developed by transitional justice scholars and 
peacebuilding scholars, working in at-times “splendid isolation,” are often remarkably 
similar.108 At the same time, the concepts from critical peacebuilding theory discussed in 
this article carry with them special salience in a world where transitional justice is 
increasingly seen as part and parcel of the international peacebuilding enterprise. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 See Roland Paris, “Understanding the ‘Coordination Problem’ in Postwar Statebuilding,” in 
Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the 
Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations 62 (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
106 Lars Waldorf, “Anticipating the Past,” 171-86. 
107 See works cited note 3, supra.  
108 Dustin Sharp, “Beyond the Post-Conflict Checklist,” 178-85.  
	   167	  
Greater collaboration by scholars in both areas would be welcome, and thinking in each 
area could serve as a source of insight and inspiration for the other.109 This article has 
only sketched a few brief ideas in this regard as an attempt to stimulate further thinking 
and debate. The hope is that careful introspection and collaboration along these lines 
could lead to a conceptualization of “transitional justice as peacebuilding” that might 
serve to loosen moorings in the most rigid and narrow templates of Western liberalism, 




















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Compare, for example, Goetschel & Hagmann, “Civilian Peacebuilding: Peace by Bureaucratic 
Means?” and Rubli, “Transitional Justice: Justice by Bureaucratic Means?” 
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Some thirty years after it burst upon the world stage, transitional justice has become the 
“globally dominant lens”1 through which we grapple with legacies of violence and mass 
atrocity. That lens has not been an apolitical, acultural, or non-ideological one, being 
most accurately viewed as a fairly narrow liberal prism. Indeed, the idea of transitional 
justice as handmaiden to liberal political transitions—the “paradigmatic transition” of 
transitional justice—remains a deeply embedded narrative in thinking, policy, and 
practice today. However, that the contours of transitional justice have been shaped by 
the light cast from that liberal prism is not itself, without more, an indictment of 
transitional justice. Key to our understanding of transitional justice and its possible future 
is a critical examination of the implications of the narratives and assumptions 
undergirding transitional justice, both historic and those possibly emerging.  
 Parts I and II of this dissertation sought to explore the ways in which the liberal 
optics of transitional justice practice, policy, and study have served to shape our sense 
of what it means to “do justice” in times of transition. I have argued that these optics 
contributed, at least in part, to some of the blindspots and frictions associated with 
transitional justice initiatives today, helping to push certain questions and modalities of 
justice into the foreground, while relegating others to the background of transitional 
justice concern: 
 
Set in the Foreground Set in the Background2 
the global, the Western 
the modern, the secular 
the legal 
civil and political rights  
physical violence 
the state, the individual 
formal, institutional, “top-down” change 
the local, the non-Western “other” 
the religious, the traditional 
the political 
economic and social rights 
economic and structural violence 
the community, the group 
informal, cultural, social, “bottom-up” change 
 
In exploring just a few of the historic peripheries of the field in Parts I and II, I have 
argued that there is nothing particularly natural or inevitable about the privilege, 
dominance, and marginalization reflected in the chart above; nor is it obvious that 
objectives of peace and justice can best be achieved in all contexts by emphasizing the 
foreground at the expense of the background. I have also argued that while a narrow 
and perhaps neoliberal understanding of liberal traditions has contributed to this 
backgrounding and foregrounding, it may be possible to recover from liberalism itself 
some of the keys to striking a better balance. Thus, for example, in Part I, I have argued 
that the field’s engagement with questions of “the local” and the “non-Western” has been 
both complex and clumsy, fraught with frictions and contradictions. Transitional justice 
has tended to privilege largely Western approaches to and understandings of what it 
means to “do justice.” Yet the choice going forward is not a simple one between vigorous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Paul Gready and Simon Robins, “From Transition to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for 
Practice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice (2014) (Advance Access). 
2 Chart adapted from, Dustin Sharp, “Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition,” 15. 
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localism and strongly assertive liberal internationalism. Rather, the dilemmas of “the 
local” reveal competing liberal principles and commitments that need to be balanced. In 
and of itself, there is nothing particularly illiberal, for example, in giving greater weight to 
local autonomy, participation, and decision making. If taken seriously, principles of 
pluralism and concepts like the “margin of appreciation” worked out in historically liberal 
societies would also go a long way towards generating transitional justice practice 
reflective of greater contextual openness and adaptability. As I argue in Chapter I, giving 
life to such principles means moving beyond invocations of near empty signifiers such as 
“local ownership,” and requires us to deconstruct and disaggregate what we mean by 
those terms.  I have proposed that understanding concepts like “local ownership” across 
multiple dimensions of “control,” “process,” and “substance” would be a useful construct 
for striking a better global-local balance in the transitional justice context and beyond. In 
sum, the clash between the global and the local, or between the Western and the non-
Western in transitional justice may therefore flow in large part from a narrow and 
arrogant version of the liberal tradition associated with the 1990s and the triumphal spirit 
of the “end of history” that has come to undergird so many aspects of liberal post-conflict 
governance in recent decades. 
 In Part II of this dissertation, I sought to reinforce arguments made in Part I, 
exploring the ways in which narrow liberal understandings of what it means to do justice 
in times of transitional have served to marginalize questions of economic violence and 
economic justice in the post conflict context. Yet, much like the dilemmas of the local, 
recovery of more accommodating strands of the liberal tradition could go a long way 
towards rectifying this blindspot. Thus, there are certainly threads of the liberal tradition 
that would pay greater attention to everyday needs, economic and social rights, and 
questions of distributive justice even if they have not characterized liberal post-conflict 
governance since the end of the Cold War.  
I have made two particular arguments that contribute to the transitional justice 
literature in this area. First, I have suggested that the paradigmatic transition of 
transitional justice, with its implicit narrow assumptions that liberal democracy and free 
markets are the unique pathway to peace, might not be the best foundation for a more 
contextually sensitive and relevant transitional justice project. As an alternative, I have 
offered the concept from critical peacebuilding theory of “positive peace,” rooted as it is 
in the need to address questions of economic and structural violence, as a potentially 
useful construct in moving the transitional justice debate forward. Second, I have argued 
against the misconception in some of the literature that addressing questions of 
economic violence will of itself over-stretch the resources and intellectual coherency of 
the field. There are potentially narrow and broad approaches to questions of economic 
violence, just as there are narrow and broad approaches to redressing violations of 
physical integrity. I have offered the construct of the “economic violence—human rights 
violations” nexus as one way of disciplining and rendering manageable the inquiry.  
 If rather narrow understandings of liberalism undergirding the “paradigmatic 
transition” associated with the birth of the field have proven problematic—resulting in 
some of the blindspots, frictions, and contradictions discussed in Parts I and II—the 
questions then turns to alternative narratives and groundings for transitional justice going 
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forward. In recent years, the view of transitional justice as handmaiden to liberal political 
transitions has begun to give way to a somewhat looser view of transitional justice as a 
component of post-conflict peacebuilding more generally. The confluence of the frictions 
and critiques developed in Parts I and II, together with the emerging narrative of 
“transitional justice as peacebuilding” therefore led me to the central research question 
of this dissertation:  might a (re)conceptualization of the field of transitional justice 
around frames of peace and peacebuilding help to address longstanding critiques and 
limitations of the field and, at the same time, serve as useful tool for re-orienting theory 
and practice in ways more reflective of a genuinely pluralistic and global project? 
Drawing on the work done in Parts I and II, I attempted to answer this question in Part III. 
In short, I answered with a very qualified “yes,” but the results cannot be taken for 
granted.  
Indeed, as I argued in Part III, there are many reasons to be wary of an increasing 
association between transitional justice and peacebuilding. These fears are legitimated 
when we consider the striking parallel critiques that have been leveled against both 
peacebuilding and transitional justice since the end of the Cold War:  that they are too 
often externally driven, being planned and implemented in a top-down and state-centric 
manner; that they are biased toward Western approaches, giving too little attention to 
local or indigenous peace and justice traditions; that they are presented as technocratic, 
neutral, and apolitical solutions to highly contested or contestable political issues and 
choices, etc. Thus, as I argue in Chapter IV, promotion of synergies between transitional 
justice and peacebuilding must first begin with a firm understanding of these critiques. 
Without this, it seems probable that greater coordination between the two will only 
exacerbate the tendencies that gave rise to the critiques rather than mitigate them. And 
yet, it might also be possible to coordinate “through the lens” of critique, giving rise to 
new and innovative transitional justice and peacebuilding programs. To illustrate this 
point, I explored ways in which DDR and transitional justice programs might be 
coordinated through the lens of critique.    
Second, in considering the ever-closer alignment of peacebuilding and transitional 
justice, we must be aware that historically, the “peace” associated with international 
post-conflict peacebuilding efforts spearheaded by the United Nations and major 
(Western) international donors has typically been conceived of as a narrow liberal peace 
predicated on free markets and Western-style democracy. Thus, one might well ask 
whether the “peacebuilding” promoted by the “international community” and the historic 
goals of transitional justice might not be one and the same. Even with that very 
significant caveat, I have argued that there are also emancipatory concepts of peace 
and peacebuilding that carry with them the potential to challenge longstanding blindspots 
and assumptions and to increase the possibility of a transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding 
narrative that is true to human rights ideals while becoming more open-textured and 
attuned to local needs and context. Preventing simple elision of transitional justice and 
liberal international peacebuilding—and working toward a more emancipatory 
conception of transitional justice-as-peacebuilding in the process—can be facilitated in 
part through the use of several constructs from critical peacebuilding theory:  positive 
peace, the everyday, popular peace, and hybridity. While they do not themselves create 
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a program for action, these constructs, together with an effort to remember that 
liberalism is indeed a big tent capable of accommodating a great diversity of ideas and 




Proposals for Future Consideration 
 
This dissertation has sought to explore but a few of the historic peripheries and 
dichotomies of the field of transitional justice, and has done so at a fairly high level of 
generality. That inquiry has at times been broad brush and superficial. More specific and 
detailed work is needed in the future, and it is hoped that this dissertation provides a 
number of points of departure in this regard.  
First, just as this dissertation has sought to unpack and explore historic 
peripheries of “the local” and “the economic,” there is a need to interrogate further 
peripheries and blindspots of both transitional justice and peacebuilding. Referencing the 
chart above revels that I have done little to explore, for example, the marginalization of 
concepts of “the religious” and “the community” in liberal post-conflict governance. 
These are projects that I or other scholars might find worthwhile in the future. 
Second, I have analyzed how we might begin to work through some of the 
frictions arising out of such historic dichotomies at a time when the field is in a state of 
normative ferment, when some of its foundational assumptions appear to be in question, 
and when the historic narratives undergirding the field may be evolving. I have sketched 
several ideas to help shape an alternative transitional justice narrative, but much more 
could be done to put flesh on the bones of those ideas. This dissertation has been 
written largely in a “critical studies” tradition, seeking to explore and understand some of 
the implications of the implicit and explicit ideologies and politics associated with liberal-
post conflict governance, without at the same time providing a blueprint for change. Thus, 
much can and should be done to help develop these ideas in the direction of concrete 
policy and action.  
Finally, at a time when transitional justice is increasingly seen as a component of 
peacebuilding in a diverse range of contexts, there is a need for greater critical 
theoretical and empirical attention to the links between transitional justice, peace, and 
peacebuilding that take us beyond the “no peace without justice” debates and 
sloganeering of the past. Greater collaboration by scholars in both areas would be 
welcome, and thinking in each area could serve as a source of insight and inspiration for 
the other. To date, peacebuilding and transitional justice scholars have too often worked 
in “splendid isolation.” It is hoped that this work, together with work other scholars mining 
similar veins, will be an important step in breaking down those siloes.   




What does it mean to “do justice” in times of transition? Justice for what, justice for 
whom, and to what ends? Attempts to answer these and other related questions have 
often aroused debate: from antiquity, to the so-called “third wave” of democratic 
transitions in the 1980s and 90s up through the present day. While “justice” may be an  
elusive and essentially contested concept deeply rooted in context-specific history and 
culture, increasingly, “doing justice” in the wake of large-scale human rights violations 
has become inseparable from the field of “transitional justice.” Such is the dominance of 
the mainstream transitional justice paradigm today that, in practice, the question is 
increasingly not whether there will be some kind of transitional justice in the aftermath of 
conflict, but how various components of the transitional justice “toolbox” will be 
implemented.  
If the growth and trajectory of transitional justice discourse and practice has been 
seen in some quarters an unalloyed “good thing,” it has also been accompanied by 
fierce resistance and persistent frictions, leading some to question the future of the field 
and call for its re-examination. Such examination makes clear that the core narratives 
and preoccupations of the field contain something of a contradiction. Transitional justice 
is at times imagined as a post-political and post-ideological enterprise, part of “the end of 
history,” and yet is also heavily associated with liberal and neoliberal democratic political 
transitions and has been dominated by largely Western conceptions and modalities of 
justice. Though increasingly implicit, the idea of transitional justice as handmaiden to 
liberal political transitions—the “paradigmatic transition” of transitional justice—remains a 
deeply embedded narrative that continues to shape thinking, policy, and practice today. 
Together with post-conflict peacebuilding, transitional justice has, since the end of the 
Cold War, become an important feature of liberal post-conflict governance, a means by 
which Western liberal values are pushed from core to periphery. 
While the narratives undergirding and shaping the field have had many positive 
dimensions, they have also served to limit and constrain the transitional justice 
enterprise in various ways. For example, they have heavily shaped the modalities of 
transitional justice (approaches that are generally state-centered, top-down, privileging 
the global over the local). In addition, they have served to limit our sense of what the 
“justice” of transitional justice should reasonably include (generally addressing civil and 
political rights rather than economic and social rights, physical violence rather than 
questions of economic or structural violence). In short, transitional justice theory and 
practice have typically failed to reflect the complex depth and pluralism of the many 
varied notions of justice across the globe, and this may ultimately hinder the emergence 
of a truly global project, where “global” is not simply a byword for “western” or “liberal.” In 
this light, there is a strong need to revisit and deconstruct the field’s core normative 
metanarratives, blindspots and assumptions as a prelude to seeking a more 
emancipatory ground for transitional justice policy and practice that is true to human 
rights ideals while becoming more open-textured and attuned to local needs and context.  
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In recent years, the view of transitional justice as handmaiden to liberal political 
transitions has begun to give way to a somewhat looser view of transitional justice as a 
component of post-conflict peacebuilding more generally. One can therefore ask 
whether the emerging transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding narrative is likely to address 
the aforementioned historic blindspots and tensions. To the extent that “peace” invokes 
more holistic sets of objectives than the narrower goals associated with facilitating liberal 
political transitions, the turn to peacebuilding might be seen to represent a broadening 
and a loosening of earlier paradigms and moorings, making this a significant moment in 
the normative evolution of the field. At the same time, given the parallel critiques that 
have been leveled against both peacebuilding and transitional justice since the end of 
the Cold War, there are reasons to be wary of this increasing association. Historically, 
the “peace” associated with international post-conflict peacebuilding efforts spearheaded 
by the United Nations and major international donors has typically been conceived of as 
a narrow liberal peace predicated on free markets and Western-style democracy. Thus, 
insofar as the goals of liberal international peacebuilding and the historic goals of 
transitional justice are essentially one and the same, without more, “transitional justice 
as peacebuilding” may be little more than a dressed up tautology. 
Yet there are also emancipatory concepts of peace and peacebuilding that carry 
with them the potential to challenge longstanding blindspots and assumptions and to 
increase the possibility of a less rigid transitional-justice-as-peacebuilding narrative. 
Preventing simple elision of transitional justice and liberal international peacebuilding—
and working toward a more emancipatory conception of transitional justice-as-
peacebuilding in the process—can be facilitated in part through the use of several 
constructs from critical peacebuilding theory: positive peace, the everyday, popular 
peace, and hybridity. While they do not themselves create a program for action, these 
constructs offer a very useful starting point for reimagining transitional justice going 
forward.  
Finally, principles of pluralism and concepts like the “margin of appreciation” 
worked out in historically liberal societies can be useful constructs in generating new 
transitional justice practice reflective of greater contextual openness and adaptability. 
Thus, if an arrogant, aggressive and narrow liberalism has historically been part of the 
problem in transitional justice, some of the solutions to modern-day transitional justice 
dilemmas might also be recovered from the broader liberal tradition.  
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Nederlandse Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
Transitional Justice en Liberaal Post-Conflict Bestuur 
Synergieën en symmetrieën, wrijvingen en tegenstrijdigheden 
 
Door Dustin Nachise Sharp 
 
Wat betekent het om “gerechtigheid te brengen” in een overgangsperiode? 
Gerechtigheid voor wat, gerechtigheid voor wie, en met welk doel? Pogingen om deze 
en andere, gerelateerde, vragen te beantwoorden hebben vaak geleid tot discussie: 
sinds de oudheid, tijdens de zogeheten “derde golf” van democratische overgangen in 
de jaren ’80 en ’90 en heden ten dage nog steeds. Hoewel “gerechtigheid” een vaag en 
wezenlijk betwist concept is dat sterk gebonden is aan de specifieke geschiedenis en 
cultuur in een bepaalde context, wordt “gerechtigheid brengen” in de nasleep van 
grootschalige mensenrechtenschendingen steeds meer gezien als een onafscheidelijk 
deel van “transitional justice”. Het mainstream paradigma van transitional justice is 
tegenwoordig zo dominant dat de vraag niet langer is of er een vorm van transitional 
justice zal plaatsvinden in de nasleep van een conflict, maar hoe verschillende 
componenten van de transitional justice “toolbox” geïmplementeerd zullen worden. 
In bepaalde kringen wordt de groei en het traject van het transitional justice 
discours en de implementatie ervan in de praktijk gezien als een onbetwist “goede zaak”. 
Het gaat echter ook gepaard met felle weerstand en aanhoudende wrijvingen, wat 
sommigen ertoe leidt de toekomst van dit veld in vraag te stellen en op te roepen tot een 
herziening ervan. Nader onderzoek onthult dat de centrale uitgangspunten en 
bekommernissen van het domein in zekere mate tegenstrijdig zijn. Transitional justice 
wordt soms voorgesteld als een post-politieke en post-ideologische onderneming, 
onderdeel van “het einde van de geschiedenis”, en toch wordt het sterk geassocieerd 
met liberale en neoliberale democratische politieke overgangen en wordt het sterk 
gedomineerd door voornamelijk westerse opvattingen en modaliteiten van gerechtigheid. 
Hoewel in toenemende mate impliciet, het idee van transitional justice als de knecht van 
liberale politieke overgangen – de “paradigmatische overgang” van transitional justice – 
blijft een diep verankerde visie die nog steeds het denken, beleid en de praktijk 
vormgeeft. Samen met post-conflict vredesopbouw is transitional justice sinds het einde 
van de Koude Oorlog een belangrijk aspect van liberaal post-conflict bestuur geworden, 
een middel waarmee westerse liberale waarden vanuit de kernstaten verspreid worden 
over de periferie.  
Hoewel de uitgangspunten die het domein schragen en vormgeven veel positieve 
dimensies gehad hebben, hebben ze ook gediend om de transitional justice 
onderneming op verschillende manieren te beperken en te belemmeren. Zo hebben zij 
bijvoorbeeld de modaliteiten van transitional justice sterk vormgegeven (benaderingen 
die in het algemeen gericht zijn op de staat, van bovenaf opgelegd worden en globaal 
bevoorrechten boven lokaal). Daarenboven hebben ze gediend tot het begrenzen van 
ons aanvoelen van wat de “gerechtigheid” of “justice” van transitional justice 
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redelijkerwijs zou moeten omvatten (in het algemeen is het gericht op burgerlijke en 
politieke rechten eerder dan op economische en sociale rechten, op fysiek geweld 
eerder dan op economisch en structureel geweld). Kortom, de theorie en praktijk van 
transitional justice falen doorgaans de complexe diepte en het pluralisme van de vele, 
verschillende invullingen van het begrip gerechtigheid in de wereld te weerspiegelen en 
dit kan uiteindelijk het ontstaan van een werkelijk globaal project verhinderen, waar 
“globaal” niet synoniem is met “westers” of “liberaal”. In dit licht is er een grote behoefte 
aan een herziening van het domein en moeten we de centrale normatieve meta-
verhalen, de blinde vlekken en de uitgangspunten van het domein deconstrueren als 
een aanloop tot de emancipatie van transitional justice met een beleid en praktijk die 
trouw zijn aan mensenrechtenidealen en tegelijkertijd een meer toegankelijke structuur 
krijgen en meer afgestemd worden op de lokale noden en context.  
In recente jaren is de visie op transitional justice als de knecht van liberale 
politieke overgangen beginnen wijken voor een enigszins lossere visie op transitional 
justice als een meer algemene component van post-conflict vredesopbouw. Men kan 
zich daarom afvragen of het aannemelijk is dat het opkomende transitional-justice-als-
vredesopbouw discours de bovenvermelde historische blinde vlekken en spanningen zal 
aanpakken. In de mate dat “vrede” een meer alomvattend geheel van doelen oproept 
dan de meer beperkte doelstellingen die geassocieerd worden met het bevorderen van 
liberale politieke overgangen, kan de wending naar vredesopbouw gezien worden als 
een verruiming en een versoepeling van de eerdere paradigma’s en pijlers, wat dit een 
belangrijk moment maakt in de normatieve evolutie van het domein. Tegelijkertijd zijn er 
redenen om terughoudend te zijn tegenover deze toenemende associatie, gezien de 
parallelle kritiek die geuit wordt op zowel vredesopbouw als transitional justice sinds het 
einde van de Koude Oorlog. De “vrede” die geassocieerd wordt met internationale 
inspanningen voor post-conflict vredesopbouw en aangevoerd wordt door de Verenigde 
Naties en grote internationale donoren werd in het verleden doorgaans opgevat als een 
nauwe liberale vrede gebaseerd op vrije markt en democratie in westerse stijl. In de 
mate dat de doelen van liberale internationale vredesopbouw en de historische doelen 
van transitional justice wezenlijk een en dezelfde zijn, is “transitional justice als 
vredesopbouw”, zonder meer, dus waarschijnlijk weinig meer dan een opgesmukte 
tautologie. 
Er zijn echter ook emancipatoire concepten van vrede en vredesopbouw die 
potentieel hebben om de aloude blinde vlekken en uitgangspunten uit te dagen en die 
meer mogelijkheid bieden voor een minder stug transitional-justice-als-vredesopbouw 
discours. Het voorkomen van het simpelweg samensmelten van transitional justice en 
liberale internationale vredesopbouw – en het werken naar een meer geëmancipeerd 
concept van transitional-justice-als-vredesopbouw in dat proces – kan vergemakkelijkt 
worden door het gebruiken van verschillende constructies van de kritische 
vredesopbouwtheorie: positieve vrede, het alledaagse, vrede voor het volk, en hybriditeit. 
Hoewel deze constructies zelf geen programma voor actie creëren bieden ze een 
bruikbaar beginpunt om transitional justice te herzien. 
Ten slotte kunnen beginselen van pluralisme en concepten zoals de 
“beoordelingsmarge”, ontwikkeld in historisch liberale maatschappijen, bruikbare 
	   179	  
constructies zijn om een nieuwe transitional justice praktijk te genereren die getuigt van 
een grotere openheid voor de context en van aanpassingsvermogen. Kortom, als een 
arrogant, agressief en eng liberalisme doorheen de geschiedenis deel is geweest van 
het probleem in transitional justice, dan kunnen een aantal van de oplossingen voor de 
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